How Israeli security convinced Kenya to support Entebbe raid

By Muwonge Magembe, researcher

The New Vision recently commemorated 39 years of Operation Entebbe by serialising how Israeli commandos led by Brig. Gen. Dan Shomron rescued about 102 Israeli and non-Israeli Jews at Entebbe Airport terminal.

The rescued were among the 248 passengers and 12 crew members hijacked on Air France flight 139 on June 27, 1976 by the operatives of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-External Operations and German Revolutionary Cells.

The hijackers deceitfully boarded Air France among the 58 additional passengers picked on its stopover in Greece. They accordingly ordered Capt. Michael Bacos to divert to Benghazi, Libya for refuelling before landing at Entebbe. At that time, President Idi Amin, like Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was offering military training to the PLO as per Yasser Arafat’s request.

For example, in 1975, Amin directed air force commander Lt. Col. Zed Maruru to train three PLO recruits as military pilots in Gulu. They, however, failed the course like earlier on in Algeria and Libya.

Similarly, four PLO trainees in Uganda joined the hijackers at Entebbe to incarcerate the hostages that included two retired colonels of the Israeli air force. They thus demanded a $5m ransom plus the release of 40 Palestinian prisoners in Israel and the 13 in Switzerland, Kenya, France and Germany prisons.

Fortunately, the hostages were rescued on July 4, 1976 in an operation that was commanded by Brig. Shomron together with Amnon Birani (mission’s intelligence officer), Col. Joshua Shani (Squadron), Col. Matan Vilanai (paratroopers), Col. Efraim Sneh (Medical), Col. Ami Ayalon (Air Force representative), Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu (Assault Unit), Maj. Muki Betser, Maj. Shaul Mofaz and Col. Uri Sagi.

The rescue success is also attributable to the Kenyan government’s collaboration. Israel lobbied Kenya for permission to use Nairobi Airport to refuel mission planes. That lobbying was tricky given that three years before Israel and Kenya had strained relations after Kenya supported Egyptian vice-president Col. Hassan el-Shafei’s statement of May 27, 1973 to the tenth OAU session chaired by King Hassan II of Morocco condemning Israel over the Yom Kippur war. Henceforth, Kenya and other African countries (apart from Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland) terminated full diplomatic relations with Israel.

Mindful of that background, Operation Entebbe architects first brainstormed on how to convince Kenya. These architects were Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, defence minister Shimon Peres, Maj. Gen. Yekutiel Adam, Yitzhak Hofi (Mossad director), Gen. Mordechai Gur, (IDF chief of staff), Col. Ehud Barak (assistant head of intelligence for research and special operations), Benny Peled (air force commander), Col. Shai Tamari (chief of operations), Capt. Alik Ron (platoon reserve commander) and Michael Harari (Caesarea).

Convinced on how to persuade Kenya, prime minister Rabin telephoned President Jomo Kenyatta. Whilst exchanging pleasantries, Rabin skillfully through exaggeration and praise told Kenyatta how he had enjoyed and read repeatedly (four times) Kenyatta’s 348 page autobiography Suffering without bitterness. When Rabin completed his other sweet-talking statement that he was halfway reading it for the fifth time; a delighted Kenyatta burst into lengthy laughter cut short by a cough. He then sipped on the Covonia cough syrup which was on his table.

Kenyatta thereafter promised Rabin more copies of his autobiography to distribute to his friends.

Realising that Kenyatta was in the right mood; Rabin put forth Israel’s request. But Kenyatta raised fears of possible military retaliation by Amin against Kenya which Rabin downplayed by pledging Israeli military support.

To persuade Kenyatta more; Rabin nostalgically reminded him of the 1963 deal which Israel Prime Minister David Ben Gurion through air force commander Ezer Weizman approved by accepting Kenyatta’s request of clandestinely training five native Kenyans as fighter pilots in Israel without Britain’s knowledge. Kenyatta was then prime minister of Kenya’s internal self-government before Britain granted Kenya full independence. The five who Kenyatta selected for training avoided being detected on departure by British spies stationed at Nairobi Airport. They, therefore, first travelled by bus to Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania from where they boarded a plane to Israel. Actually, Rabin reminded Kenyatta that Col. Dedan Gichuru was among the five that Israel trained under such concealment. Incidentally, at the time of Operation Entebbe planning, Col. Gichuru was Kenya’s air force commander since April 17, 1973. After Rabin narrated all that to him; Kenyatta permitted Israel.

Meanwhile, Mossad director contacted Kenyan agriculture minister, Bruce Mackenzie, who networked with Nicholas Biwott, the home affairs undersecretary. Mackenzie and Biwott were confidants since Biwott served as Mackenzie’s personal assistant from 1968 to1970. Their network enabled Mossad operative Shalomo Gal to charter a plane from Nairobi and take photos of Entebbe which augmented the 1971 blueprint of the Entebbe airport terminal Mossad had secured from Solein Boneh, the Israel Company that constructed it. Additionally, Michael Harari, another Mossad agent, provided useful information after he bravely disguised himself as an Italian businessman and travelled to Uganda for espionage at the time of the hostage saga.

As Israel-Kenya were finalising, Gen. Gur advised Rabin to prevent the mission from possible leakage by engaging Amin diplomatically through Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the United States. Rabin and Gur knew which United States officials to engage in the deceptive diplomatic ploy since the two had hitherto worked together at Israel Embassy in Washington DC (Rabin was the ambassador with Gur as military attaché).

Furthermore, Mossad monitored Fredrick Isingoma, Uganda’s High Commissioner to London, before and after they debriefed Patricia Martell, a British national who the hijackers released in Benghazi after she faked a miscarriage. However, paltry details regarding Operation Entebbe leaked when some Kenyan air force officers bickered over anticipated operational cash from Israel. Isaac Lumago, Uganda’s ambassador to Lesotho, learnt of it and alerted Brig. Isaac Maliyamungu from Ombokolo. Shockingly, Maliyamungu didn’t care. He continued visiting his 32 wives and concubines while distributing to them cash he withdrew from Libyan Arab Bank when Amin left for Mauritius to handover the OAU chairmanship to President Seewoosagur Ramgoolam.

Col. Gad Wilson Toko, too, learnt of it as Israel planned where to refuel from. Toko had friends in Israel security since the construction of the Nakasongola air base. Toko’s prior knowledge of the raid was tricky given his friendship with Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s vice-president. The two became friends when Toko trained in Egypt when Mubarak was air force commander. Indeed, it was out of that friendship that when Toko became Okello Lutwa’s vice-president; Mubarak supplied him with weapons to counter NRA rebellion.

However, at the time of Israeli raid, Toko had developed irreconcilable differences with Amin. Meanwhile, Egypt was cautious since Sadat through US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was reconciling with Israel; resulting in the Morocco meeting between officials of Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and Mossad. Ultimately, Sadat made a historic visit to Israel in November 1977 thereby addressing the Knesset.

Kenya was, therefore, the major regional player in the raid. Its collaboration infuriated Amin since his 11 MiG fighter jets were destroyed by the Maj. Mofaz-led squad after assault commandos like Tamir Pardo (the current Mossad director) secured the hostages.

Eventually, Amin avenged in May, 1978, when Mackenzie visited Uganda. Mackenzie was given a sculpture containing a time bomb as a gift which exploded as his plane flew back over Ngong Hills in Kenya.

muwongecwm@gmail.com