Somalia: New ball in the UPDF court?
Mar 20, 2007
As their giant C-130 plane touched down in the Somali capital, Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) African Union Peace Keepers came under fire. The attackers were beaten off by a combined force of Ethiopians and Somali Government Forces. The Ugandan peace keepers have since been attacked three t
History of UPDF Somali Mission
This is not the first time Uganda considered sending peace-keepers to Somalia. Uganda first showed intentions of moving into Somalia way back in early 1992, even before the Americans deployed there.
At the time, the Army High Command had deployed then Lt. Colonel Edward Katumba Wamala as the commandant of the force which was set to operate under UNASOM. A force of over 1,000 soldiers was trained in both Jinja Training School and other military institutions.
However, deployment was delayed due to lack of clear operational guidelines from the UN and further shelved after what happened to the Americans in Somalia. In 1995, attention was turned to another Ugandan peace-keeping mission. The operation in Liberia, which was led by then Brigadier Ivan Koreta and commanded by then Brigadier Levi Karuhanga, lasted for two years.
After the signing of the Somali Peace Agreement and the formation of the transitional government in 2004, there was a new request for peace-keeping troops to Somalia. Uganda, being one of the leading facilitators of the talks under IGAD, was among the first countries to offer troops. But the deployment was halted because the UN, under pressure of the US, delayed lifting the arms embargo. It was only in early December 2006, when the Union of Islamic Courts had taken control of Mogadishu and most of central and south Somalia, that the UN finally lifted the embargo and approved the peace-keeping operation. Up to today, only the Ugandan contingent is in Somalia. Other countries that offered troops: Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana, Malawi and South Africa, seem to have adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
Current military analysis
Although the Ugandans have fought in various wars, including Congo, Rwanda and Sudan, the challenge in Somalia is very different. The soldiers have to contend with urban warfare, roadside bombs and a population that is partly hostile.
The main threat to UPDF soldiers in Somalia comes from deposed forces of the Islamic Courts. In addition, if not handled well, there is a risk of being caught up in vicious clan violence and struggles for power and wealth of warlords.
The fact that some of the neighbouring countries, such as Eritrea, do not support the peace-keeping operation is a potential recipe for disaster. Officials in Eritrea have already warned UPDF soldiers of “dire consequences†if they refuse to leave Somalia. These threats have been hushed aside by State Minister for Defence Ruth Nankabirwa as being “misguided and made on wrong premises.â€
Unlike the north, where the UPDF fought ambushes in the middle of thickets, they have to deal with ambushes in towns and in a dilapidated city.
“The Islamists have been planning their ambush spots for months. They know their backyard very well. This is why they pose a serious threat to our boys,†says a senior UPDF officer. Mogadishu and other towns in Somalia have got notoriously narrow roads. These roads, surrounded by buildings, favour local Somali gunmen, in this case the insurgents.
Under the circumstances, it is very hard to fire and move, for example a T-55 Tank. Soldiers in Mambas and Buffalos are threatened by gunmen firing from the top of buildings and through broken windows.
“That is why it is tricky. The option would be to return heavy fire into the enemy’s firing holes, but then you stand the risk of hitting civilians,†the officer says.
The other option would be trying to carry out door-to-door or flat-to-flat sweeps of the ambush scenes to neutralise the gunmen. However, such operations could cause bigger casualties to the searching peace-keepers than to the enemy. In Iraq, most of the soldiers killed by insurgents are caught up during cordon-and-search operations that are carried out shortly after ambushes.
“In Somalia, seven out of every 10 people carry or own a gun. There lies the biggest threat for our soldiers. While assuming that these are civilians, they might not realise who is shooting at them,†says a senior UPDF officer.
Not only ambushes pose a threat to the UPDF soldiers, also roadside bombs and landmines. On their very first day in Mogadishu, the UPDF troops survived a landmine that was planted on the main road from the airport. It is likely that the insurgents will try to plant more of these deadly mines, especially to try and target troops driving in trucks. Last Tuesday, an Ethiopian truck was hit by a mine.
Need of human intelligence
To fight insurgents, especially if you are a foreign force, one needs a lot of intelligence information. At the moment, it is not known how much local intelligence the peace-keepers are getting.
According to contingent spokesman Captain Paddy Ankunda, the troops have got some degree of local support, thus intelligence. “For example, we got the information that a mine had been laid on the road from the airport from local people,†he says.
Through such intelligence, the troops can receive prior situational reports on where ambushes are planned. They can either change route or move to stage a counter-ambush to disperse it. Experience from past sojourns in the DRC and Liberia shows that Ugandans are very good at creating friendships. It is unlikely that they will fail to get them in Somalia.
Somali armaments
Somali Islamists, who are threatening the UPDF, are armed with light weapons such as AK-47s, Light Machine Guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades and mortars. For support weapons, they have General Purpose Heavy Machines mounted on pick-up trucks commonly called “technical†in Somalia. They also have a few 23 and 37mm guns.
On a conventional front, those weapons cannot be a match for the peace-keepers’ tanks and Mambas, in addition to medium and heavy artillery, including Multiple Rocket Launching Systems that the UPDF contingent took to Somalia. This is why it was very easy for the Ethiopians to chase them out of power.
However, the Islamists are aware of their inadequacies. They are aware that they have no chance against the peace keepers if they engage them in a conventional way. This is why they have adopted guerrilla style operations.
For example, they have been using mortars to shell several areas of the capital Mogadishu, including the presidential palace last Tuesday. “Mortars are largely mobile weapons. After firing them, the attackers fold them back and change positions. It will be very hard for our men to deal with such threats, unless they have got enough local human intelligence,†says a serving UPDF officer.
As an example of how dangerous light armed but highly tactical fighters can be, a giant Ilyushin-76 plane carrying a UPDF contingent and weapons was struck by a single RPG-7D shell as it was landing at Mogadishu Airport. Though the AU is still investigating the incident, the government of Belarus confirmed in a press statement, distributed by the French press agency AFP, that its plane had been attacked. The gunman is suspected to have fired at the plane off a small boat on the Indian Ocean as it came in low to land at the airport, according to the statement.
The experience of the American intervention in the 1990s shows that urban warfare can be tricky. The three American helicopters that were downed in 1993 were shot at by RPGs launched from roof tops.
“Three fighters armed with an RPG and rifles can cause serious mayhem. All they have to do is fire and move on,†a UPDF soldier says.
It is worth noting that armoured patrols can drastically reduce casualties against lightly armed Somalis.
“One of our mambas was directly hit by a shell but it remained intact. Actually, only soldiers who were manning the weapons were injured by fragments,†a UPDF officer says.
UPDF command and formations
Uganda sent mainly three formations to Somalia: a motorised element, armoured elements and the infantry.
A motorised element consists of infantry support and personnel carrier vehicles. In Uganda, this equipment includes BMPs, Buffalos and Mambas. All these vehicles are armed with machine guns and in some cases light artillery weapons. They can respond to fire and cover foot soldiers, in addition to engaging in patrols.
The infantry are foot soldiers, armed with sub-machine guns, supported by heavy machine guns, should they be fired at by rocket launchers and mortars. The soldiers are also equipped with flak or bullet-proof jackets.
An armoured battalion consists of at least 12 main battle tanks. The T-55 tanks that were deployed have long proven themselves as some of the most effective and easiest to use around the world. The above formations were complemented with transport trucks, jeeps and pick-ups.
“The contingent is more than a peace-keeping force. It is actually a fighting force that is able to counter all kinds of threats,†says a senior UPDF officer. His views were echoed by the force spokesman: “The force can handle any situation,†Ankunda said confidently.
Source of possible trouble
One of the mistakes the Americans made in Somalia was to engage into forceful disarmament. The transitional Somali government on March 10 announced it was going to start forceful disarmament of gunmen in Mogadishu.
The value of a gun to a Somali can only be compared to the value of a gun to a Karimojong warrior. Many Somali men use guns for a living: to create a security group that is subsequently hired by relief groups and individuals to provide guard services.
The reaction to disarmament is most likely going to be a negative one. The order to forcefully disarm might further alienate fighters who originally supported the peace-keepers. Guns are also the leading source of income for unemployed youth.
They are sold like any other merchandise in various markets around Mogadishu, the most notorious one being Bakka Market. “A gun is a source of power in Somalia. If they are taken away, people will see it as a loss of livelihood,†says an analyst.
This is not the first time Uganda considered sending peace-keepers to Somalia. Uganda first showed intentions of moving into Somalia way back in early 1992, even before the Americans deployed there.
At the time, the Army High Command had deployed then Lt. Colonel Edward Katumba Wamala as the commandant of the force which was set to operate under UNASOM. A force of over 1,000 soldiers was trained in both Jinja Training School and other military institutions.
However, deployment was delayed due to lack of clear operational guidelines from the UN and further shelved after what happened to the Americans in Somalia. In 1995, attention was turned to another Ugandan peace-keeping mission. The operation in Liberia, which was led by then Brigadier Ivan Koreta and commanded by then Brigadier Levi Karuhanga, lasted for two years.
After the signing of the Somali Peace Agreement and the formation of the transitional government in 2004, there was a new request for peace-keeping troops to Somalia. Uganda, being one of the leading facilitators of the talks under IGAD, was among the first countries to offer troops. But the deployment was halted because the UN, under pressure of the US, delayed lifting the arms embargo. It was only in early December 2006, when the Union of Islamic Courts had taken control of Mogadishu and most of central and south Somalia, that the UN finally lifted the embargo and approved the peace-keeping operation. Up to today, only the Ugandan contingent is in Somalia. Other countries that offered troops: Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana, Malawi and South Africa, seem to have adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
Current military analysis
Although the Ugandans have fought in various wars, including Congo, Rwanda and Sudan, the challenge in Somalia is very different. The soldiers have to contend with urban warfare, roadside bombs and a population that is partly hostile.
The main threat to UPDF soldiers in Somalia comes from deposed forces of the Islamic Courts. In addition, if not handled well, there is a risk of being caught up in vicious clan violence and struggles for power and wealth of warlords.
The fact that some of the neighbouring countries, such as Eritrea, do not support the peace-keeping operation is a potential recipe for disaster. Officials in Eritrea have already warned UPDF soldiers of “dire consequences†if they refuse to leave Somalia. These threats have been hushed aside by State Minister for Defence Ruth Nankabirwa as being “misguided and made on wrong premises.â€
Unlike the north, where the UPDF fought ambushes in the middle of thickets, they have to deal with ambushes in towns and in a dilapidated city.
“The Islamists have been planning their ambush spots for months. They know their backyard very well. This is why they pose a serious threat to our boys,†says a senior UPDF officer. Mogadishu and other towns in Somalia have got notoriously narrow roads. These roads, surrounded by buildings, favour local Somali gunmen, in this case the insurgents.
Under the circumstances, it is very hard to fire and move, for example a T-55 Tank. Soldiers in Mambas and Buffalos are threatened by gunmen firing from the top of buildings and through broken windows.
“That is why it is tricky. The option would be to return heavy fire into the enemy’s firing holes, but then you stand the risk of hitting civilians,†the officer says.
The other option would be trying to carry out door-to-door or flat-to-flat sweeps of the ambush scenes to neutralise the gunmen. However, such operations could cause bigger casualties to the searching peace-keepers than to the enemy. In Iraq, most of the soldiers killed by insurgents are caught up during cordon-and-search operations that are carried out shortly after ambushes.
“In Somalia, seven out of every 10 people carry or own a gun. There lies the biggest threat for our soldiers. While assuming that these are civilians, they might not realise who is shooting at them,†says a senior UPDF officer.
Not only ambushes pose a threat to the UPDF soldiers, also roadside bombs and landmines. On their very first day in Mogadishu, the UPDF troops survived a landmine that was planted on the main road from the airport. It is likely that the insurgents will try to plant more of these deadly mines, especially to try and target troops driving in trucks. Last Tuesday, an Ethiopian truck was hit by a mine.
Need of human intelligence
To fight insurgents, especially if you are a foreign force, one needs a lot of intelligence information. At the moment, it is not known how much local intelligence the peace-keepers are getting.
According to contingent spokesman Captain Paddy Ankunda, the troops have got some degree of local support, thus intelligence. “For example, we got the information that a mine had been laid on the road from the airport from local people,†he says.
Through such intelligence, the troops can receive prior situational reports on where ambushes are planned. They can either change route or move to stage a counter-ambush to disperse it. Experience from past sojourns in the DRC and Liberia shows that Ugandans are very good at creating friendships. It is unlikely that they will fail to get them in Somalia.
Somali armaments
Somali Islamists, who are threatening the UPDF, are armed with light weapons such as AK-47s, Light Machine Guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades and mortars. For support weapons, they have General Purpose Heavy Machines mounted on pick-up trucks commonly called “technical†in Somalia. They also have a few 23 and 37mm guns.
On a conventional front, those weapons cannot be a match for the peace-keepers’ tanks and Mambas, in addition to medium and heavy artillery, including Multiple Rocket Launching Systems that the UPDF contingent took to Somalia. This is why it was very easy for the Ethiopians to chase them out of power.
However, the Islamists are aware of their inadequacies. They are aware that they have no chance against the peace keepers if they engage them in a conventional way. This is why they have adopted guerrilla style operations.
For example, they have been using mortars to shell several areas of the capital Mogadishu, including the presidential palace last Tuesday. “Mortars are largely mobile weapons. After firing them, the attackers fold them back and change positions. It will be very hard for our men to deal with such threats, unless they have got enough local human intelligence,†says a serving UPDF officer.
As an example of how dangerous light armed but highly tactical fighters can be, a giant Ilyushin-76 plane carrying a UPDF contingent and weapons was struck by a single RPG-7D shell as it was landing at Mogadishu Airport. Though the AU is still investigating the incident, the government of Belarus confirmed in a press statement, distributed by the French press agency AFP, that its plane had been attacked. The gunman is suspected to have fired at the plane off a small boat on the Indian Ocean as it came in low to land at the airport, according to the statement.
The experience of the American intervention in the 1990s shows that urban warfare can be tricky. The three American helicopters that were downed in 1993 were shot at by RPGs launched from roof tops.
“Three fighters armed with an RPG and rifles can cause serious mayhem. All they have to do is fire and move on,†a UPDF soldier says.
It is worth noting that armoured patrols can drastically reduce casualties against lightly armed Somalis.
“One of our mambas was directly hit by a shell but it remained intact. Actually, only soldiers who were manning the weapons were injured by fragments,†a UPDF officer says.
UPDF command and formations
Uganda sent mainly three formations to Somalia: a motorised element, armoured elements and the infantry.
A motorised element consists of infantry support and personnel carrier vehicles. In Uganda, this equipment includes BMPs, Buffalos and Mambas. All these vehicles are armed with machine guns and in some cases light artillery weapons. They can respond to fire and cover foot soldiers, in addition to engaging in patrols.
The infantry are foot soldiers, armed with sub-machine guns, supported by heavy machine guns, should they be fired at by rocket launchers and mortars. The soldiers are also equipped with flak or bullet-proof jackets.
An armoured battalion consists of at least 12 main battle tanks. The T-55 tanks that were deployed have long proven themselves as some of the most effective and easiest to use around the world. The above formations were complemented with transport trucks, jeeps and pick-ups.
“The contingent is more than a peace-keeping force. It is actually a fighting force that is able to counter all kinds of threats,†says a senior UPDF officer. His views were echoed by the force spokesman: “The force can handle any situation,†Ankunda said confidently.
Source of possible trouble
One of the mistakes the Americans made in Somalia was to engage into forceful disarmament. The transitional Somali government on March 10 announced it was going to start forceful disarmament of gunmen in Mogadishu.
The value of a gun to a Somali can only be compared to the value of a gun to a Karimojong warrior. Many Somali men use guns for a living: to create a security group that is subsequently hired by relief groups and individuals to provide guard services.
The reaction to disarmament is most likely going to be a negative one. The order to forcefully disarm might further alienate fighters who originally supported the peace-keepers. Guns are also the leading source of income for unemployed youth.
They are sold like any other merchandise in various markets around Mogadishu, the most notorious one being Bakka Market. “A gun is a source of power in Somalia. If they are taken away, people will see it as a loss of livelihood,†says an analyst.