Is the end of Kony war at hand?
Nov 18, 2003
Press reports about the UPDF’s campaign against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) indicate that the latter are making headway
By Asuman Bisiika
Press reports about the UPDF’s campaign against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) indicate that the latter are making headway. ‘Brigadier’ Charles Tabuley was recently killed in Teso region where the insurgents had opened another front of operation.
‘Maj. Gen.’ Vincent Otti, the de facto second in command of the ungainly LRA, is said to be contemplating surrendering to the UPDF. Not to forget intelligence reports on the rift between the LRA top leadership. One may even say this marks the beginning of the end of the Kony insurgency.
To appreciate this, one would have to look at security and geo-political developments in the Great Lakes region. Today, there are concerted efforts to end security problems in the region more than ever before.
At the moment, the LRA insurgency is the only active conflict in the region without a framework under which it can be resolved peacefully. Given the fact that the LRA has been tagged a terrorist group, means that it has no recourse to any open foreign diplomatic succour.
LRA has almost entirely fed on the dynamics of the civil war in the Sudan. However, developments in regional efforts to end the Sudanese civil war would affect the LRA’s supplies capability and moral sympathy to wage a war on Uganda.
In addition to the geo-political dispensation on resolving regional security problems, the UPDF is on the offensive: taking the war to the LRA, so to speak. This approach is a departure from the tactical defensive posturing that has hitherto been the hallmark of UPDF operations.
Reports from operational areas indicate that the UPDF is now using counter-insurgence methods, thereby denying the LRA the exclusive advantage of guerrilla warfare.
Does this mean UPDF has corrected the perennial mistakes always blamed for the failure to end the Kony war?
Asked whether the recent success in the UPDF campaign against LRA represents the beginning of the end of the Kony war, Maj. Shaban Bantariza, the UPDF spokesman says, “I hope so.â€
He says the UPDF success is attributed to the saturation (mass deployment) of forces in the areas of operation.
“The UPDF regular forces are now exclusively deployed to hunt down the LRA terrorists because the auxiliary forces (what you people call Arrow Group, Amuka, Rhino etc) are handling the security in the villages and on the roads.
“This has liberated the UPDF regular forces to concentrate on hunting for these terrorists wherever they are,†a confident Bantariza says.
Asked how the new developments in southern Sudan would benefit UPDF operations, Bantariza says, “The problem of southern Sudan has been the ‘No Man’s Land’ which the LRA terrorists use as their rear base. The new arrangement would put the no-man’s-land under the authority of the SPLA. With state authority in southern Sudan, the LRA would be denied base in the country. This would be good for us.â€
Some of the factors that have perpetuated the LRA insurgency include:
UPDF tactical and strategic mistakes. In August 1986, the 35th (then) National Resistance Army (NRA) Battalion made reprisal killings when Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) rebels attacked them at Namukora.
Despite government’s immediate response to disband the unit, the killings marked the beginning of mistrust and suspicion that has run through the 17-year old insurgency.
Underestimation of the conflict. Government and military officials issued deadlines and ultimatums under which they would end the rebellion.
However, every deadline that passed emboldened the rebel fighters. So, government seems to have underestimated the challenges posed by the insurgency.
Socio-economic factors:
Between 1986-87, Acholi peasants provided livestock for the rebels and expected compensation after victory.
The Karimojong tribal warriors took advantage of the conflict to rustle the remaining animals.
This had social and economic implications that were later to feed the rebellion with emotional sympathy and human capacity. Economically deprived, many youths found it attractive to take up arms as a way of survival.
Downsizing the UPDF and the Sudan Factor
In 1992, as a result of donor pressure, government reduced army strength. The reduction weakened the army’s deployment capacity, which would enable them contain LRA who had training and operational bases in the Southern Sudan.
Under-funding the Ministry of Defence
Under donor pressure, the Ministry of Defence has been under-funded; making it unable to cope with the challenges of the rebellion. With a tight budget, the ministry lacks the capacity to acquire appropriate equipment to handle the war.
The army has been poorly provisioned with equipment and welfare. Soldiers go to the battle front in slippers, tattered battle fatigues and lack incentives.
Lack of common stand on Kony:
The insurgency has fitted in the oppositionist psyche during national and local elections since 1989. During the Presidential elections of 1996 and 2001, the LRA tended to gain some degree of legitimacy or acceptance because it was a manifesto issue that was approached differently by various candidates during the campaigns.
Press reports about the UPDF’s campaign against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) indicate that the latter are making headway. ‘Brigadier’ Charles Tabuley was recently killed in Teso region where the insurgents had opened another front of operation.
‘Maj. Gen.’ Vincent Otti, the de facto second in command of the ungainly LRA, is said to be contemplating surrendering to the UPDF. Not to forget intelligence reports on the rift between the LRA top leadership. One may even say this marks the beginning of the end of the Kony insurgency.
To appreciate this, one would have to look at security and geo-political developments in the Great Lakes region. Today, there are concerted efforts to end security problems in the region more than ever before.
At the moment, the LRA insurgency is the only active conflict in the region without a framework under which it can be resolved peacefully. Given the fact that the LRA has been tagged a terrorist group, means that it has no recourse to any open foreign diplomatic succour.
LRA has almost entirely fed on the dynamics of the civil war in the Sudan. However, developments in regional efforts to end the Sudanese civil war would affect the LRA’s supplies capability and moral sympathy to wage a war on Uganda.
In addition to the geo-political dispensation on resolving regional security problems, the UPDF is on the offensive: taking the war to the LRA, so to speak. This approach is a departure from the tactical defensive posturing that has hitherto been the hallmark of UPDF operations.
Reports from operational areas indicate that the UPDF is now using counter-insurgence methods, thereby denying the LRA the exclusive advantage of guerrilla warfare.
Does this mean UPDF has corrected the perennial mistakes always blamed for the failure to end the Kony war?
Asked whether the recent success in the UPDF campaign against LRA represents the beginning of the end of the Kony war, Maj. Shaban Bantariza, the UPDF spokesman says, “I hope so.â€
He says the UPDF success is attributed to the saturation (mass deployment) of forces in the areas of operation.
“The UPDF regular forces are now exclusively deployed to hunt down the LRA terrorists because the auxiliary forces (what you people call Arrow Group, Amuka, Rhino etc) are handling the security in the villages and on the roads.
“This has liberated the UPDF regular forces to concentrate on hunting for these terrorists wherever they are,†a confident Bantariza says.
Asked how the new developments in southern Sudan would benefit UPDF operations, Bantariza says, “The problem of southern Sudan has been the ‘No Man’s Land’ which the LRA terrorists use as their rear base. The new arrangement would put the no-man’s-land under the authority of the SPLA. With state authority in southern Sudan, the LRA would be denied base in the country. This would be good for us.â€
Some of the factors that have perpetuated the LRA insurgency include:
Despite government’s immediate response to disband the unit, the killings marked the beginning of mistrust and suspicion that has run through the 17-year old insurgency.
However, every deadline that passed emboldened the rebel fighters. So, government seems to have underestimated the challenges posed by the insurgency.
Between 1986-87, Acholi peasants provided livestock for the rebels and expected compensation after victory.
The Karimojong tribal warriors took advantage of the conflict to rustle the remaining animals.
This had social and economic implications that were later to feed the rebellion with emotional sympathy and human capacity. Economically deprived, many youths found it attractive to take up arms as a way of survival.
In 1992, as a result of donor pressure, government reduced army strength. The reduction weakened the army’s deployment capacity, which would enable them contain LRA who had training and operational bases in the Southern Sudan.
Under donor pressure, the Ministry of Defence has been under-funded; making it unable to cope with the challenges of the rebellion. With a tight budget, the ministry lacks the capacity to acquire appropriate equipment to handle the war.
The army has been poorly provisioned with equipment and welfare. Soldiers go to the battle front in slippers, tattered battle fatigues and lack incentives.
The insurgency has fitted in the oppositionist psyche during national and local elections since 1989. During the Presidential elections of 1996 and 2001, the LRA tended to gain some degree of legitimacy or acceptance because it was a manifesto issue that was approached differently by various candidates during the campaigns.