Aliker raps Otunnu over LRA war case
Jun 16, 2010
SENIOR presidential adviser for special duties, Dr. Martin Aliker, has defended President Yoweri Museveni against accusations that he stoked the LRA war in an attempt to exterminate the Acholi. He dismissed accusations made by UPC leader Dr. Olara Otunnu as untruthful.
By Milton Olupot
SENIOR presidential adviser for special duties, Dr. Martin Aliker, has defended President Yoweri Museveni against accusations that he stoked the LRA war in an attempt to exterminate the Acholi.
Aliker yesterday said accusations made by UPC leader Dr. Olara Otunnu that Museveni is responsible for the death of the Acholi during the two-decade war cannot hold any truth.
DR. MARTIN ALIKER'S UNEDITED WRITE-UP TO THE NEW VISION
The president of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), Olara Otunnu, is wanted by the Police for questioning. It is alleged that Otunnu accused President Museveni, while addressing people in Lira, of assisting the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) to kill the Acholi. This, Otunnu said, was because Museveni hates the Acholi. Whether Otunnu is right or wrong is now for the Police to find out.
The dispute between Otuunu and President Museveni is not the subject of this commentary. The reason for commenting arises out of my personal experiences when I was involved in the peace process with the LRA.
Between 1996 and 2004, I was officially assigned to this case, but continued to monitor the problem for a longer period. In the course of my duties, I had contact with some
LRA leaders and their followers. I also was very involved in the restoration of diplomatic relations between Uganda and Sudan. I met president Omar-el Bashir several times during the period when Uganda and Sudan had severed diplomatic relations. Each meeting lasted not less than two hours.
The Sudan government made no attempt to hide the fact that they were supporting the LRA as retaliation against the Uganda Government for assisting the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The line was “drawn in the sand†between the two governments saying if you support my enemy, I will support your enemy.
The relations between Uganda and Sudan were eventually restored and I feel great satisfaction for the role I played in the process.
The conflict between the LRA and the Uganda Government remains alive to this day, albeit the LRA is no longer a threat as it was in yesteryears. At the height of its activities, the LRA was the number one pre-occupation of the Government.
At that time, there was a great deal of frustration on the part of the Government. The army was ill-equipped and, therefore, found difficulty in dealing with an illusive enemy. The civilian population, among whom the LRA operated, initially supported the LRA.
When the LRA began abducting children and youth and killing indiscriminately, the local population withdrew its support. Protection and help was sought from the Government.
Clearly, the Government could not station soldiers in every village and a temporary solution was sought. This was the creation of the internally displaced people’s camps (IDP). It was the people who demanded for these camps, not the Government.
However, no sooner had the camps been established, than the displaced people began agitating against the camps and the conditions there.
These complaints were taken up by local politicians who wanted to gain mileage out of the situation. Three elections were won or lost in the north by the politicians who exploited the establishment of IDP camps.
The Government, jointly with the World Food Programme and other serious NGOs managed to feed the people in the camps for many years. Despite all its efforts to keep people alive, the Government has never been thanked, neither by the politicians of that region nor by the people themselves. In the mean time, the Government continued with its efforts to fight the LRA.
During this period many individuals and organisations came to the Government with offers to help, mediate, and end the war. These included committed Ugandan church leaders.
Others included committed NGOs, a group of black American Muslims and many other individuals and NGOs. Unfortunately, some of the NGOs and individuals, both foreign and local, had self-interest at heart.
I recall an expatriate funded by USAID who spent two years, mostly in Kampala, building a dossier on Joseph Kony. As far as I know he probably is still in the process of completing the dossier. Among some of the individual Ugandan peacemakers were those whose efforts were motivated more by financial reasons.
The longer the peace talks lasted, the more facilitation funds were made available to them. The result, houses were built and land was purchased.
The most lucrative “peace talk†was the one in Juba. People of all sorts rushed to Juba for the facilitation money.
As a government, as long as Kony remained a threat to the country, all possible means had to be taken to counter that threat.
As the President of Uganda, Museveni had to take personal charge of the situation. During his presidency nothing has tested his ability to rule Uganda more than the LRA. I know this. I was there. The darkest period of the LRA war was the abduction of the Aboke girls.
This incident was painful and morally devastating.
The occasion I hated to see the President was when he had just seen sister Rachelle, the headmistress of Aboke girls school, in State House.
The President was a frustrated, helpless man who could not fulfill the prayer and wish of a simple Catholic nun who wanted nothing, but the return of her girls.
If there was anything in his power to bring back the Aboke girls, President Museveni would have done it. Many people took advantage of this frustration. They were given money. They never delivered the girls.
President Museveni camped in Gulu weeks on end several times. He wanted to be on the spot to supervise the operations. On several occasions it looked as if the President had abdicated to go and fight Joseph Kony himself.
With all the pain, frustration and anger, Museveni remained humane.
I cannot claim to know how President Museveni thinks and plans his political moves. However, dealing with him for seven years on the LRA issue, I feel it is the height of unkindness, ingratitude and downright dishonesty to say Museveni stoked the war with the LRA for whatever reason.
Museveni is not a man of emotions. One day my appointment followed that of sister Rachelle.
As I approached the President from a distance, he saw me and retreated to the next room presumably to wipe his tears for the people of the north.
As an Acholi, it would be so easy to support the accusation made by Otunnu that President Museveni supported the LRA war against the civilians, but my conscience says no.
Otunnu was not in Uganda in those dark days. I was.
As head of state, President Museveni is open to accusations by Ugandans from all corners of our country. Supporting the LRA is one that cannot hold true.
Let me also address the religious leaders who oppose President Barack Obama’s plans to deal with the LRA. Joseph Kony will never sign an agreement that requires him to surrender. Some time ago, Kony wrote to me and sent a message to me to that effect.
His reasons as stated in both of the above are:
“If I sign an agreement, my commanders and I will be taken to the Hague, tried and executed.
If I sign an agreement with the Government of Uganda, my commanders and I will be tried under an untested law. We will be convicted and hanged.
Therefore, if the end result for me is death then it is better I die fighting. If the religious leaders have any assurance contrary to the above, let them reveal it to all Ugandans.
The writer is a member of the East African Advisory Board
SENIOR presidential adviser for special duties, Dr. Martin Aliker, has defended President Yoweri Museveni against accusations that he stoked the LRA war in an attempt to exterminate the Acholi.
Aliker yesterday said accusations made by UPC leader Dr. Olara Otunnu that Museveni is responsible for the death of the Acholi during the two-decade war cannot hold any truth.
DR. MARTIN ALIKER'S UNEDITED WRITE-UP TO THE NEW VISION
The president of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), Olara Otunnu, is wanted by the Police for questioning. It is alleged that Otunnu accused President Museveni, while addressing people in Lira, of assisting the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) to kill the Acholi. This, Otunnu said, was because Museveni hates the Acholi. Whether Otunnu is right or wrong is now for the Police to find out.
The dispute between Otuunu and President Museveni is not the subject of this commentary. The reason for commenting arises out of my personal experiences when I was involved in the peace process with the LRA.
Between 1996 and 2004, I was officially assigned to this case, but continued to monitor the problem for a longer period. In the course of my duties, I had contact with some
LRA leaders and their followers. I also was very involved in the restoration of diplomatic relations between Uganda and Sudan. I met president Omar-el Bashir several times during the period when Uganda and Sudan had severed diplomatic relations. Each meeting lasted not less than two hours.
The Sudan government made no attempt to hide the fact that they were supporting the LRA as retaliation against the Uganda Government for assisting the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The line was “drawn in the sand†between the two governments saying if you support my enemy, I will support your enemy.
The relations between Uganda and Sudan were eventually restored and I feel great satisfaction for the role I played in the process.
The conflict between the LRA and the Uganda Government remains alive to this day, albeit the LRA is no longer a threat as it was in yesteryears. At the height of its activities, the LRA was the number one pre-occupation of the Government.
At that time, there was a great deal of frustration on the part of the Government. The army was ill-equipped and, therefore, found difficulty in dealing with an illusive enemy. The civilian population, among whom the LRA operated, initially supported the LRA.
When the LRA began abducting children and youth and killing indiscriminately, the local population withdrew its support. Protection and help was sought from the Government.
Clearly, the Government could not station soldiers in every village and a temporary solution was sought. This was the creation of the internally displaced people’s camps (IDP). It was the people who demanded for these camps, not the Government.
However, no sooner had the camps been established, than the displaced people began agitating against the camps and the conditions there.
These complaints were taken up by local politicians who wanted to gain mileage out of the situation. Three elections were won or lost in the north by the politicians who exploited the establishment of IDP camps.
The Government, jointly with the World Food Programme and other serious NGOs managed to feed the people in the camps for many years. Despite all its efforts to keep people alive, the Government has never been thanked, neither by the politicians of that region nor by the people themselves. In the mean time, the Government continued with its efforts to fight the LRA.
During this period many individuals and organisations came to the Government with offers to help, mediate, and end the war. These included committed Ugandan church leaders.
Others included committed NGOs, a group of black American Muslims and many other individuals and NGOs. Unfortunately, some of the NGOs and individuals, both foreign and local, had self-interest at heart.
I recall an expatriate funded by USAID who spent two years, mostly in Kampala, building a dossier on Joseph Kony. As far as I know he probably is still in the process of completing the dossier. Among some of the individual Ugandan peacemakers were those whose efforts were motivated more by financial reasons.
The longer the peace talks lasted, the more facilitation funds were made available to them. The result, houses were built and land was purchased.
The most lucrative “peace talk†was the one in Juba. People of all sorts rushed to Juba for the facilitation money.
As a government, as long as Kony remained a threat to the country, all possible means had to be taken to counter that threat.
As the President of Uganda, Museveni had to take personal charge of the situation. During his presidency nothing has tested his ability to rule Uganda more than the LRA. I know this. I was there. The darkest period of the LRA war was the abduction of the Aboke girls.
This incident was painful and morally devastating.
The occasion I hated to see the President was when he had just seen sister Rachelle, the headmistress of Aboke girls school, in State House.
The President was a frustrated, helpless man who could not fulfill the prayer and wish of a simple Catholic nun who wanted nothing, but the return of her girls.
If there was anything in his power to bring back the Aboke girls, President Museveni would have done it. Many people took advantage of this frustration. They were given money. They never delivered the girls.
President Museveni camped in Gulu weeks on end several times. He wanted to be on the spot to supervise the operations. On several occasions it looked as if the President had abdicated to go and fight Joseph Kony himself.
With all the pain, frustration and anger, Museveni remained humane.
I cannot claim to know how President Museveni thinks and plans his political moves. However, dealing with him for seven years on the LRA issue, I feel it is the height of unkindness, ingratitude and downright dishonesty to say Museveni stoked the war with the LRA for whatever reason.
Museveni is not a man of emotions. One day my appointment followed that of sister Rachelle.
As I approached the President from a distance, he saw me and retreated to the next room presumably to wipe his tears for the people of the north.
As an Acholi, it would be so easy to support the accusation made by Otunnu that President Museveni supported the LRA war against the civilians, but my conscience says no.
Otunnu was not in Uganda in those dark days. I was.
As head of state, President Museveni is open to accusations by Ugandans from all corners of our country. Supporting the LRA is one that cannot hold true.
Let me also address the religious leaders who oppose President Barack Obama’s plans to deal with the LRA. Joseph Kony will never sign an agreement that requires him to surrender. Some time ago, Kony wrote to me and sent a message to me to that effect.
His reasons as stated in both of the above are:
Therefore, if the end result for me is death then it is better I die fighting. If the religious leaders have any assurance contrary to the above, let them reveal it to all Ugandans.
The writer is a member of the East African Advisory Board