In most of the early battles, a section of NRA fighters was armed with three or four guns, and a platoon was armed with less than 10 guns. Even when personnel reached company levels, the guns that they had could only arm a platoon of 30 soldiers. The rest fought as ‘commandos’ (fighters without guns). This situation persisted for most of the time between 1981 and 1984.

Getting the guns from the ‘quartermaster’ was no walk in the back. His ‘quarter-guard’ was always well-guarded. You had to kill him before taking the guns away. Gradually, this is what the NRA did and one by one, the guns came.

When they attacked Kabamba on February 6^th, they had 27 guns. On these, they added 13 to make 40 guns. This according to the fighters was not so good, but not so bad since they did not lose any of their men.

On the next day or second day of the war, they attacked Nsunga Police Post and on top of three guns also captured a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). The total of guns that they had then grew to 43 with an RPG. Rocket Propelled Grenades are very important weapons for mobile guerrillas because they are the only movable close combat support weapon available.

The number of guns grew to 60 on February 8^th, after they attacked UNLA establishments in Kiboga. This meant that in three days of action, they had harvested 33 guns.  The only RPG that they had also had only one shell. And when it was used against a Tanzanian convoy on February 17^th, they did not have any more shells. On 18 March, however, they ambushed a military vehicle at Kawanda and collected 10 rifles.

On April 6th, they attacked Kakiri Military Barracks. The establishment was located near or exactly were the current 1^st Division headquarters are found.  At Kakiri however, they only managed to get 12 guns, including a mortar and a GPMG. By then, they had grown to around 200 fighters, with only 60 guns!

Lost some, gained some

However, a few days later, the group was attacked around Katera on the Busunju-Kiboga road and most of the weapons got from Kakiri, including the GPMG and two mortars were lost. That was a very big loss to the NRA. One of the senior army officers, at the time said that he almost abandoned the cause because the guns were not coming. “I almost left the war effort because it seemed to be very frustrating,” he said.

Such was the value attached to a single gun that a fighter who lost one had to thoroughly account for the loss of the single gun before his superiors. It was also common for a section of fighters (between 10 and 20) to be sent from one unit to another to deliver a single gun or two guns there! Gertrude Njuba is one of the fighters who numerously risked her life as they moved two or three guns from one unit to another.

In August 1981, the expected foreign help should have arrived. Elements in Libya dropped weapons for rebel groups in Uganda somewhere, however, the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) of Dr Andrew Kayiira reached the location first and took over 600 of the 700 rifles. The NRA got only 96 rifles, 5 Machine Guns and 100 Anti-Vehicle Mines. The number of rifles then grew to around 200. However, the number of fighters had grown to around 1500!

The land mines were however very useful. The NRA used them to blow up tens of UNLA trucks and eventually, this helped them cut off most areas of the war zone. For example, it became difficult for the UNLA to cross from Wobulenzi to Nakaseke through River Lumansi.

Similarly, mines helped cut off Luwero-Kiwoko-Ngoma at Kikubanimba bridge. Furthermore, the NRA was able to protect Semuto and Kapeeka after effectively using mines at River Danze near Masulita. In his book, Museveni`s Long Match, the Late Major Odonga Ori Amaza described the effect that the mines had on the UNLA as the ‘war of making the enemy dance’.

In early 1982, the NRA got over 220 guns, that formerly belonged to the UFM. This was like manna from hell.   It is not surprising that the Late Lt. Colonel Ssonko Lutaaya, who defected from the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) after their ill-planned attack on Lubiri barracks is a hero among NRA fighters.

According to accounts by Brigadier Pecos Kuteesa, when the UFM were defeated by the UNLA after their attack on the Lubiri,  Ssonko, who was then in charge of the truck that carried the weapons refused to allow the weapons to fall into the hands of the UNLA.

He instead drove the truck towards areas were he knew NRA camps were and handed them over to them. They were around 220 sub-machine guns, but this was a very big haul at that time. This brought the number of guns that they had to around 400. However, at the time, the force had grown to around 4,000 men. This meant that the ratio of guns per fighter was 1:10!