By Professor Alex Bashasha
Last year, friends, family and those who have had a chance to cross paths with Gen. Salim Saleh celebrated his 65th birthday in style. A 115-page magazine titled Happy Birthday Afande was published as part of the celebrations.
The magazine was dotted with tributes about Saleh’s unique attributes and his role in pacifying Uganda. This is the man at the centre of charting a new journey for Uganda under his proposed consociational democracy.
Uganda's political history is a long procession of broken bargains, uneasy alliances and unfinished national conversations.
From the colonial cartography that assembled disparate kingdoms and communities into one territorial entity to the turbulent politics of independence, the coups, military dictatorships and revolutionary promises that followed, the country has repeatedly struggled with one fundamental question: how can people of different political, cultural and historical persuasions share a state without one group treating it as its private inheritance?
It is against this historical backdrop that Gen Salim Saleh's proposed consociational democracy deserves more than passing political attention. Saleh's initiative could provide an important bridge between the country's troubled past and its democratic future.
The intriguing proposition is not simply that a brother of President Yoweri Museveni is advocating political accommodation. It is that a man whose life has been intimately intertwined with Uganda's liberation struggle, military consolidation, post-conflict recovery and economic transformation is now attempting to turn the language of reconciliation into a framework for national governance.
Why Saleh’s intervention matters
Gen. Saleh occupies a unique place in Uganda’s political landscape.
As a veteran of the liberation struggle, former Army Commander, presidential adviser and businessman, he possesses both historical legitimacy and access to centres of power.
More importantly, his career has repeatedly involved efforts at reconciliation and
reintegration.
Saleh’s commitment to dialogue began long before he entered high office. Having joined the liberation struggle as a youthful combatant, he experienced firsthand the human cost of conflict. Throughout Uganda’s post-war history, he has pursued engagement with armed groups and conflict-affected communities in search of peace.
During efforts to end insurgencies in northern Uganda and other parts of the country, he
developed a reputation for direct engagement with combatants and rebel leaders, encouraging them to abandon violence and return to civilian life. Those familiar with several peace processes recount instances in which he undertook sensitive contacts at considerable personal risk, sometimes outside formal government channels and without public attention.
Saleh has consistently demonstrated an appreciation of a simple political truth: sustainable stability is built through inclusion rather than perpetual confrontation.
That experience gives his current proposal particular significance. It suggests that his
advocacy for political accommodation is rooted not merely in theory, but in lessons drawn from decades spent navigating Uganda’s conflicts and reconciliation efforts.
And perhaps that is precisely where Uganda's next chapter ought to begin.
To understand why Saleh's proposal matters, one must return to the making of Uganda itself.
The modern Ugandan state was not born out of a single, organically negotiated national compact. It emerged from British imperial expansion, commercial interests, missionary activity and colonial administrative expediency.
The 1894 declaration of the Uganda Protectorate formalised British control over Buganda, while subsequent agreements and territorial arrangements extended colonial authority over other kingdoms, chiefdoms and communities.
The 1900 Buganda Agreement institutionalised a particular political and administrative relationship between the British and the Buganda Kingdom, while the agreements of 1902 and 1904 further shaped the colonial territorial and administrative order.
The eventual boundaries of Uganda brought together communities with different political systems, cultural institutions, economic interests and historical experiences.
Consequently, Uganda approached independence in 1962 as a territorially united country still negotiating the terms of its political and constitutional belonging.
The independence settlement itself was an exercise in political accommodation. The UPC-Kabaka Yekka alliance helped Milton Obote secure power, while the constitutional arrangement preserved the position of traditional kingdoms, including Buganda's federal status and the Kabaka's presidency.
But the bargain proved fragile. The 1966 constitutional crisis, the abolition of kingdoms and the 1967 Republican Constitution exposed the unresolved tensions between central authority, traditional institutions and competing political interests.
The subsequent regimes of Idi Amin, Obote II and the National Resistance Movement emerged from a political landscape repeatedly scarred by authoritarianism, military intervention, human rights violations and regional mistrust.
The lesson is sobering: Uganda's problem has never been merely the absence of political parties or constitutional documents. It has been the persistent difficulty of constructing a political settlement that commands the confidence of the country's diverse constituencies.
Independence transferred sovereignty from Britain to Ugandans, but the deeper task of building a genuinely shared national political community remains unfinished.
The question today is whether Uganda can finally negotiate that settlement without another national rupture.
The Constitution's forgotten promise: Power belongs to the people
Perhaps the most compelling justification for Saleh's initiative is already written in Uganda's supreme law. The 1995 Constitution opens with the solemn declaration, "WE THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA", recalling the country's history of political and constitutional instability and recognising the struggles against tyranny, oppression and exploitation. It commits the nation to a political order founded on unity, peace, equality, democracy, freedom, social justice and progress.
These are not decorative constitutional expressions. They are the philosophical foundations of the Ugandan state.
More explicitly, Article 1(1) declares: "All power belongs to the people who shall exercise their sovereignty in accordance with this Constitution." Article 1(2) adds that all authority in the state emanates from the people, who shall be governed through their will and consent.
The restoration of multiparty politics in 2005 was an important democratic development, but political pluralism cannot be measured merely by counting registered parties.
It must also be measured by whether those parties can compete freely, whether citizens can express dissent without intimidation, whether public institutions act independently and whether political minorities retain meaningful constitutional protection.
This is where consociational democracy enters the conversation.
Associated with Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, particularly his 1968 work The Politics of Accommodation and 1977 book Democracy in Plural Societies, consociationalism challenges the assumption that democracy must invariably mean unrestricted majoritarian rule.
Its four central pillars are grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy. Together, they seek to protect significant political and social constituencies from permanent exclusion while preserving democratic government.
Saleh and Prof Ogenga Otunnu's proposal seeks to adapt these principles to Uganda's historical circumstances.
The grand coalition principle envisages a national governing arrangement in which significant political constituencies participate in decisions affecting the country. It would require a political culture in which the NRM, NUP, FDC, DP, UPC, JEEMA, PFF and other legitimate formations can engage as stakeholders rather than treating one another as permanent adversaries.
The question is whether Uganda can develop a political settlement in which losing an election does not translate into losing one's stake in the country.
This is where Gen Salim Saleh's consociational democracy proposal deserves serious consideration.
Its central proposition is both politically ambitious and democratically compelling: Uganda's future stability should rest on negotiated inclusion, institutional accountability, equitable economic opportunities and national reconciliation rather than the perpetual confrontation between electoral winners and losers.
The theory is not a perfect solution simply because its proponents say so. But it offers perhaps the most appropriate framework for confronting Uganda's interconnected governance problems.
Tanzania provides an interesting comparison. It restored multiparty politics in 1992 but has remained dominated by Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which has governed since independence. Its dominant-party experience illustrates how the formal existence of political competition can coexist with prolonged political dominance.
However, CCM's electoral longevity should not be confused with the winner-takes-all principle itself.
Uganda's challenge is more complicated because its political competition intersects with historical regional grievances, unequal economic opportunities, political patronage and questions about the independence of public institutions.
Uganda's cultural institutions, including the Buganda Kingdom and other traditional leadership structures, possess historical legitimacy and community connections that political parties cannot simply replicate.
Religious leaders, meanwhile, retain considerable moral influence and can help provide the ethical foundation for a national reconciliation process.
Saleh's opportunity is to become the bridge across these different worlds.
His conciliatory approach could help persuade political actors to distinguish between defending their political identities and rejecting the possibility of national cooperation.
In political negotiation, the ability to bring adversaries to the table is often more consequential than the ability to deliver an eloquent speech once they arrive.
Yet the ultimate measure of his influence will be whether he can persuade those who distrust one another to accept common rules that protect them all.
Beyond the Museveni succession
The timing of Saleh's initiative is particularly consequential because Uganda's succession question is no longer an abstract political discussion.
Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba's publicly expressed presidential ambitions for 2031 have added another dimension to the country's political calculations. Within the NRM, questions of continuity, ideological preservation and generational transition are increasingly difficult to separate from the broader debate about Uganda's future.
Saleh's intervention should therefore be understood within this larger historical moment.
Saleh and Otunnu's proposed 135-page working paper must therefore be judged not by its ambition but by the institutional architecture it eventually produces.
The proposed National Consociational Council, with its Elite Cooperation Chamber, Grassroots and Multi-Stakeholder Chamber, and Technical and Implementation Secretariat, offers an interesting framework. But its powers, membership, financing and accountability must be clearly established.
It must not become a parallel government that diminishes Parliament, the judiciary, local governments or other constitutional institutions.
More importantly, the arrangement must confront the difficult questions of electoral credibility, judicial independence, security-sector accountability, political freedoms, corruption, unemployment and regional economic inequalities.