Wealth creation programmes need stronger accountability

However, the exercise also reminded us that a good policy can only achieve its intended objectives when implementation is equally strong. In Lango sub-region, for the four local governments where I conducted my monitoring (Otuke, Dokolo, Apac and Lira districts) for example, approximately sh250b had been received under PDM, with about sh219b disbursed to approximately 222,000 beneficiaries. Yet, only about sh23m had reportedly been paid back into SACCOS accounts, against an expected sh20b. Since PDM funds are intended to revolve and benefit more households, this low repayment rate requires urgent attention.

Monitoring also identified inadequate sensitisation, weaknesses in SACCOS governance and beneficiary identification, as well as concerns about inappropriate or forced purchases of inputs. These factors severely affect the viability of enterprises and the ability of beneficiaries to repay.

In Teso, we observed similar implementation challenges alongside beneficiaries who were using PDM support for productive activities. For example, in the four local governments of Kapelabyong, Kalaki, Bukedea and Soroti city, a total of sh347b was allocated as PDM funds to the would-be beneficiaries in the sub-region, however, only sh300b was disbursed and out of this, sh77b is due for payment. This comes at a time when only sh86m has been recovered from some beneficiaries.

Some beneficiaries faced difficulties accessing funds due to mismatches between information in the PDM Information System and the Wendi mobile payment platform, particularly with telephone numbers. In some areas, the absence of Wendi agents also made access to funds more difficult and costly.

These challenges may appear merely administrative, but for a beneficiary waiting to access capital for an enterprise, an administrative gap can mean a missed production season or a lost business opportunity. Government systems must work as effectively as the policies they are designed to implement.

Ghost SACCOS, weaknesses

The same principle applies to Emyooga. In both Lango and Teso, the programme has created opportunities for citizens to organise around common enterprises, mobilise savings and access capital. But we also encountered weaknesses in governance, record-keeping, and SACCOS management.

In Erute South (Lira district), Lango, monitoring identified two Emyooga SACCOS that reportedly received sh100m but could not easily be traced on ground while their leaders could not readily be identified. Such cases underline the importance of verifying SACCOS – their membership, leadership, financial records and actual enterprise activities, both before and after public resources are committed.

Cattle restocking dilemma

Cattle restocking presents another important dimension of household transformation in Lango and Teso sub-regions. For communities in these sub-regions that experienced significant cattle losses in the past, livestock is not simply an animal; it is a productive asset from which households can rebuild wealth and livelihoods.

In the four Lango local governments visited, sh8.728b was received for cattle restocking in the 2025/26 financial year, of which sh7.010b had been spent on 1,402 beneficiaries, leaving sh1.717b unspent at the time of monitoring.

In Teso, the programme was similarly welcomed. However, monitoring raised concerns in both sub-regions about beneficiary verification, selection, livestock management and follow-up. 

The exercise also brought to light allegations of manipulation of beneficiary lists, exploitation of beneficiaries, and the possible involvement of public officials. Fourteen Gombolola internal security officers were implicated in allegations of benefiting directly from restocking funds, with sh58m reportedly recovered. In Lira, sh48m was reportedly recovered from civil servants, while Apac authorities reported allegations involving approximately sh70m.

These are allegations that must be subjected to the appropriate investigative and judicial processes. Nevertheless, they reinforce the need for stronger controls to ensure that programmes intended to restore household livelihoods are not compromised by individuals seeking to benefit improperly.

Fixing the system

These findings should not be interpreted as evidence that PDM, Emyooga or cattle-restocking are misguided interventions. They point to something more important: the quality of implementation determines the extent to which good policy translates into real change.

Not every failure is corruption. Some failures arise from weak supervision, inadequate sensitisation, poor information systems, weak SACCOS governance or insufficient technical support. These require administrative and programme improvements. Where there is deliberate diversion or theft of public resources, however, the law must take its course.

We need stronger beneficiary verification, clearer accountability at every level, better SACCOS governance, and reliable information systems linking programme records to actual beneficiaries. We also need to measure success beyond the amount of money disbursed. The real questions are: Did the enterprise grow? Did the livestock survive and multiply? Did the SACCOS become stronger? Did the household income improve?

Where public resources are recovered through due process, they should, where legally appropriate, be returned to the intended programme or beneficiaries. Accountability should not end with recovery; it should ultimately restore the public benefit for which the resources were allocated.

The lessons from Lango and Teso, therefore, provide an opportunity to improve, rather than retreat. The Government’s commitment to household transformation remains important. PDM, Emyooga and cattle restocking are the instruments through which that commitment is being translated into support for households. Our task now is to strengthen implementation so that the resources committed to these programmes produce the outcomes for which they were intended.

We cannot fight poverty by losing the money meant to defeat it. Our responsibility is to ensure that every shilling invested in household transformation reaches its intended purpose and becomes an opportunity for a Ugandan household to build a better future.

The writer is the Minister of State for Economic Monitoring