September riots not a constitutional crisis
Oct 20, 2009
LIKENING the September 2009 riots to the 1966 constitutional crisis, as done by Kalundi Serumaga (<i>The East African</i> September 14-20) and Joe Powell in <i>The Independent</i> (issue 078), would be superficial.
By Kintu Nyago
LIKENING the September 2009 riots to the 1966 constitutional crisis, as done by Kalundi Serumaga (The East African September 14-20) and Joe Powell in The Independent (issue 078), would be superficial.
To begin with, the 1966 constitutional crisis involved Obote abrogating the 1962 Constitution, ironically a fudge he had opportunistically crafted together with Mengo and the British.
The September riots, however, involved the NRM government’s attempt to protect constitutional order against forces that, in part, advocated communal sectarian strife and anarchy.
Additionally, the constitution in 1966 had recognised Mengo’s demand to have an ethnic federal state within a state entity, with the Kabaka as its political head (positions Serumaga advocates). Today, the Kabaka is a constitutional traditional ruler within a unitary arrangement.
I refer to the 1962 Lancaster House constitution as a fudge because its logic was based on partisan short term political expediency, all serving the interests of the UPC-Mengo alliance.
Sir Edward Muteesa, the Kabaka, in effect became head of the Ugandan state, Buganda government and the resultant Kabaka Yekka (KY) party. This was politically untenable within a democracy. And a position that was vehemently opposed by both the Catholic Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka and the DP supremo, Benedicto Kiwanuka.
Incidentally, the anomaly of making the Kabaka political negated a position that had been adopted seven years prior in the Buganda Agreement of 1955. This agreement conditioned Mutesa’s return, from his first exile, in the early 1950s, upon his becoming a constitutional monarch. This in addition to having an elected Lukiiko and Katikkiro.
The genesis of Uganda’s 1966 constitutional crisis lay in the conflictprone 1962 Constitution, the culture of political autocracy and impunity we had inherited from the British, political divisions within the Uganda People’s Congress and the lack of political experience amongst our then rulers.
Uganda’s 1962 Constitution was a partisan sectarian document. Worse still, it was managed by an opportunistic, short-term coalition. For the UPC, then, following in the tradition of the Uganda National Congress, aspired to be a pro-democracy (Anglican) pan-Ugandan party while the KY, on the other hand, was a sectarian party that advocated an ethnic federal type of governance system, headed by an absolute monarch. Colonialism tended to respond to political dissent with brute. This thinking informed the operations of the colonial state apparatus. These tensions stretched the young Ugandan polity to the limit.
A reality further complicated by the inexperience of the political actors at play. For instance, Obote only meaningfully engaged with national statecraft just four years to independence, when he joined the Legco. Moreover, he fluked the UNC leadership resulting from an internal coup instigated by Joe Kiwanuka, who replaced Ignatius Musaazi with Obote in 1959.
Grace Ibingira was barely 30 years when he become the attorney general. Other key actors were equally inexperienced; for example Felix Onama (defence minister) had been a village cooperative union clerk.
Inexperience and shortsightedness led Obote at the 1965 UPC Gulu delegates’ conference, to dump John Kakonge, a reliable ally, for the position of party secretary general, and instead support Ibingira.
Soon after, the latter with Mengo led by Mutesa attempted to remove Obote, both extra-constitutionally and constitutionally from power.
All this played out through the attempted failed coup by Brig. Shaban Opolot, the disbanding of the KY and having its members join UPC, which was followed by internal UPC party elections.
Then came the Daudi Ochieng parliamentary motion of ‘no confidence.’ Obote responded by pushing forward with the referendum of the Lost Counties and ethnicising the military and security forces. This background explains his partisan response to the 1965 Uganda Army mutiny. While following his defeat in UPC party elections in Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, Busoga and Bukedi and the no-confidence motion, Obote arrested and detained five dissenting cabinet colleagues, during a cabinet meeting.
He also abrogated the 1962 Constitution and attacked the Lubiri (palace) where more than 1,000 people were killed, with Mutesa being exiled till death. This alienated Obote from an important power structure that later vehemently opposed him. He also affected many when he imposed a Buganda specific state of emergency. This sealed his and whatever had remained of the UPC’s political fortunes in Buganda.
Serumaga argues that when the Museveni administration stopped Kabaka Mutebi from visiting Kayunga, it was a sign of constitutional collapse. Isn’t this a misinterpretation of facts? The Banyala may be a minority, but nonetheless they are constitutionally recognised as a separate ethnic group and their Sabanyala has the sanctioning of Kayunga district council.
Now given that some Banyala were opposed to the Kabaka’s visit without being consulted and involved, with fired tempers on both ends, was it not in the country’s best interest to ensure that Kabaka Mutebi, his delegation and the people of Kayunga were protected from harm? Does this constitute a constitutional breakdown? Certainly not.
Furthermore, Powell’s likening of the 1966 crisis to the September riots illustrates his profound ignorance of the facts. For, unlike Obote, Museveni and his inner circle are better exposed and seasoned political actors who are unlikely to embark on a mistake safari.
They acted to protect rather than undermine or abrogate the 1995 Constitution. Additionally, the NRM party and the Ugandan state apparatus are cohesively behind their leadership.
Mengo, on the other hand, lacks the formidable state and partisan political apparatus, which Kabaka Mutesa had at his disposal through the 1962 Constitution. Lastly, unlike the UPC in the mid-1960s, the NRM has solid political support in Buganda. These elected leaders would sway the population towards the NRM when push comes to shove.
The writer is a political analyst
LIKENING the September 2009 riots to the 1966 constitutional crisis, as done by Kalundi Serumaga (The East African September 14-20) and Joe Powell in The Independent (issue 078), would be superficial.
To begin with, the 1966 constitutional crisis involved Obote abrogating the 1962 Constitution, ironically a fudge he had opportunistically crafted together with Mengo and the British.
The September riots, however, involved the NRM government’s attempt to protect constitutional order against forces that, in part, advocated communal sectarian strife and anarchy.
Additionally, the constitution in 1966 had recognised Mengo’s demand to have an ethnic federal state within a state entity, with the Kabaka as its political head (positions Serumaga advocates). Today, the Kabaka is a constitutional traditional ruler within a unitary arrangement.
I refer to the 1962 Lancaster House constitution as a fudge because its logic was based on partisan short term political expediency, all serving the interests of the UPC-Mengo alliance.
Sir Edward Muteesa, the Kabaka, in effect became head of the Ugandan state, Buganda government and the resultant Kabaka Yekka (KY) party. This was politically untenable within a democracy. And a position that was vehemently opposed by both the Catholic Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka and the DP supremo, Benedicto Kiwanuka.
Incidentally, the anomaly of making the Kabaka political negated a position that had been adopted seven years prior in the Buganda Agreement of 1955. This agreement conditioned Mutesa’s return, from his first exile, in the early 1950s, upon his becoming a constitutional monarch. This in addition to having an elected Lukiiko and Katikkiro.
The genesis of Uganda’s 1966 constitutional crisis lay in the conflictprone 1962 Constitution, the culture of political autocracy and impunity we had inherited from the British, political divisions within the Uganda People’s Congress and the lack of political experience amongst our then rulers.
Uganda’s 1962 Constitution was a partisan sectarian document. Worse still, it was managed by an opportunistic, short-term coalition. For the UPC, then, following in the tradition of the Uganda National Congress, aspired to be a pro-democracy (Anglican) pan-Ugandan party while the KY, on the other hand, was a sectarian party that advocated an ethnic federal type of governance system, headed by an absolute monarch. Colonialism tended to respond to political dissent with brute. This thinking informed the operations of the colonial state apparatus. These tensions stretched the young Ugandan polity to the limit.
A reality further complicated by the inexperience of the political actors at play. For instance, Obote only meaningfully engaged with national statecraft just four years to independence, when he joined the Legco. Moreover, he fluked the UNC leadership resulting from an internal coup instigated by Joe Kiwanuka, who replaced Ignatius Musaazi with Obote in 1959.
Grace Ibingira was barely 30 years when he become the attorney general. Other key actors were equally inexperienced; for example Felix Onama (defence minister) had been a village cooperative union clerk.
Inexperience and shortsightedness led Obote at the 1965 UPC Gulu delegates’ conference, to dump John Kakonge, a reliable ally, for the position of party secretary general, and instead support Ibingira.
Soon after, the latter with Mengo led by Mutesa attempted to remove Obote, both extra-constitutionally and constitutionally from power.
All this played out through the attempted failed coup by Brig. Shaban Opolot, the disbanding of the KY and having its members join UPC, which was followed by internal UPC party elections.
Then came the Daudi Ochieng parliamentary motion of ‘no confidence.’ Obote responded by pushing forward with the referendum of the Lost Counties and ethnicising the military and security forces. This background explains his partisan response to the 1965 Uganda Army mutiny. While following his defeat in UPC party elections in Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, Busoga and Bukedi and the no-confidence motion, Obote arrested and detained five dissenting cabinet colleagues, during a cabinet meeting.
He also abrogated the 1962 Constitution and attacked the Lubiri (palace) where more than 1,000 people were killed, with Mutesa being exiled till death. This alienated Obote from an important power structure that later vehemently opposed him. He also affected many when he imposed a Buganda specific state of emergency. This sealed his and whatever had remained of the UPC’s political fortunes in Buganda.
Serumaga argues that when the Museveni administration stopped Kabaka Mutebi from visiting Kayunga, it was a sign of constitutional collapse. Isn’t this a misinterpretation of facts? The Banyala may be a minority, but nonetheless they are constitutionally recognised as a separate ethnic group and their Sabanyala has the sanctioning of Kayunga district council.
Now given that some Banyala were opposed to the Kabaka’s visit without being consulted and involved, with fired tempers on both ends, was it not in the country’s best interest to ensure that Kabaka Mutebi, his delegation and the people of Kayunga were protected from harm? Does this constitute a constitutional breakdown? Certainly not.
Furthermore, Powell’s likening of the 1966 crisis to the September riots illustrates his profound ignorance of the facts. For, unlike Obote, Museveni and his inner circle are better exposed and seasoned political actors who are unlikely to embark on a mistake safari.
They acted to protect rather than undermine or abrogate the 1995 Constitution. Additionally, the NRM party and the Ugandan state apparatus are cohesively behind their leadership.
Mengo, on the other hand, lacks the formidable state and partisan political apparatus, which Kabaka Mutesa had at his disposal through the 1962 Constitution. Lastly, unlike the UPC in the mid-1960s, the NRM has solid political support in Buganda. These elected leaders would sway the population towards the NRM when push comes to shove.
The writer is a political analyst