Is it time to engage Joseph Kony again?
Apr 15, 2008
Who are Mr. Bill and Mr. Alex? These are just some of the many questions swirling around in the wake of the failed signing of the peace agreement by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) last Thursday in Ri-Kwangba.
OPIYO OLOYA
PERSPECTIVE OF A UGANDAN IN CANADA
Who are Mr. Bill and Mr. Alex? These are just some of the many questions swirling around in the wake of the failed signing of the peace agreement by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) last Thursday in Ri-Kwangba.
According to media reports, LRA chief Joseph Kony was a no-show at the historic event in South Sudan where dignitaries had assembled. More confusion was added to the mix when a letter purported to have come from the LRA was circulated in which Kony cited several reasons for failing to ratify the agreements.
The latest information indicates turmoil in LRA ranks with as many as nine rebels including Commander Okot Odhiambo killed by Kony. What is going on here?
Let us start with the issue of credibility of the negotiators in the ongoing negotiations. The first and second points in the letter purported to have come from the LRA note the “lack of neutral mediator for mediation process†and “insecure Juba and Dr. Machar†as reasons for postponing the signing of the agreement.
Meanwhile, the seventh point in the complaint cites the “incompetence of H.E. former President Joachim Alberto Chissano†who “lacks expertise and experience†in conflict negotiation. Now, regardless of what the LRA expects in a negotiator, Joachim Chissano is an internationally respected personality whose work as a peace-builder is not in dispute. Rather the question is why the LRA is raising the question about Chissano now, almost two years after the former president became involved in the northern Uganda peace process.
All of this suggests that the LRA is stalling for time before signing the agreement. The question though is: Time to do what? There are several possibilities. There are a couple of possible explanations for the LRA belated attack on the credibility of Mr. Chissano and Chief Negotiator Dr. Riek Machar. Foremost, the LRA was not sincere all along, taking the entire international community for a wild ride, only to dump everyone in the dustbin after getting what they wanted (we will return to this in a moment).
The issues of security and Dr. Machar’s alleged bias against the LRA were comprehensively dealt with in February 2007 at the Acholi Conference in Juba. At the time, everyone agreed that the LRA delegation needed to feel safe, and consequently, security was addressed. Since then, the LRA has not brought this issue again, until last week.
Secondly, it is also possible that the LRA has developed cold feet to the peace agreement because its leaders seek to raise the stakes to get the International Criminal Court (ICC) to blink on the pending war-crime indictments against Joseph Kony, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo. In other words, Kony and his lieutenants know that the best time to get a better deal is now, not later. To the LRA, the peace agreement must include a “no prosecution†clause for top commanders indicted by the ICC. Such a clause would clearly indicate that the government of Uganda will do everything to protect the remaining LRA commanders from being sent to The Hague.
However, as argued here last week, while the government of Uganda may choose to give such a guarantee in the agreement with the LRA, it no longer has the capacity to stop the ICC process from moving ahead. The problem with any amnesty given to Kony and the other indicted LRA commanders is that the government of Uganda (or indeed any government that shelters the indicted men) will face heavy international pressure to extradite the accused to the Hague.
Amnesty International fired off a quick salvo early this week reiterating to all governments to ensure that Kony and his top commanders are arrested and turned over to the ICC. Uganda or any country shielding Kony and his indicted compatriots could face any number of international sanctions. That may include curtailed international trips by the head of state, restrictions of diplomatic visas for government delegations, and possible withholding of international financial loans.
Indeed, it would be very costly for any country to attempt to dial back the clock in the ICC indictments against the LRA. A possible scenario which should not be completely ignored is that the LRA is stalling for time because it hopes to acquire enough weaponry in order to resume fighting in northern Uganda and in south Sudan as a means of forcing the hands of negotiators for a better deal that includes complete amnesty for all.
However, this is unlikely because the dynamics that made it easy for the LRA to move freely within the Sudan-Uganda boundaries have changed.
The LRA is no longer a surrogate supported by the Khartoum government. Moreover, the logistics are enormous to move fighters from Garamba where the LRA is currently holed up to northern Uganda.
The bottom line is that whatever is eating Kony’s grapes, it is not for lack of trying on the part of the people of Uganda to get a just peace for northern Uganda. There are clues which suggest that there is a tremendous disconnect between the LRA delegation in Juba and the fighters in the bush.
The delegation in Juba is only looking at certain modalities for concluding the 20-year war in northern Uganda, but the fighters in the bush are thinking of the nut and bolts issues— what things will look like once they give up their weaponry. Yet, instead of saying: “Look, we want to rethink this whole thing againâ€, the LRA leadership has thrown up smokescreen at the last minute.
This has exposed the flank of the LRA to those who believe that the time is ripe to return to the guns. Such a move, of course, would be catastrophic for everyone, especially for the long-suffering people of northern Uganda.
Opiyo.oloya@sympatico.ca
PERSPECTIVE OF A UGANDAN IN CANADA
Who are Mr. Bill and Mr. Alex? These are just some of the many questions swirling around in the wake of the failed signing of the peace agreement by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) last Thursday in Ri-Kwangba.
According to media reports, LRA chief Joseph Kony was a no-show at the historic event in South Sudan where dignitaries had assembled. More confusion was added to the mix when a letter purported to have come from the LRA was circulated in which Kony cited several reasons for failing to ratify the agreements.
The latest information indicates turmoil in LRA ranks with as many as nine rebels including Commander Okot Odhiambo killed by Kony. What is going on here?
Let us start with the issue of credibility of the negotiators in the ongoing negotiations. The first and second points in the letter purported to have come from the LRA note the “lack of neutral mediator for mediation process†and “insecure Juba and Dr. Machar†as reasons for postponing the signing of the agreement.
Meanwhile, the seventh point in the complaint cites the “incompetence of H.E. former President Joachim Alberto Chissano†who “lacks expertise and experience†in conflict negotiation. Now, regardless of what the LRA expects in a negotiator, Joachim Chissano is an internationally respected personality whose work as a peace-builder is not in dispute. Rather the question is why the LRA is raising the question about Chissano now, almost two years after the former president became involved in the northern Uganda peace process.
All of this suggests that the LRA is stalling for time before signing the agreement. The question though is: Time to do what? There are several possibilities. There are a couple of possible explanations for the LRA belated attack on the credibility of Mr. Chissano and Chief Negotiator Dr. Riek Machar. Foremost, the LRA was not sincere all along, taking the entire international community for a wild ride, only to dump everyone in the dustbin after getting what they wanted (we will return to this in a moment).
The issues of security and Dr. Machar’s alleged bias against the LRA were comprehensively dealt with in February 2007 at the Acholi Conference in Juba. At the time, everyone agreed that the LRA delegation needed to feel safe, and consequently, security was addressed. Since then, the LRA has not brought this issue again, until last week.
Secondly, it is also possible that the LRA has developed cold feet to the peace agreement because its leaders seek to raise the stakes to get the International Criminal Court (ICC) to blink on the pending war-crime indictments against Joseph Kony, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo. In other words, Kony and his lieutenants know that the best time to get a better deal is now, not later. To the LRA, the peace agreement must include a “no prosecution†clause for top commanders indicted by the ICC. Such a clause would clearly indicate that the government of Uganda will do everything to protect the remaining LRA commanders from being sent to The Hague.
However, as argued here last week, while the government of Uganda may choose to give such a guarantee in the agreement with the LRA, it no longer has the capacity to stop the ICC process from moving ahead. The problem with any amnesty given to Kony and the other indicted LRA commanders is that the government of Uganda (or indeed any government that shelters the indicted men) will face heavy international pressure to extradite the accused to the Hague.
Amnesty International fired off a quick salvo early this week reiterating to all governments to ensure that Kony and his top commanders are arrested and turned over to the ICC. Uganda or any country shielding Kony and his indicted compatriots could face any number of international sanctions. That may include curtailed international trips by the head of state, restrictions of diplomatic visas for government delegations, and possible withholding of international financial loans.
Indeed, it would be very costly for any country to attempt to dial back the clock in the ICC indictments against the LRA. A possible scenario which should not be completely ignored is that the LRA is stalling for time because it hopes to acquire enough weaponry in order to resume fighting in northern Uganda and in south Sudan as a means of forcing the hands of negotiators for a better deal that includes complete amnesty for all.
However, this is unlikely because the dynamics that made it easy for the LRA to move freely within the Sudan-Uganda boundaries have changed.
The LRA is no longer a surrogate supported by the Khartoum government. Moreover, the logistics are enormous to move fighters from Garamba where the LRA is currently holed up to northern Uganda.
The bottom line is that whatever is eating Kony’s grapes, it is not for lack of trying on the part of the people of Uganda to get a just peace for northern Uganda. There are clues which suggest that there is a tremendous disconnect between the LRA delegation in Juba and the fighters in the bush.
The delegation in Juba is only looking at certain modalities for concluding the 20-year war in northern Uganda, but the fighters in the bush are thinking of the nut and bolts issues— what things will look like once they give up their weaponry. Yet, instead of saying: “Look, we want to rethink this whole thing againâ€, the LRA leadership has thrown up smokescreen at the last minute.
This has exposed the flank of the LRA to those who believe that the time is ripe to return to the guns. Such a move, of course, would be catastrophic for everyone, especially for the long-suffering people of northern Uganda.
Opiyo.oloya@sympatico.ca