These events led to the 1966 crisis
Feb 12, 2007
THE Uganda crisis of 1966 was a culmination of a series of events which started to unfold in 1956 and resulted in the polarisation of our politics in multiple centres. It started with the detention of five ministers on February 22, 1966 followed by the suspension of the independence constitution and
Peter Mulira
A learned friend with a historical perspective
THE Uganda crisis of 1966 was a culmination of a series of events which started to unfold in 1956 and resulted in the polarisation of our politics in multiple centres. It started with the detention of five ministers on February 22, 1966 followed by the suspension of the independence constitution and the attack on Mengo palace by the national army. In essence, the crisis was prompted by a desire of the ruling party to locate the political power base in one centre.
The stage for the eventual crisis was set in January 1956 when Matayo Mugwanya, who was later to become the president general of the Democratic Party, came within four votes of winning the katikiroship of Buganda. Later in June of that year, all the political parties came together to successfully fight the Buganda lukiiko’s decision to distribute, as gifts to “deserving peopleâ€, the remaining 154 square miles of land from the legendary 8,000 square miles, which were distributed in 1900.
This double victory of the political parties was seen as a direct strike on Mengo government’s traditional hold on Buganda’s mind and soul. The reaction of the establishment was to embark on an open war on the parties and their leaders, who were depicted as traitors of Buganda’s aspirations. In the process, a group of about five ultra-conservative chiefs under the leadership of the able Amos Sempa took direction of the kingdom’s affairs and this group must be credited for determining the fate of the entire country in the end.
The Mengo clique, as the group came to be known later, was ruthless in its pursuit of what it believed to be in the best interests of the kingdom and on many occasions the group failed to foresee the possible consequences of its policies. For example, in an attempt to ostracise the political parties, the Mengo establishment convinced the governor that since Buganda’s relationship with the rest of country was based on an agreement with the British, only Mengo and not parties had the mandate to discuss matters concerning this relationship. Thus the idea of a two countries in one was born which Obote tried to crash in 1966.
This exclusion of the parties from Buganda’s issues further widened the rift between Mengo and the parties as Mengo followed a separatist approach to self-government while the parties sought our independence through constitutional evolution in the legislative council. This parting of ways reached its crescendo in January 1957 when the Buganda lukiiko decided to send a petition to the British queen asking for a meeting with her representatives and of the lukiiko to discuss the attainment of self-government for Buganda within the commonwealth.
The Uganda National Congress’ reaction to Buganda’s demands was representative of all the parties. At a mammoth rally in Kampala on May 20, 1957, where 30 speakers from all over Uganda addressed the gathering, the central committee of the party was mandated to negotiate with the central government on four issues. These were the holding of direct elections of all members of the legislative council; the unity of all tribes of Uganda; preservation of all tribal institutions and Africanisation of the civil service and the economy.
The parties’ campaigns partially bore fruit when the government published a sessional paper in which it announced that direct elections to the Legco of district representatives would be held in 1958. Unfortunately, this opportunity to create a truly representative assembly was missed when Mengo boycotted the elections on the ground that the appointment of a speaker as chairman of the Legco instead of the governor contravened Buganda’s agreement of 1955. The result of this boycott was to transfer national political leadership from Buganda for the first time as well as to condemn the kingdom to a future of alliances in order to maintain a presence in the national affairs.
When the elections of 1958 were held, they brought to the Legco a new breed of leaders including Apollo Milton Obote. But as the country was settling down to new realities, a little known person from Katwe by the name of Augustine Kamya declared a boycott of all expatriate trade and businesses and galvanised the population behind him.
Recognising the opportunity of winning the masses to their side in the battle with Mengo, all the parties with the exception of D.P and Obote’s faction of UNC joined Kamya and formed the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM).
The reaction of the government to UFM was harsh and decisive as it resorted to a little-known law in the statute book, which allowed it to ‘deport’ all the political leaders in UFM to various remote areas of the country, leaving the political field to only Obote’s faction of UNC, Ben Kiwanuka’s DP and the Mengo establishment. As a sign of things to come, as soon as the government ‘deported’ the leaders of UFM, the elected members of Legco, who had shunned all party politics formed the Uganda People’s Party which was moribund from the start although its members made articulate contributions in the house.
When the Wild Relationships Committee Report which set the pace for our independence came out in early 1960, Cuthbert Obwangor, a member of the Legco from Teso, moved a motion in the house calling on the Government to release “the people’s leaders†but only one or two African members supported him. The motion was lost but not before the chief secretary, Mr Hartwell, had pointedly challenged Obwangor to prove that the detainees were still the people’s leaders and not others. The following day, Apollo Milton Obote and Otema Allimadi announced, at a press conference, the formation of UPC as an amalgamation of Obote’s UNC faction and UPP.
At this point, it was settled that the leadership of independent Uganda would be contested by DP and UPC with Mengo standing in between. However, the political cauldron was further mixed by Mengo’s declaration of Buganda’s independence and its subsequent boycott of the elections of 1961, which DP defiantly contested and won to form the first representative government which eliminated it from Mengo’s friends.
At the constitutional conference, which was held in London just before the independence elections, UPC, which had all along opposed Buganda’s demands, saw electors’ value in going to bed with Mengo while DP stuck to its guns. UPC formed an alliance with KY and won the elections, but the marriage was never consummated thus setting the scene for a messy divorce in 1966.
A learned friend with a historical perspective
THE Uganda crisis of 1966 was a culmination of a series of events which started to unfold in 1956 and resulted in the polarisation of our politics in multiple centres. It started with the detention of five ministers on February 22, 1966 followed by the suspension of the independence constitution and the attack on Mengo palace by the national army. In essence, the crisis was prompted by a desire of the ruling party to locate the political power base in one centre.
The stage for the eventual crisis was set in January 1956 when Matayo Mugwanya, who was later to become the president general of the Democratic Party, came within four votes of winning the katikiroship of Buganda. Later in June of that year, all the political parties came together to successfully fight the Buganda lukiiko’s decision to distribute, as gifts to “deserving peopleâ€, the remaining 154 square miles of land from the legendary 8,000 square miles, which were distributed in 1900.
This double victory of the political parties was seen as a direct strike on Mengo government’s traditional hold on Buganda’s mind and soul. The reaction of the establishment was to embark on an open war on the parties and their leaders, who were depicted as traitors of Buganda’s aspirations. In the process, a group of about five ultra-conservative chiefs under the leadership of the able Amos Sempa took direction of the kingdom’s affairs and this group must be credited for determining the fate of the entire country in the end.
The Mengo clique, as the group came to be known later, was ruthless in its pursuit of what it believed to be in the best interests of the kingdom and on many occasions the group failed to foresee the possible consequences of its policies. For example, in an attempt to ostracise the political parties, the Mengo establishment convinced the governor that since Buganda’s relationship with the rest of country was based on an agreement with the British, only Mengo and not parties had the mandate to discuss matters concerning this relationship. Thus the idea of a two countries in one was born which Obote tried to crash in 1966.
This exclusion of the parties from Buganda’s issues further widened the rift between Mengo and the parties as Mengo followed a separatist approach to self-government while the parties sought our independence through constitutional evolution in the legislative council. This parting of ways reached its crescendo in January 1957 when the Buganda lukiiko decided to send a petition to the British queen asking for a meeting with her representatives and of the lukiiko to discuss the attainment of self-government for Buganda within the commonwealth.
The Uganda National Congress’ reaction to Buganda’s demands was representative of all the parties. At a mammoth rally in Kampala on May 20, 1957, where 30 speakers from all over Uganda addressed the gathering, the central committee of the party was mandated to negotiate with the central government on four issues. These were the holding of direct elections of all members of the legislative council; the unity of all tribes of Uganda; preservation of all tribal institutions and Africanisation of the civil service and the economy.
The parties’ campaigns partially bore fruit when the government published a sessional paper in which it announced that direct elections to the Legco of district representatives would be held in 1958. Unfortunately, this opportunity to create a truly representative assembly was missed when Mengo boycotted the elections on the ground that the appointment of a speaker as chairman of the Legco instead of the governor contravened Buganda’s agreement of 1955. The result of this boycott was to transfer national political leadership from Buganda for the first time as well as to condemn the kingdom to a future of alliances in order to maintain a presence in the national affairs.
When the elections of 1958 were held, they brought to the Legco a new breed of leaders including Apollo Milton Obote. But as the country was settling down to new realities, a little known person from Katwe by the name of Augustine Kamya declared a boycott of all expatriate trade and businesses and galvanised the population behind him.
Recognising the opportunity of winning the masses to their side in the battle with Mengo, all the parties with the exception of D.P and Obote’s faction of UNC joined Kamya and formed the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM).
The reaction of the government to UFM was harsh and decisive as it resorted to a little-known law in the statute book, which allowed it to ‘deport’ all the political leaders in UFM to various remote areas of the country, leaving the political field to only Obote’s faction of UNC, Ben Kiwanuka’s DP and the Mengo establishment. As a sign of things to come, as soon as the government ‘deported’ the leaders of UFM, the elected members of Legco, who had shunned all party politics formed the Uganda People’s Party which was moribund from the start although its members made articulate contributions in the house.
When the Wild Relationships Committee Report which set the pace for our independence came out in early 1960, Cuthbert Obwangor, a member of the Legco from Teso, moved a motion in the house calling on the Government to release “the people’s leaders†but only one or two African members supported him. The motion was lost but not before the chief secretary, Mr Hartwell, had pointedly challenged Obwangor to prove that the detainees were still the people’s leaders and not others. The following day, Apollo Milton Obote and Otema Allimadi announced, at a press conference, the formation of UPC as an amalgamation of Obote’s UNC faction and UPP.
At this point, it was settled that the leadership of independent Uganda would be contested by DP and UPC with Mengo standing in between. However, the political cauldron was further mixed by Mengo’s declaration of Buganda’s independence and its subsequent boycott of the elections of 1961, which DP defiantly contested and won to form the first representative government which eliminated it from Mengo’s friends.
At the constitutional conference, which was held in London just before the independence elections, UPC, which had all along opposed Buganda’s demands, saw electors’ value in going to bed with Mengo while DP stuck to its guns. UPC formed an alliance with KY and won the elections, but the marriage was never consummated thus setting the scene for a messy divorce in 1966.