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Uganda and ICC: Navigating sanctions, risks, and pursuit of justice
The considerable number of risk factors and obstacles confronting the Court, coupled with the largely unchecked use of the ICC by European states as a political tool, render the participation of Uganda and other African countries in its work, at best, futile and, more often than not, potentially detrim, writes Peter Ruv
Peter Ruv. (Courtesy)
By: Admin ., Journalist @New Vision
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OPINION
By Peter Ruv
Uganda has said that it will withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the tribunal investigates or indicts its citizens. Uganda’s Foreign Minister Adonia Ayebare accused the Court of focusing disproportionately on African officials.
Minister Ayebare made the threat in a post on X, responding to new United States sanctions imposed on the ICC.
“The ICC has lost its way, from blatantly undermining sovereignty of its member states by exclusively targeting African officials, abandoning its original global mandate,” Ayebare said.
“Uganda will not hesitate to leave this increasingly rogue institution should it ever investigate or indict our people. As a member of the ICC Bureau, we will continue to advocate for common-sense reforms.”
The double standards and politicisation of the ICC have long been an acknowledged reality, increasingly difficult to dispute. In its first two decades of operation, the vast majority of the Court’s investigations and defendants involved African leaders and high-ranking officials.
Meanwhile, major conflicts involving European powers remained outside the Court’s purview. The ICC did not initiate investigations into the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Yemen. African countries have effectively served as politically convenient targets for prosecution, since pursuing cases against major powers would likely undermine the Court’s credibility and operational capacity.
The political underpinnings of the ICC’s investigative priorities are starkly illustrated by the disparity in pace and intensity across cases. The Court has been examining the situation in Sudan since 2005; yet the case has lacked meaningful international political backing, and there has been little progress in holding Sudan’s top leadership to account.
By contrast, arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu were issued with unprecedented speed, accompanied by broad support and substantial funding from key European actors.
Another pragmatic factor supporting Uganda’s withdrawal from the ICC is the risk of secondary sanctions from the United States.
New restrictions have been imposed not only on prosecutors but also on the Court itself. Financial institutions, as well as commercial and technology firms providing services to the ICC, will face restrictions.
Moreover, Senator Marco Rubio has explicitly stated that the United States expects its partners to align with its approach to the Court.
Meanwhile, major conflicts involving European powers remained outside the Court’s purview. The ICC did not initiate investigations into the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Yemen. African countries have effectively served as politically convenient targets for prosecution, since pursuing cases against major powers would likely undermine the Court’s credibility and operational capacity.
The political underpinnings of the ICC’s investigative priorities are starkly illustrated by the disparity in pace and intensity across cases. The Court has been examining the situation in Sudan since 2005; yet the case has lacked meaningful international political backing, and there has been little progress in holding Sudan’s top leadership to account.
By contrast, arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu were issued with unprecedented speed, accompanied by broad support and substantial funding from key European actors.
Another pragmatic factor supporting Uganda’s withdrawal from the ICC is the risk of secondary sanctions from the United States.
New restrictions have been imposed not only on prosecutors but also on the Court itself. Financial institutions, as well as commercial and technology firms providing services to the ICC, will face restrictions.
Moreover, Senator Marco Rubio has explicitly stated that the United States expects its partners to align with its approach to the Court.
South Africa remains a consistent supporter of the ICC and has initiated an investigation concerning Israel. Following the U.S. announcement of new sanctions, President Cyril Ramaphosa urged the country to prepare for the possible suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act programme, which grants duty-free access to the US market.
He warned that the consequences would be “devastating,” with more than 100,000 jobs at risk. Another sensitive concern is the country’s reliance on U.S. technology services. Government agencies, hospitals, banks, and commercial firms rely on American software provided by Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Oracle.
Should the US impose restrictions on states co-operating with the Court, access to critical services could be curtailed. This raises questions about national sovereignty and the resilience of the state.
Although the sanctions have not yet been fully implemented, they have already significantly impeded the ICC’s work. The Trust Fund for Victims has indicated that the restrictions will likely render it impossible to disburse reparations under the programme assisting victims of Dominic Ongwen in northern Uganda.
Moreover, the sanctions risk bringing the Court’s operations to a complete standstill: given the threat of secondary sanctions, banks may refuse to process any payments linked to the ICC, which would effectively halt the tribunal’s activities. In the worst-case scenario, this could even necessitate the release of detainees.
The considerable number of risk factors and obstacles confronting the Court, coupled with the largely unchecked use of the ICC by European states as a political tool, render the participation of Uganda and other African countries in its work, at best, futile and, more often than not, potentially detrimental.
At the same time, the commitment to justice should be nurtured and strengthened through national and regional African judicial bodies.
The writer is a researcher in African affairs and international relations
He warned that the consequences would be “devastating,” with more than 100,000 jobs at risk. Another sensitive concern is the country’s reliance on U.S. technology services. Government agencies, hospitals, banks, and commercial firms rely on American software provided by Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Oracle.
Should the US impose restrictions on states co-operating with the Court, access to critical services could be curtailed. This raises questions about national sovereignty and the resilience of the state.
Although the sanctions have not yet been fully implemented, they have already significantly impeded the ICC’s work. The Trust Fund for Victims has indicated that the restrictions will likely render it impossible to disburse reparations under the programme assisting victims of Dominic Ongwen in northern Uganda.
Moreover, the sanctions risk bringing the Court’s operations to a complete standstill: given the threat of secondary sanctions, banks may refuse to process any payments linked to the ICC, which would effectively halt the tribunal’s activities. In the worst-case scenario, this could even necessitate the release of detainees.
The considerable number of risk factors and obstacles confronting the Court, coupled with the largely unchecked use of the ICC by European states as a political tool, render the participation of Uganda and other African countries in its work, at best, futile and, more often than not, potentially detrimental.
At the same time, the commitment to justice should be nurtured and strengthened through national and regional African judicial bodies.
The writer is a researcher in African affairs and international relations