Was the Nairobi Peace Accord real or a joke?

Even though not much good came of it, 17 December 1985 marked another epoch in Uganda's political history. On this day, the peace agreement that aimed to end five years of bloody civil war, was signed between Uganda's ruling Military Council and the rebel National Resistance Movement.

Signing on behalf of the Military Council (MC) was the President of Uganda, Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa, while the rebel NRM was represented by the Chairman of NRA High Command and interim chairman of the NRM, Mr. Yoweri Museveni. The peace broker was Kenya's President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi and the venue for the talks, which began on 26 August 1985, was the Kenya capital Nairobi.

Why Obote fell

What enabled the peace talks to begin was the military coup that ousted President Milton Obote on 27 July 1985. Dr. Obote had resolutely refused to discuss peace with anti-government guerillas, confident that the government's Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was close to defeating them. Most prominent among these groups was Museveni's NRA fighting in Central and western Uganda but Capt. George Nkwanga's Federal Democratic Movement for Uganda (FEDEMU) and pockets of Dr. Andrew Kayiira's Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) were also active in Buganda. In West Nile was Gen. Moses Ali's Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), active since the fall of President Idi Amin in 1979. Many more groups would emerge after the July coup.

But why did the once deeply loyal UNLA top brass overthrow President Obote? All authorities agree that the death of the charismatic UNLA Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. David Oyite Ojok in a helicopter accident or incident was the beginning of the end of Dr. Obote's presidency. There had been tensions in UNLA between the Langi and Acholi but Ojok and Army Commander Tito Okello kept the force together. When President Obote appointed Brig. Smith Opon Acak as chief of staff, his high military credentials were obscured by the biological fact that he was like Obote a Langi. In an army where longevity of service was deemed more valid for promotion than military courses, Opon's rise above veterans like Brig. Bazilio Okello was the last straw. But there was more.

In his ‘Politics & The Military in Uganda, 1890-1985', Amii Omara Otunnu, whose younger brother Olara Otunnu was President Tito Okello's Foreign Minister, gives more insights. He narrates a scheme by the Langi chief of staff Opon to deploy Acholi (and not Langi) soldiers to the war front to die there. He also reveals a plot to have senior Acholi officers arrested to pre-empt an Acholi-inspired coup against Obote. In short, that is how Obote lost power to his army for the second and last time.

Armies divide Uganda

The prime cause of the anti-Obote coup was to end the bloodshed and this saw President Okello inviting all political parties and all guerilla groups to join him in the Military Council government. Dr. Andrew Kayiira flew in from the USA and took up the UFM seat. UNRF was represented by Maj. Ibrahim Amin Onzi while the little-known Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) was represented by Maj. Gen. Isaac Lumago. FEDEMU was represented by Capt. George Nkwanga and Capt. Livingstone Gyagenda Kalyesubula. Apart from Gen. Tito Okello and Army Commander Lt. Gen. Bajilio Okello, the UNLA was also represented by Vice Chairman Brig. Wilson Toko, Chief of Staff Brig. Zedi Maruru, Col. Fred Oketcho, Lt. Col. Dr. Kweya, Lt. Col. Eric Odwar, Lt. Col. Sam Nanyumba, Maj. Jacob Loum, Maj. Tom Kiyengo and Maj. Ocero Nangai.

As the talks were going on in Nairobi there was also a tacit ceasefire. As usually happens, both sides used this period to recruit and arm. NRA had cut off western Uganda from the Katonga Bridge and even set up a government of sorts. Their ranks were heavily swelled by deserters from UNLA units in the west and south-west Uganda, even as they recruited enthusiastic civilians.

The UNLA-led Military Council also benefitted from troops of the various fighting groups allied to it. There was talk of Anya-nya mercenaries recruited from Sudan but it seems these were Ugandans of West Nile origin who had served Amin's government in the Uganda Army. Even control of Kampala City had been divided among the member-armies of the Military Council! More manpower came from Karimojong cattle raiders who, according to President Museveni, were promised all the cattle they would find once they broke through the Katonga blockade!

Agreement or joke?

On reflection, it is perhaps good that the Nairobi Agreement flopped because it included resolutions tailored for disaster. Take the resolution that all fighters be disarmed and a new army of only 8,480 officers and men be constituted. I believe this was just 10% of the total number of soldiers under arms and it is not clear in how the 90% were to be handled apart from being disarmed. To supervise this disarmament and peace process was a Commonwealth force from Britain, Canada, Kenya and Tanzania. UNLA which had over 40,000 soldiers was allotted 3,700 while NRA which had close to 20,000 got 3,580. The other four armies, UFM, FEDEMU, UNRF and FUNA were to share 1,200 slots at 300 each! The weapons each of these groups would have hidden away would have laid the foundation for the next round of bloodletting.

The second deadly resolution in the Nairobi Accord was to recruit the new army on ethnic representation. While it sounds ideal, the truth is that Uganda's soldiers would easily become tribal delegates expecting to be deployed in tribal battalions. And these battalions would inevitably fight each other and perhaps leave Uganda's security to a UN peacekeeping force.

The homegrown solution was achieved when NRA captured power on 26 January 1986 and accommodated virtually every combatant without taking interest in their biology. Today, the armed forces recruit via a district quota system rather than by ethnic identity. In a sense, not all was lost when both Military Council and NRA breached the Nairobi Peace Accord because many of its resolutions were implemented…in a different fashion. Dismissing the Nairobi Accord as a joke is, therefore, also a bad joke.