International community has failed Rwanda again
May 14, 2009
BY PHIL CLARK<br><br>The recent decision by the UK High Court to release four Rwandan genocide suspects whom the Home Secretary had ordered to be extradited to Rwanda represents the latest international failure concerning post-genocide justice.
BY PHIL CLARK
The recent decision by the UK High Court to release four Rwandan genocide suspects whom the Home Secretary had ordered to be extradited to Rwanda represents the latest international failure concerning post-genocide justice.
The ruling also repeats widespread and misinformed views on the current political and legal situation in Rwanda.
Recently, we witnessed the outrage of Rwandan citizens at the effect of the High Court decision and its timing. Only a court detached from realities in Rwanda would issue this judgement on April 8, at the height of the 15th anniversary commemorations of the genocide.
Many Rwandans interpreted the court’s decision as a painful affront at a time when the commemoration focused on the international abandonment of Rwanda in 1994. Just as the UN and foreign governments turned away when innocent civilians were being killed during the genocide, the international community is now reneging on its duty to try genocide suspects.
In their decision, Judges Sullivan and Laws stated that the genocide suspects could not be extradited to Rwanda because they would not receive a fair trial at home. Appearing for one of the suspects, leading lawyer Lord Gifford stated that the case highlighted “an emerging international consensus that there is no fair trial in Rwanda.†As judges in Germany, Finland and France have done in similar cases, the UK judges echoed the recent findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
The ICTR’s refusal to transfer five cases to the Rwandan courts hinges on its finding that witnesses would be too frightened to testify in the suspects’ defence in Rwanda. The ICTR judges based their decisions on their own perception of the fear of witnesses who have travelled to the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, and assertions by organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Statements by HRW, drawing on a handful of highly selective cases in the Rwandan courts, have become the basis of key ICTR decisions, which have shaped national judgments around the world. Crucial international and domestic legal decisions regarding genocide crimes are being made on the basis of information gathering that is filtered through the position of one dominant advocacy group.
The UK decision stands out because — unlike other European countries — the UK lacks the domestic legislation to prosecute the genocide cases that it chooses not to transfer to Rwanda. Given the choice between returning suspects to Rwanda to face trial to determine their guilt or innocence and letting them walk free, the UK judges needed watertight evidence that the former would result in an unfair trial. The High Court ruling was based on no such evidence.
Our research in Rwanda over the last six years shows that most defence witnesses are willing to testify in genocide hearings. The quality of justice delivered through the Rwandan courts has increased, due to the training of local judges and lawyers, legislative reform and improved salaries and infrastructure. The Rwandan judiciary – both the national courts and the gacaca community courts – have tried thousands of genocide suspects.
As is also the case before the ICTR, the determination of suspects’ innocence or guilt has depended heavily on oral evidence. The impact of defence testimony accounts for the high incidence of domestic acquittal of genocide suspects, including a 25% acquittal rate through gacaca. Both prosecution and defence counsel at the ICTR argue that evidence at gacaca is sometimes their strongest means of building a case because of the wealth of eyewitness testimony that gacaca has gathered.
Furthermore, Rwandan defence witnesses continue to travel to the ICTR in Arusha, even though it is impossible to hide their identities, as tight-knit communities can easily identify individuals who are away for lengthy periods. Certainly some defence and prosecution witnesses in Rwanda have suffered intimidation and reprisals for giving testimony, either to the domestic courts or the ICTR, but no more or less than in other countries.
HRW, the ICTR and the UK High Court therefore, must base their analyses on a much finer-grained examination of legal realities in Rwanda, rather than assuming that a country recovering from genocide is incapable of prosecuting serious cases.
Not only is there insufficient evidence to block the transfer of genocide cases to Rwanda, but such transfers would be of immense benefit to Rwandans. Our research indicates that justice delivered domestically can have a major impact in terms of understanding of the events of 1994 and reconciliation. Prosecutions through the national courts and gacaca have brought justice into people’s midst, making it a daily reality. During gacaca hearings, genocide suspects and survivors tell their stories face-to-face.
The impact of gacaca has not always been easy to predict, particularly given the volatile and often traumatising narratives that participants tell and hear. However, by doing justice locally, gacaca has come to matter to those most affected by the genocide.
In contrast, our research shows that most Rwandans feel little connection to the international justice delivered by the ICTR in Arusha. By refusing to transfer genocide cases to the national courts, the ICTR has continued this sense of dislocation from daily life in Rwanda. Echoing the ICTR’s legal rationale, the UK High Court has also denied Rwandans the benefits of witnessing firsthand post-genocide justice being done.
The writer is a a research fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford
Co writer: Nicola Palmer
The recent decision by the UK High Court to release four Rwandan genocide suspects whom the Home Secretary had ordered to be extradited to Rwanda represents the latest international failure concerning post-genocide justice.
The ruling also repeats widespread and misinformed views on the current political and legal situation in Rwanda.
Recently, we witnessed the outrage of Rwandan citizens at the effect of the High Court decision and its timing. Only a court detached from realities in Rwanda would issue this judgement on April 8, at the height of the 15th anniversary commemorations of the genocide.
Many Rwandans interpreted the court’s decision as a painful affront at a time when the commemoration focused on the international abandonment of Rwanda in 1994. Just as the UN and foreign governments turned away when innocent civilians were being killed during the genocide, the international community is now reneging on its duty to try genocide suspects.
In their decision, Judges Sullivan and Laws stated that the genocide suspects could not be extradited to Rwanda because they would not receive a fair trial at home. Appearing for one of the suspects, leading lawyer Lord Gifford stated that the case highlighted “an emerging international consensus that there is no fair trial in Rwanda.†As judges in Germany, Finland and France have done in similar cases, the UK judges echoed the recent findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
The ICTR’s refusal to transfer five cases to the Rwandan courts hinges on its finding that witnesses would be too frightened to testify in the suspects’ defence in Rwanda. The ICTR judges based their decisions on their own perception of the fear of witnesses who have travelled to the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, and assertions by organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Statements by HRW, drawing on a handful of highly selective cases in the Rwandan courts, have become the basis of key ICTR decisions, which have shaped national judgments around the world. Crucial international and domestic legal decisions regarding genocide crimes are being made on the basis of information gathering that is filtered through the position of one dominant advocacy group.
The UK decision stands out because — unlike other European countries — the UK lacks the domestic legislation to prosecute the genocide cases that it chooses not to transfer to Rwanda. Given the choice between returning suspects to Rwanda to face trial to determine their guilt or innocence and letting them walk free, the UK judges needed watertight evidence that the former would result in an unfair trial. The High Court ruling was based on no such evidence.
Our research in Rwanda over the last six years shows that most defence witnesses are willing to testify in genocide hearings. The quality of justice delivered through the Rwandan courts has increased, due to the training of local judges and lawyers, legislative reform and improved salaries and infrastructure. The Rwandan judiciary – both the national courts and the gacaca community courts – have tried thousands of genocide suspects.
As is also the case before the ICTR, the determination of suspects’ innocence or guilt has depended heavily on oral evidence. The impact of defence testimony accounts for the high incidence of domestic acquittal of genocide suspects, including a 25% acquittal rate through gacaca. Both prosecution and defence counsel at the ICTR argue that evidence at gacaca is sometimes their strongest means of building a case because of the wealth of eyewitness testimony that gacaca has gathered.
Furthermore, Rwandan defence witnesses continue to travel to the ICTR in Arusha, even though it is impossible to hide their identities, as tight-knit communities can easily identify individuals who are away for lengthy periods. Certainly some defence and prosecution witnesses in Rwanda have suffered intimidation and reprisals for giving testimony, either to the domestic courts or the ICTR, but no more or less than in other countries.
HRW, the ICTR and the UK High Court therefore, must base their analyses on a much finer-grained examination of legal realities in Rwanda, rather than assuming that a country recovering from genocide is incapable of prosecuting serious cases.
Not only is there insufficient evidence to block the transfer of genocide cases to Rwanda, but such transfers would be of immense benefit to Rwandans. Our research indicates that justice delivered domestically can have a major impact in terms of understanding of the events of 1994 and reconciliation. Prosecutions through the national courts and gacaca have brought justice into people’s midst, making it a daily reality. During gacaca hearings, genocide suspects and survivors tell their stories face-to-face.
The impact of gacaca has not always been easy to predict, particularly given the volatile and often traumatising narratives that participants tell and hear. However, by doing justice locally, gacaca has come to matter to those most affected by the genocide.
In contrast, our research shows that most Rwandans feel little connection to the international justice delivered by the ICTR in Arusha. By refusing to transfer genocide cases to the national courts, the ICTR has continued this sense of dislocation from daily life in Rwanda. Echoing the ICTR’s legal rationale, the UK High Court has also denied Rwandans the benefits of witnessing firsthand post-genocide justice being done.
The writer is a a research fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford
Co writer: Nicola Palmer