Digital Number Plates: Fix the Flaws, Preserve the Gains

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Uganda’s Digital Number Plate Project has come under weeks of parliamentary scrutiny over its cost, implementation, production capacity and security capabilities. The scrutiny is legitimate. Parliament has a responsibility to hold government and contractors accountable for public expenditure and the delivery of promised services.

However, recent developments have provided fresh evidence about the system’s security capabilities.

The Ministry of Works and Transport told Parliament that the average waiting time for fitting digital number plates in Kampala had fallen from 19 days in December 2025 to two days in September 2026. Police also reported that 337 of 375 stolen motor vehicles had been tracked and recovered, representing a recovery rate of about 90%.

On October 2, members of Parliament’s Committee on Physical Infrastructure visited the Police Command Centre in Naguru to assess the system firsthand. Rather than relying solely on a prepared demonstration, the MPs brought vehicles fitted with digital number plates and asked Police to locate them.

The system displayed the vehicles’ locations. Following the demonstration, committee chairperson Mwine Mpaka acknowledged that the technology could track vehicles.

“Yes, indeed, we have established that cars and motorbikes can be tracked,” Mpaka said, adding that digital number plates were important and that attention should now turn to improving the system.

The demonstration provided practical evidence that the tracking function works. However, questions about the project’s cost, implementation and overall performance remain matters for Parliament to examine.

The Inspector General of Police, Abas Byakagaba

The Inspector General of Police, Abas Byakagaba, has also defended the system, saying: “The system is working, and it is giving us solutions in our investigation.”

The project should also be considered in the context of its original purpose. President Yoweri Museveni called for electronic vehicle identification and tracking as part of efforts to strengthen national security and improve law enforcement agencies’ capacity to investigate crime.

Digital number plates are therefore more than a vehicle registration initiative. They form part of a wider security system intended to make it harder for criminals to use forged or interchangeable number plates and easier for security agencies to identify and trace vehicles linked to crime.

Police have reported recovering hundreds of stolen motor vehicles through the system. However, the reported recovery figures for motorcycles are considerably lower, underscoring the need to examine the technology’s effectiveness across different categories of vehicles.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether the project has shortcomings. It is also how those shortcomings can be addressed without losing the security capabilities the system is intended to provide.

THE COST OF THE PLATES

The debate over the project has increasingly centred on one figure: sh714,300, the reported charge for a digital number plate package.

The central issue is whether the fee is justified by the cost of supplying and operating the system, and whether motorists are receiving value for money.

A cost breakdown presented during the parliamentary inquiry put the direct cost of delivering one kit at approximately sh630,000, leaving a difference of about sh80,000 between that estimate and the fee charged.

According to the breakdown, the onboard tracking device costs about sh350,000, two Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacons about sh130,000, and the number plates approximately sh74,000.

Labour, equipment, materials, premises, taxes and other operating expenses add to the total cost. On these estimates, the physical plates account for only about 12% of the cost of the complete kit.

However, the figures and the justification for the charge require careful scrutiny. The difference between the stated fee and the estimated direct cost should not automatically be treated as the contractor’s profit, nor should the cost breakdown be regarded as conclusive without verification of the underlying figures and contractual obligations.

The wider inquiry must establish the full cost of the project, how the fee was determined, what the contractor is required to deliver and whether the arrangement offers value for money.

MORE THAN A NUMBER PLATE

The Digital Number Plate Project is not simply about manufacturing and installing registration plates. It is part of an integrated vehicle identification and monitoring system intended to support law enforcement, improve vehicle traceability and strengthen Uganda’s security infrastructure.

The project involves data centres, servers, tracking technology, software, production facilities, a Police Command Centre and personnel training.

Beyond its security objectives, the initiative has implications for local manufacturing, technical skills development, employment and government revenue.

The project is reported to have paid more than sh48b in taxes in Uganda since 2023, placing it among the country’s significant taxpayers. More than 300 Ugandans are also said to be directly employed in local production, with additional jobs supported through related operations.

These contributions are relevant when assessing the project’s overall value. However, they should be considered alongside the cost to motorists, the terms of the contract, the quality of service and the sustainability of the system.

LESSONS FROM THE SGS

Uganda has faced a similar dilemma before.

In 2015, the Government contracted Swiss company SGS to establish mandatory vehicle inspection facilities intended to identify mechanically unsafe vehicles and improve road safety.

Parliament suspended the programme in 2017 and ordered investigations into the contract. Disputes followed before the Government eventually terminated the arrangement.

The financial consequences were significant. The Government later agreed to pay SGS about sh109.857b in a settlement covering assets, losses and related claims, while taking over seven inspection stations established by the company.

Yet terminating the contract did not eliminate the need that had prompted the programme in the first place. Uganda still needed a system for inspecting vehicles to ensure they were roadworthy.

The SGS experience offers a lesson for policymakers: ending a project does not automatically resolve the problem it was intended to address. Depending on the contractual terms, termination can also expose taxpayers to substantial costs.

That does not mean a project should continue regardless of its shortcomings. Rather, the decision to terminate, renegotiate or reform an arrangement should be based on evidence, the public interest and a clear assessment of the alternatives.

FIX WEAKNESSES, KEEP GAINS

Uganda’s Digital Number Plate Project has faced legitimate questions about costs, delays, accountability and implementation. Parliament should pursue those questions until the outstanding issues are resolved.

At the same time, the inquiry has produced evidence of the system’s tracking capabilities. Police have reported the recovery of hundreds of stolen motor vehicles, the Ministry of Works and Transport has reported shorter waiting times for fitting the plates, and MPs have witnessed the tracking technology in operation.

The project also represents an existing investment in security infrastructure, local production, employment and government revenue.

The next stage of scrutiny should therefore go beyond identifying shortcomings. It should establish the true cost of the system, assess its performance, examine the contractual arrangements and determine how identified weaknesses can be corrected.

If the project is delivering security benefits, those benefits should be measured and weighed against its costs. If there are failures, they should be addressed and those responsible held accountable.

Uganda should not have to choose between parliamentary accountability and an effective national security system. It should demand both.