Western Sahara and crisis of decolonisation in shadow of MINURSO
The Sahrawi people have waited for more than three decades since MINURSO was established, yet the promised referendum on Western Sahara’s future has never taken place. Any changes to the mission must protect their right to self-determination rather than allow geopolitical interests to predetermine the outcome, writes Duncan Dickson Dyogo
Duncan Dickson Dyogo. (File)
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OPINION
By Duncan Dickson Dyogo
A Governance and International Relations professional, Peace and Conflict Researcher, with expertise in African integration, migration, humanitarian affairs and peacebuilding.
In my previous article, Resolutions on Western Sahara Must Reflect Law, Not Just Leverage, I argued that the future of Western Sahara must not be determined solely by the diplomatic influence of powerful states. Developments at the United Nations in October 2026 have made this concern even more urgent. The question is no longer simply whether the international community will renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO); it is whether the mission established to facilitate decolonisation could be fundamentally transformed before the Sahrawi people have exercised the right to self-determination that the international process was intended to protect.
Two documents dated 20 and 22 October 2026 bring this question into sharp focus. A zero draft of a proposed Security Council resolution, dated 20 October and circulated by the United States as penholder according to a subsequent letter from the Frente POLISARIO, proposes renaming MINURSO, ending its peacekeeping mandate and transitioning it into a special political mission. It also proposes making Morocco’s expanded autonomy proposal the sole framework for negotiations and declares autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty the only feasible solution.
In a letter dated 22 October 2026 to the President of the United Nations Security Council, the Frente POLISARIO raised serious objections to the proposed direction. It argued that the draft departed from the principles of international law underpinning Western Sahara’s status as a decolonisation question and warned that adoption without substantive changes could lead it to disengage from the peace process.
These documents do not establish that the proposed measures have been adopted. They do, however, reveal a critical moment for the future of the territory, the credibility of the United Nations and the ability of the Sahrawi people to participate meaningfully in determining their political future. The international community must therefore examine not only what is being proposed, but also the legal principles, institutional responsibilities and human consequences involved.
Western Sahara Remains an Unfinished Decolonisation Question
The history of Western Sahara demonstrates why the dispute cannot be reduced to a disagreement over territorial administration. The United Nations placed the territory on its list of Non Self Governing Territories in 1963. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted on 14 December 1960, had already established the international framework for ending colonial domination and affirming the right of peoples to self-determination.
On 16 December 1965, General Assembly Resolution 2072 (XX) called upon Spain, the administering Power, to take the necessary measures to liberate Western Sahara from colonial domination. The question was therefore formally recognised within the United Nations decolonisation framework long before the creation of MINURSO.
On 16 October 1975, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on Western Sahara. The Court found that the territory was not terra nullius at the time of Spanish colonisation. It acknowledged certain historical ties involving Morocco and the Mauritanian entity, but concluded that the evidence did not establish territorial sovereignty by either that would displace the application of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people of the territory.
The opinion remains central to understanding the legal framework. It did not determine that Western Sahara had already become an independent sovereign state. Nor did it establish Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. Instead, it confirmed that the historical ties examined by the Court did not remove the requirement to apply the principle of self-determination.Spain, Morocco and Mauritania concluded the Madrid Accords in November 1975. Spain subsequently ended its presence in the territory in 1976. The accords did not themselves confer internationally recognised sovereignty over Western Sahara on Morocco or Mauritania, nor could they extinguish the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination.
On 27 February 1976, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic(SADR) was proclaimed. It subsequently became a member of the Organisation of African Unity in 1982, the organisation that preceded the African Union. Its international recognition remains contested, and Morocco rejects its claim to statehood. Nevertheless, the SADR’s institutions and membership of the African Union form part of the political and diplomatic reality that any credible account of Western Sahara must acknowledge.The territory therefore presents an unresolved question of decolonisation with implications for sovereignty, statehood, regional security and international law. Its future cannot credibly be settled by treating the outcome as predetermined before the Sahrawi people have had a free and meaningful opportunity to determine it.
The Human Cost of a Process that has Lasted More than Three Decades
On 29 April 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 690, establishing MINURSO in accordance with the United Nations and Organisation of African Unity settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. The mission was created to monitor the ceasefire and help implement a settlement that included a referendum through which the people of Western Sahara would choose their political future.That referendum has never taken place.
The passage of time is itself a central part of the story. By October 2026, more than thirty five years had passed since the establishment of MINURSO. Sahrawi generations have grown up amid displacement, political uncertainty and the absence of a definitive settlement. Refugees in the Tindouf camps continue to depend on meagre humanitarian assistance, while Sahrawis living in the territory face the consequences of a dispute whose final political status remains unresolved.
In November 2020, the ceasefire underpinning the United Nations process broke down. The resulting security environment has made an already difficult political process more fragile. The mission has continued monitoring developments, but its presence has not restored the original settlement framework or delivered the referendum for which it was established.
The consequences cannot be measured only through Security Council meetings, diplomatic statements or annual mandate renewals. They must also be understood through the years of uncertainty experienced by ordinary people, the opportunities lost by younger generations and the continuing inability of the international process to deliver its central promise.
This is why the future of MINURSO is so consequential. A mission can continue to provide useful monitoring and international engagement while simultaneously failing to fulfil its founding political purpose. If its mandate is transformed without a credible path to self-determination, the international community risks replacing an unfinished decolonisation process with an indefinite system for managing its consequences.
What the October 2026 Zero Draft Proposes
The zero draft dated 20 October 2026 sets out changes that would substantially alter the identity, functions and future of the United Nations presence in Western Sahara. These proposals must be understood in their proper procedural context. A zero draft is a negotiating document, not an adopted resolution. Its provisions are proposed measures and do not become binding Security Council decisions merely because a penholder circulates them.Nevertheless, the document deserves serious public scrutiny because its proposals are specific and far reaching.
First, it proposes renaming the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara as the United Nations Mission for Western Sahara, changing the acronym from MINURSO to MINUSO. Removing the word referendum from the mission’s name would be more than a cosmetic adjustment. It would symbolically distance the mission from the original electoral purpose that gave it its identity.
Second, the draft proposes ending the mission’s peacekeeping mandate on 30 April 2027 and continuing its presence as a special political mission from 1 May until 31 October 2027. It directs a phased reduction of the uniformed component, including a reduction of at least 50 per cent of authorised uniformed personnel by 31 January 2027, alongside the closure and consolidation of team sites.
Third, it requests detailed proposals from the Secretary General by 15 December 2026 on the future mission’s mandate, structure, staffing and resources. Those proposals would address reporting, mine action, support for the political process and the possible reuse of existing support structures.
Fifth, the draft calls for consultation with a broad range of Sahrawi constituencies, including people in the territory, refugee camps and the diaspora. This provision is significant because it recognises the need to hear from Sahrawis beyond the immediate negotiating parties. However, consultation is not equivalent to a free and genuine exercise of self-determination. The critical question is whether Sahrawis would be able to shape the available political outcomes or would be consulted within a framework whose final result had already been predetermined.
Finally, the draft proposes completing the registration of the refugee population in the Tindouf area within six months, under the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and in accordance with international refugee law and established standards.Taken together, these proposals would change the mission’s name, reduce its military presence, end its peacekeeping mandate and define a narrower negotiating framework. They would therefore require close examination of their legal implications, practical consequences and effect on the credibility of the decolonisation process.
The Frente POLISARIO’s Warning and the Risk to the Peace Process
In its letter dated 22 October 2026 to the President of the Security Council, the Frente POLISARIO argued that the zero draft represented a dangerous departure from the legal principles underpinning Western Sahara as a question of decolonisation. It maintained that the Security Council’s framework must be understood through the entirety of its relevant resolutions rather than through Resolution 2797 (2025) alone.
The letter also emphasised that MINURSO was established under Resolution 690 (1991) following a mutually accepted settlement framework involving Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. According to the letter, changing the mission unilaterally to align it with one party’s position would undermine the basis on which the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity had pursued a settlement.
The Frente POLISARIO further argued that the failure to implement commitments under the settlement plan could not justify infringement of the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination. It objected to a negotiating framework that would predetermine the outcome and stated that it would not accept a solution imposed against the will of the Sahrawi people.
The letter warned that, if the zero draft were adopted without substantive and meaningful changes, the Frente POLISARIO would have no choice but to disengage from the peace process as a whole.This warning should not be misrepresented as an accomplished withdrawal. It is a stated position conditional on the draft’s eventual treatment by the Security Council. However, it is a serious indication of the risk that the proposed changes could undermine trust between the parties and weaken participation in the United Nations led process.
A credible political process requires more than the continued existence of negotiations. It requires confidence that the process is fair, that the parties’ commitments matter and that the outcome has not been fixed in advance. If one party believes that the framework has been fundamentally altered without meaningful agreement, the prospects for a durable settlement may deteriorate.
The Security Council should therefore consider the potential consequences of adopting the proposed changes without substantive engagement with the legal and political concerns raised. The objective should be to preserve a credible route to peace and self-determination, not simply to secure the administrative transition of an international mission.
The Poisoned Chalice of MINURSO
MINURSO was created as a mechanism to help implement a settlement and organise a referendum. Its continued presence has provided international monitoring and a point of reference for diplomacy. Yet after more than three decades without a referendum, the mission’s future raises a difficult institutional question.
The mission risks becoming a poisoned chalice when its presence is presented as evidence of progress while its defining political objective remains unfulfilled. The proposed transition to a special political mission could deepen this problem if it removes peacekeeping functions without establishing a clear and credible route to self-determination.
The issue is not that peacekeeping must continue indefinitely or that a mission’s structure can never change. United Nations missions must be reviewed when circumstances change, and their resources should be used responsibly. The issue is whether reform is being designed around a clear political objective that is consistent with international law, or whether the institutional form is being changed while the underlying dispute remains unresolved.
If the mission’s referendum identity is removed, the uniformed component substantially reduced and the negotiating framework narrowed, the Security Council must explain how these changes would protect the rights of the Sahrawi people, prevent further deterioration in security and sustain a credible political process. It must also explain what safeguards would prevent the transition from becoming an irreversible retreat from the original purpose of the mission.Without clear answers, the proposed transformation could create the appearance of administrative efficiency while weakening the international framework through which decolonisation was supposed to be achieved.
The Legal Status of the SADR and the Right to Self-Determination
The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s claim to statehood must be discussed carefully and accurately. The SADR maintains political institutions, has received recognition from a number of states and is a member of the African Union. Its status is disputed, and not all states recognise it as an independent sovereign state. Morocco rejects its claim and maintains that Western Sahara should remain under Moroccan sovereignty with autonomy.
The legal question of statehood is related to, but distinct from, the right of a people to self-determination. The commonly cited Montevideo Convention of 1933 identifies a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states as criteria associated with statehood. These criteria are important in international legal analysis, but they do not operate as a simple checklist that automatically resolves every disputed claim. Recognition, effective governance, territorial circumstances and the broader rules of international law are also relevant.
For Western Sahara, the essential point is that disagreement over the SADR’s international status does not remove the territory from the United Nations decolonisation framework. Nor does it extinguish the Sahrawi people’s right to determine their political future.The International Court of Justice’s 1975 advisory opinion did not establish Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Rather, it concluded that the historical ties examined by the Court did not displace the application of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people of the territory.
Accordingly, a transparent decolonisation process must allow the political future of Western Sahara to be determined through a credible process that respects the relevant legal principles. It must not confuse the diplomatic strength of a state, the number of countries supporting a proposal or the negotiating preferences of powerful states with the freely expressed will of the people concerned.
The Need for a Settlement that Addresses Fundamental Needs
The Positions, Interests and Needs (PIN) model provides a useful way to understand the conflict and evaluate the proposed transition of MINURSO.Morocco’s stated position supports sovereignty over Western Sahara with autonomy for the territory. Its interests include territorial integrity as it defines it, security, regional influence and political stability. The Sahrawi people, represented in the negotiations by the Frente POLISARIO, seek self-determination and maintain that independence must remain a possible outcome. Their underlying needs include political agency, dignity, security, recognition and the ability to determine their collective future.
Algeria has consistently supported the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination and the role of the Frente POLISARIO in the process. Mauritania has interests in regional stability and avoiding renewed conflict. The United States and other external actors have their own interests in security, diplomatic relationships and regional stability.These interests are relevant to the negotiations, but they are not interchangeable. The strategic interests of powerful states cannot substitute for the fundamental rights of the population whose future is at stake.
A sustainable settlement must address the needs beneath the parties’ positions. If negotiations are confined to a single predetermined framework, the process may be unable to establish whether the proposed outcome is freely accepted by the people concerned. Conversely, a process that allows credible participation, addresses security concerns and protects political choice has a stronger basis for building trust.
The PIN model does not dictate a particular final status. It demonstrates why a settlement is unlikely to be durable if it ignores the needs for dignity, consent, security and legitimate political representation. The question confronting the Security Council is therefore whether the proposed changes to MINURSO would create conditions for those needs to be addressed or constrain the process before they have been resolved.
Western Sahara is an African decolonisation question with implications for the credibility of continental institutions. The African Union should therefore have a meaningful role in discussions about the future of MINURSO and the wider political process. The African Union’s Peace and Security Council should not be reduced to a body that comments after decisive arrangements have already been negotiated elsewhere. African ownership requires participation in defining the problem, assessing the implications of proposed changes and contributing to the diplomatic process. This does not mean that the African Union can replace the Security Council’s formal responsibilities. It means that the United Nations should make meaningful use of the relevant regional institution and its experience.
The principle of African solutions to African problems must have practical meaning. It cannot simply require African leaders to manage the consequences of decisions primarily shaped by powerful states. It should involve structured African participation in discussions about the legal status of the territory, the mission’s future mandate, the security environment and the conditions necessary for a credible exercise of self-determination. African solidarity must also remain principled. It should not require automatic endorsement of every position advanced by an African government or political movement. Rather, it should rest on the consistent application of international law, the protection of human dignity and the right of peoples to determine their future.
A meaningful African contribution could include formal consultations between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations, a clear opportunity for African perspectives to be considered before major mandate changes, and regular reporting on how proposed reforms would affect the decolonisation process. It should also include engagement with Sahrawi voices across the territory, refugee camps and diaspora, with attention to whether their views can genuinely influence the outcome. The proposed zero draft’s call for broader Sahrawi consultations is a potentially important element. Its value, however, will depend on how the consultations are conducted, whose voices are included, whether they are safe and meaningful, and whether their findings can influence the negotiating framework. Consultation must not become a procedural substitute for self-determination.
Transparency, Accountability and the Danger of Double Standards
The Western Sahara question raises a broader challenge for the international system. The principles of self-determination, territorial integrity and decolonisation must be applied through careful legal analysis rather than selective political convenience. Different conflicts have different histories and legal circumstances, but those differences should be explained transparently.
A Security Council penholder plays an important role in drafting and negotiating resolutions. That role does not confer exclusive authority to determine the political future of a territory. The penholder’s proposals should be open to scrutiny by Council members, relevant regional institutions, the parties and the wider international community. The October 2026 zero draft makes this issue particularly important. A proposal to remove the word referendum from the mission’s name, terminate its peacekeeping mandate and designate autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the only feasible solution should be accompanied by a clear explanation of how these measures would remain consistent with the broader legal framework for decolonisation.
The Security Council should also explain how it would preserve the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination if the negotiating framework is narrowed to a single outcome. If the proposed transition is intended to improve the process, its expected benefits, risks, safeguards and consequences should be made clear. Transparency is not an obstacle to diplomacy. It is a condition for public confidence in diplomacy. The people affected by the conflict, the governments that contribute to international decisions and the wider public should be able to distinguish between established facts, proposals under negotiation, contested interpretations and decisions formally adopted by the United Nations.
The long chronology is difficult to ignore. Western Sahara was placed on the United Nations list of Non Self Governing Territories in 1963. The International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion in 1975. MINURSO was established in 1991. The ceasefire broke down in 2020. Resolution 2797 was adopted in 2025, and a new mandate decision is due before the end of October 2026. More than six decades after its inclusion on the decolonisation list, the territory’s final status remains unresolved.For the Sahrawi people, these dates represent more than institutional history. They reflect a prolonged period in which the international community has recognised the question but failed to complete the process intended to resolve it. The world must ask whether the next decision will bring the process closer to a credible outcome or further entrench its postponement.
What a Credible Process Should Require
The United Nations Security Council should not treat the renewal or transformation of MINURSO as a purely administrative decision. The mission’s future should be assessed against clear principles and practical safeguards.First, the Council should reaffirm the relevance of the full body of United Nations decisions concerning Western Sahara and the territory’s continuing status as a decolonisation question.
Second, any change to the mission’s name, structure or functions should be accompanied by a transparent explanation of how the change advances a credible political settlement and protects the right to self-determination.
Third, the negotiating framework should not be presented as having already settled the final status of the territory. Proposals may be discussed, amended or considered by the parties, but the right of the Sahrawi people to determine their future must remain meaningful rather than merely rhetorical.
Fourth, the proposed transition should be assessed for its security consequences. If the uniformed component is reduced and peacekeeping ends, the Council should explain how monitoring, reporting, mine action and prevention of escalation would be sustained.
Fifth, consultations with Sahrawi constituencies should be independent, inclusive and meaningful. Their purpose should be to hear and reflect the views of the people concerned, not simply to demonstrate that consultations occurred.
Sixth, the African Union and its Peace and Security Council should have a substantive opportunity to contribute to discussions about the mission’s future and the political process.
Finally, the United Nations should make the relevant drafts, decisions, strategic assessments and implementation reports accessible to the public wherever possible. Public awareness should be based on verifiable documents rather than unsubstantiated claims or the mistaken presentation of a draft as an adopted resolution. These measures would not prejudge the final outcome. They would strengthen the transparency and credibility of the process through which the outcome is pursued.
In conclusion, the developments of October 2026 have placed Western Sahara at a critical point. The zero draft dated 20 October proposes renaming MINURSO, ending its peacekeeping mandate on 30 April 2027, transitioning it into a special political mission and making Morocco’s autonomy proposal the only framework for negotiations.
The Frente POLISARIO’s letter of 22 October warns that adoption without meaningful changes could lead it to disengage from the peace process. These remain proposals and stated positions, not proof that the Security Council has adopted the proposed changes.
Nevertheless, their implications demand serious public attention. The international community must decide whether changes to MINURSO will strengthen a credible route to decolonisation or risk institutionalising a process in which the original promise of self-determination becomes increasingly distant.
The Sahrawi people have waited for more than three decades since MINURSO was established and for more than six decades since Western Sahara was placed on the United Nations list of Non Self Governing Territories. Their future must not be treated as an administrative detail in a mandate renewal or a secondary consideration in negotiations shaped by powerful states.
The United States can play a role in facilitating negotiations, and Morocco’s autonomy proposal can be discussed as a political proposal. Neither fact removes the need for a process consistent with international law, meaningful participation by the people concerned and a credible means of determining their future. The same standard must apply to all parties and all influential states.
MINURSO should not become a poisoned chalice through which the international community maintains the appearance of engagement while the underlying decolonisation question remains unresolved. Its reform, if undertaken, must be accompanied by transparent safeguards, meaningful Sahrawi participation, accountable reporting and a clear explanation of how the mission’s future will contribute to a just and lasting settlement.
With all that in sight, African solidarity must be more than a declaration. It must be expressed through meaningful participation by African institutions, principled diplomacy and a commitment to applying international law consistently. The African Union and the wider international community should insist that the future of Western Sahara is not determined solely by geopolitical leverage.
African civil society, legal scholars, diplomats, journalists and regional institutions all have a role in ensuring that the debate remains informed by facts and the principles of decolonisation. The question is not simply whether MINURSO will continue under a different name. It is whether the international community will preserve a credible process through which the Sahrawi people can determine their future freely. The legitimacy of the United Nations, the credibility of African solidarity and the promise of decolonisation are all implicated in the answer.