Museveni Explains Kony Rebel Attacks
Mr. Editor<br>I need to help the public put in context the present spate of attacks on civilians in Northern Uganda by Kony bandits.
Mr. Editor
I need to help the public put in context the present spate of attacks on civilians in Northern Uganda by Kony bandits.
I have not been in the North since the end of March when I had to reluctantly leave my good work to come and deal with the diversions that had emerged on account of some politicians. Since that time I have not had time to go back although I am following the situation wherever I am.
Nevertheless, when I am not on the ground I am, inevitably, twelve or so hours behind the events happening in the North.
Since March, in spite of the mistakes, the UPDF and the LDUs have continued to weaken Kony tremendously. The helicopter gunships have been a menace to the rebels.
Here below are some of the examples of the very successful attacks by different elements of the UPDF on the rebels.
Some incidents of UPDF gunship attacks on the rebels since February 2003:
February:
Location Rebels killed
Aswa Valley 20 Taidona 20
Guru Guru 15 Laminapo 20
March:
Location Rebels killed
Teladwong 15
South Latanya hills 20
Kalawinya 15
April:
Location Rebels killed
Lapul 30
It is these attacks that have made the rebels desperate. In particular they are short of food and drugs. That is why they have been launching desperate attacks on Internally Displaced Persons’ Camps (IDPCs) to get food or drugs. This is also, partly, to divert the mobile forces hunting the rebels from the deserted areas in the countryside to guard the IDPCs. We have, nevertheless, pressed on with the mobile forces and zonal forces in all the deserted areas: Zoka, Opok forest, Zambia swamps, Atto hill, Bolo, Latanya hills, Latwara hills, Waligo, Tel-Te, Aswa Ranch, etc. This is because the ultimate solution lies in denying the bandits any permanent base either in Southern Sudan or Northern Uganda.
Most of the attacks on the IDPCs have been defeated with high cost for the rebels.
Here below is the list of the attacks on IDPCs that were defeated:
Some of the incidents of the rebel attacks on IDPCs:
March:
Location Rebels killed
Akara Hills 20
Aromo in Lira 3
Acet in Omoro 4
April:
Location Rebels killed
Awere in Pader 2
Arumu 4
Paibona 3
Atoi hill 3
West Pabolo 2
May:
Location Rebels killed
Abumu 19
Omiya Pachua 3
Omiya Nyima 26
June:
Location Rebels killed
Lira Kato 6
Labing 8
Lira Paluo 9
Omunyure 19
Oryang 10
Nevertheless, due to laxity of some commanders, the bandits, on a few occasions, have found the local detachments unready in spite of prior information about the enemy's plans to attack those centres.
This was the case in respect of: Abim, Anaka, Karuma road bus incident and Obalanga. In these cases, the soldiers were either drunk after getting their pay or were inside the houses instead of being in trenches with scouts deployed around the encampment. On account of this indiscipline, the following COs and OCs have been arrested:
1. Capt. Kayemba
2. Capt. Kiyingi
3. Capt. Kefa Juliwa
The group that infiltrated Katakwi was hit yesterday by gunships at Olwa. We are also bringing new brigades from other parts of the country, including those that were in Congo to wipe out these bandits.
Do these attacks on civilians represent the gaining of the strength by the rebels as some people keep saying? Not at all! The contrary is true. They are desperate attempts at stretching the Army so that it does not occupy the deserted areas that they were trying to make their bases. To be sure of this, the journalists should visit the inaccessible parts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader - Zambia swamps, Opok forest, Zoka forest, Latanya, Akilok Game Reserve, Aswa Ranch, Bolo, etc. They will find our forces permanently based there. This is the real battle.
Of course, the under-spending on defence, forced on us by the so-called donors, is partly the source of the protractedness of these operations against the terrorists. Recently we managed to get attack helicopters after a long struggle.
However, we do not yet have transport helicopters to airlift heliborne infantry and coordinate with the attack helicopters.
Therefore, after suffering big losses at the hands of the attack helicopters, the bandits have learnt to scatter in the bush on hearing the engines of the MI-24s approaching. This scattering of bandits normally helps abductees to escape. Nevertheless, the bandits scatter and re-assemble at another point.
That is why it is necessary to have, not only the attack capacity, but also the airlift capacity so that the rebels are decisively neutralised. Infantry forces on the ground move slowly, hence the protractedness.
The recent incursion of bandits into Lango and Northern Teso is, of course, a tactical mistake by the rebels, which we shall exploit as we, indeed, did yesterday when we wiped out the rebel group at Olwa in North Katakwi. This is because this area is less bushy and open.
It is true that Sudan army officers have given fresh supplies to Kony. However, those cannot be the major factor. After all, the Sudanese will never give Kony more arms than we have or can buy. Of course, it is criminal of the Sudanese to give arms to terrorists because, not having any political aim, it is enough for Kony to have some bullets to kill civilians with. Those bullets, the B-10 bombs or whatever little ammunition the Sudanese give them cannot stop the UPDF wiping out the bandits. What is more important is the internal organisation and equipment of UPDF. When we defeated Eric Odwar's force at Corner Kilak, it was much more armed than Kony can ever get from any source.
In March Kony was even daring to ambush our mambas using B-10 recoilless guns got from Sudan. This was, mainly, because the commanders were not utilising the correct tactics in using those mambas. I sent a company of the mambas from Presidential Guard Brigade under Lt. Col. Kimbowa, to deliberately lure those bandits to attack them as they were attacking the other mambas. Kimbowa caught up with the bandit group in Okwanga. Indeed, they tried to ambush him. They fired one B-10 shell and hit one of the mambas. As pre-arranged the force responded, killed the firer of the B-10 and the people with him and captured the B-10. The bandits cannot have more weapons than we have. It is the equipping and utilisation on our own side that is decisive. Where Sudan was really harming us was in giving Kony a permanent base where his rebels could withdraw to after being attacked in Uganda, where they would then regroup and recruit so as to start their attacks on us afresh. The Sudanese cannot give them that support. Even if they give them covert support like they are doing now, it cannot change the situation in favour of the bandits; and if the Sudanese change their position and give a permanent base to Kony, then, that would fundamentally change our relationship with the Sudan Government with all the associated consequences.
Do the incursions into Lango and Katakwi represent an escalation? Not at all! Apart from the mistakes of some of our commanders, due to laxity, drunkenness and corruption, actually the bandits are fleeing from Acholi because of lack of food, drugs and endless pressure by our forces. It is an attempt to relieve pressure from within Acholi on them. It is a mistake we shall utilise. That is how we defeated Lakwena when she was aimlessly moving southwards. That is how we ended ADF by killing Cobra in Kitagwenda. Lakwena was coming to “capture Kampala†(1988) and Cobra was coming from the Rwenzori Mountains to disrupt the 2001 Presidential Elections by coming to the Central Region (Buganda). Kony’s group could no longer survive in Acholi. To stay in Acholi, they would perish. To venture out as they have done, they will perish. It is a no-win situation for the bandits. Their only way out is to take advantage of the amnesty and come out.
I am thinking, however, of proposing to the Government to revoke this amnesty law so that the ringleaders responsible for these crimes only get what they have long deserved - death.
Of course the challenge of Kony is that he concentrates on killing civilians. That is why the ringleaders must be caught and punished.
Nevertheless, we are confident that we shall finish Kony with the present level of forces, given the little increment we got last financial year.
If, however, any adventurer starts new problems in Eastern Congo aimed at our country, we have plans ready for a general or partial mobilisation to raise new divisions to defeat the enemies of our Revolution once and for all time.
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
PRESIDENT
I need to help the public put in context the present spate of attacks on civilians in Northern Uganda by Kony bandits.
I have not been in the North since the end of March when I had to reluctantly leave my good work to come and deal with the diversions that had emerged on account of some politicians. Since that time I have not had time to go back although I am following the situation wherever I am.
Nevertheless, when I am not on the ground I am, inevitably, twelve or so hours behind the events happening in the North.
Since March, in spite of the mistakes, the UPDF and the LDUs have continued to weaken Kony tremendously. The helicopter gunships have been a menace to the rebels.
Here below are some of the examples of the very successful attacks by different elements of the UPDF on the rebels.
Some incidents of UPDF gunship attacks on the rebels since February 2003:
February:
Location Rebels killed
Aswa Valley 20 Taidona 20
Guru Guru 15 Laminapo 20
March:
Location Rebels killed
Teladwong 15
South Latanya hills 20
Kalawinya 15
April:
Location Rebels killed
Lapul 30
It is these attacks that have made the rebels desperate. In particular they are short of food and drugs. That is why they have been launching desperate attacks on Internally Displaced Persons’ Camps (IDPCs) to get food or drugs. This is also, partly, to divert the mobile forces hunting the rebels from the deserted areas in the countryside to guard the IDPCs. We have, nevertheless, pressed on with the mobile forces and zonal forces in all the deserted areas: Zoka, Opok forest, Zambia swamps, Atto hill, Bolo, Latanya hills, Latwara hills, Waligo, Tel-Te, Aswa Ranch, etc. This is because the ultimate solution lies in denying the bandits any permanent base either in Southern Sudan or Northern Uganda.
Most of the attacks on the IDPCs have been defeated with high cost for the rebels.
Here below is the list of the attacks on IDPCs that were defeated:
Some of the incidents of the rebel attacks on IDPCs:
March:
Location Rebels killed
Akara Hills 20
Aromo in Lira 3
Acet in Omoro 4
April:
Location Rebels killed
Awere in Pader 2
Arumu 4
Paibona 3
Atoi hill 3
West Pabolo 2
May:
Location Rebels killed
Abumu 19
Omiya Pachua 3
Omiya Nyima 26
June:
Location Rebels killed
Lira Kato 6
Labing 8
Lira Paluo 9
Omunyure 19
Oryang 10
Nevertheless, due to laxity of some commanders, the bandits, on a few occasions, have found the local detachments unready in spite of prior information about the enemy's plans to attack those centres.
This was the case in respect of: Abim, Anaka, Karuma road bus incident and Obalanga. In these cases, the soldiers were either drunk after getting their pay or were inside the houses instead of being in trenches with scouts deployed around the encampment. On account of this indiscipline, the following COs and OCs have been arrested:
1. Capt. Kayemba
2. Capt. Kiyingi
3. Capt. Kefa Juliwa
The group that infiltrated Katakwi was hit yesterday by gunships at Olwa. We are also bringing new brigades from other parts of the country, including those that were in Congo to wipe out these bandits.
Do these attacks on civilians represent the gaining of the strength by the rebels as some people keep saying? Not at all! The contrary is true. They are desperate attempts at stretching the Army so that it does not occupy the deserted areas that they were trying to make their bases. To be sure of this, the journalists should visit the inaccessible parts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader - Zambia swamps, Opok forest, Zoka forest, Latanya, Akilok Game Reserve, Aswa Ranch, Bolo, etc. They will find our forces permanently based there. This is the real battle.
Of course, the under-spending on defence, forced on us by the so-called donors, is partly the source of the protractedness of these operations against the terrorists. Recently we managed to get attack helicopters after a long struggle.
However, we do not yet have transport helicopters to airlift heliborne infantry and coordinate with the attack helicopters.
Therefore, after suffering big losses at the hands of the attack helicopters, the bandits have learnt to scatter in the bush on hearing the engines of the MI-24s approaching. This scattering of bandits normally helps abductees to escape. Nevertheless, the bandits scatter and re-assemble at another point.
That is why it is necessary to have, not only the attack capacity, but also the airlift capacity so that the rebels are decisively neutralised. Infantry forces on the ground move slowly, hence the protractedness.
The recent incursion of bandits into Lango and Northern Teso is, of course, a tactical mistake by the rebels, which we shall exploit as we, indeed, did yesterday when we wiped out the rebel group at Olwa in North Katakwi. This is because this area is less bushy and open.
It is true that Sudan army officers have given fresh supplies to Kony. However, those cannot be the major factor. After all, the Sudanese will never give Kony more arms than we have or can buy. Of course, it is criminal of the Sudanese to give arms to terrorists because, not having any political aim, it is enough for Kony to have some bullets to kill civilians with. Those bullets, the B-10 bombs or whatever little ammunition the Sudanese give them cannot stop the UPDF wiping out the bandits. What is more important is the internal organisation and equipment of UPDF. When we defeated Eric Odwar's force at Corner Kilak, it was much more armed than Kony can ever get from any source.
In March Kony was even daring to ambush our mambas using B-10 recoilless guns got from Sudan. This was, mainly, because the commanders were not utilising the correct tactics in using those mambas. I sent a company of the mambas from Presidential Guard Brigade under Lt. Col. Kimbowa, to deliberately lure those bandits to attack them as they were attacking the other mambas. Kimbowa caught up with the bandit group in Okwanga. Indeed, they tried to ambush him. They fired one B-10 shell and hit one of the mambas. As pre-arranged the force responded, killed the firer of the B-10 and the people with him and captured the B-10. The bandits cannot have more weapons than we have. It is the equipping and utilisation on our own side that is decisive. Where Sudan was really harming us was in giving Kony a permanent base where his rebels could withdraw to after being attacked in Uganda, where they would then regroup and recruit so as to start their attacks on us afresh. The Sudanese cannot give them that support. Even if they give them covert support like they are doing now, it cannot change the situation in favour of the bandits; and if the Sudanese change their position and give a permanent base to Kony, then, that would fundamentally change our relationship with the Sudan Government with all the associated consequences.
Do the incursions into Lango and Katakwi represent an escalation? Not at all! Apart from the mistakes of some of our commanders, due to laxity, drunkenness and corruption, actually the bandits are fleeing from Acholi because of lack of food, drugs and endless pressure by our forces. It is an attempt to relieve pressure from within Acholi on them. It is a mistake we shall utilise. That is how we defeated Lakwena when she was aimlessly moving southwards. That is how we ended ADF by killing Cobra in Kitagwenda. Lakwena was coming to “capture Kampala†(1988) and Cobra was coming from the Rwenzori Mountains to disrupt the 2001 Presidential Elections by coming to the Central Region (Buganda). Kony’s group could no longer survive in Acholi. To stay in Acholi, they would perish. To venture out as they have done, they will perish. It is a no-win situation for the bandits. Their only way out is to take advantage of the amnesty and come out.
I am thinking, however, of proposing to the Government to revoke this amnesty law so that the ringleaders responsible for these crimes only get what they have long deserved - death.
Of course the challenge of Kony is that he concentrates on killing civilians. That is why the ringleaders must be caught and punished.
Nevertheless, we are confident that we shall finish Kony with the present level of forces, given the little increment we got last financial year.
If, however, any adventurer starts new problems in Eastern Congo aimed at our country, we have plans ready for a general or partial mobilisation to raise new divisions to defeat the enemies of our Revolution once and for all time.
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
PRESIDENT