Economics, power struggle began the spiral of violence
Apr 02, 2007
Kampala residents were stunned when for the first time in their memory gunshots were heard for almost two hours in the Nakulabye city suburb on November 10, 1964.
A LEARNED FRIEND WITH A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Peter Mulira
Kampala residents were stunned when for the first time in their memory gunshots were heard for almost two hours in the Nakulabye city suburb on November 10, 1964.
It transpired that policemen went to the area at about 6:pm and without any reason or justification opened fire on a group of people who had gathered around a couple involved
in a domestic brawl.
A neighbour had called the police who did not bother to investigate the cause or the nature of the conflict before wantonly killing six innocent people in an act of madness that preluded the onset of state-inspired violence that lasted for 20 years until the NRM put a stop to it when it took over power in 1986.
Earlier in October 1964, in a different form of state violence 14 students of St Mary’s College, Kisubi had died in a freak accident along Entebbe road when returning from a football match. According to a report which appeared in the Africa Report (December 1966) the accident was caused by an army driver who deliberately drove an empty truck into the bus. The report continued,
“Without apology, the army justified the action on the grounds the schoolboys were believed to be heading toward the capital of Entebbe to take part in a Baganda plot to assassinate Oboteâ€. Were these two incidents connected?
In a new book to which we return later it is reported that on November 6, 1964 the then prime minister, Dr Apollo Milton Obote, gave a stern warning to what he termed lawless elements adding, “I have therefore today issued very firm instructions to the Army Commander and to the Inspector General of Police, to use such power as they have to protect the lives and property of the public.â€
The book goes on to quote the parliamentary debates in which E.Y. Latim, an opposition member for Acholi north claimed in parliment that he spoke to highly placed security officers who told him that the government had authorised the use of violence against civilians.
Kasozi identifies the economic marginalisation of some communities and the struggle to control UPC and the state after independence in 1962 as the immediate cause of violence between 1965 and 1986.
According to Kasozi, UPC was a disparate party without grassroots following whose support came from elected councillors and MPs who saw politics as an opportunity to ‘eat’. This led to manouvres within the party which were characterised by intrigues, conspiracy and backdoor decisions. Out of this configuration, three factions rose within the party which Kakoza terms as the right wing with Grace Ibingira as leader, the centre headed by Obote and John Kakonge who was the party’s secretary general leading the left wing faction.
Ibingira associated himself with the southern part of the country, Obote’s centre faction drew its support from the marginalised north while Kakonge found his base in the youth wingers. At first, Obote’s faction joined with Ibingira’s to get rid of Kakonge as secretary general at the party’s annual general meeting which was to be held in Gulu in 1964. All the delegates were to come from subcounty level but three days before the conference, a meeting attended by Obote, Ibingira and Nadiope at the Uganda Club, changed the rules so that Busoga was represented at subcounty level. This gave the district 684 delegates while the rest of Uganda sent 1086 delegates. Ibingira won and the real battlelines were now drawn between him and Obote.
Meanwhile, UPC’s fortunes were helped by the crossover of opposition MPs so that by July 1965, the party had 74 seats, DP nine and Kabaka Yekka, eight. Kakoza argues that although the figures did not reflect UPC’s level of electoral support, numerical strength in parliament gave Obote the legal, moral and psychological ability to use violence on his opponents in party and state.
The integration of Buganda into Uganda was a challenge Obote could have achieved by alligning himself with the different strands of politicians within the substate who were opposed to Mengo’s policies, Kakoza argues, but instead Obote deliberately demoted Baganda civil servants and demonised Buganda.
It was at this juncture that the gates of violence were opened starting with the Nakulabye incident. By 1965, the rift within UPC itself had become public. Ibingira was consolidating himself in the south and his visit to the United States attracted a lot of attention for it was thought he went to acquire funds for the final assault on Obote. Obote’s centre was also secretly active in the Congo using Idi Amin as the contact person with rebels there, a liaison which was alleged to have enriched both men in gold and money.
The details of this information fell in the hands of an MP who was in Ibingira’s camp, Daudi Ochieng, thanks to the betrayal of a European bank manager. On February 4, 1965 Ochieng moved in parliament a motion of no-confidence in Obote over the Congo allegations which was certain to be carried.
Obote reacted by arresting Ibingira and five other ministers from a cabinet meeting in an unprecedented show of force. After Ibingira and his group were out of the way, Obote turned his attention to Mutesa whom he suspected of being in Ibingira’s group. Using Amin as his commander, he ordered the attack on Mutesa’s palace forcing him to flee and abolished his kingdom.
The field was now left to Obote and Amin as the principal players. Unfortunately Obote had taught Amin how to stay in power by using force and Amin had been a good student. Suspecting each other now, the two men started recruiting into the army from their own ethnicities, Amin drawing heavily from former southern Sudan’s former rebels known as Anyanyas while Obote recruited from Acholis and Langis.
Just before Obote left for the commonwealth conference in Singapore he accused Amin to have embezzled $2,500,000 and ordered the colonel he had used to do his bidding in battles to prepare a written report for his study on his return. He was not to return.
On January 25, 1971, Amin moved his Anyanya troops against Obote’s Langis and Acholis who were remorselessly killed in a coup that saw Obote toppled with Amin as the new leader. The gates of a new chapter of violence was opened.
Peter Mulira
Kampala residents were stunned when for the first time in their memory gunshots were heard for almost two hours in the Nakulabye city suburb on November 10, 1964.
It transpired that policemen went to the area at about 6:pm and without any reason or justification opened fire on a group of people who had gathered around a couple involved
in a domestic brawl.
A neighbour had called the police who did not bother to investigate the cause or the nature of the conflict before wantonly killing six innocent people in an act of madness that preluded the onset of state-inspired violence that lasted for 20 years until the NRM put a stop to it when it took over power in 1986.
Earlier in October 1964, in a different form of state violence 14 students of St Mary’s College, Kisubi had died in a freak accident along Entebbe road when returning from a football match. According to a report which appeared in the Africa Report (December 1966) the accident was caused by an army driver who deliberately drove an empty truck into the bus. The report continued,
“Without apology, the army justified the action on the grounds the schoolboys were believed to be heading toward the capital of Entebbe to take part in a Baganda plot to assassinate Oboteâ€. Were these two incidents connected?
In a new book to which we return later it is reported that on November 6, 1964 the then prime minister, Dr Apollo Milton Obote, gave a stern warning to what he termed lawless elements adding, “I have therefore today issued very firm instructions to the Army Commander and to the Inspector General of Police, to use such power as they have to protect the lives and property of the public.â€
The book goes on to quote the parliamentary debates in which E.Y. Latim, an opposition member for Acholi north claimed in parliment that he spoke to highly placed security officers who told him that the government had authorised the use of violence against civilians.
Kasozi identifies the economic marginalisation of some communities and the struggle to control UPC and the state after independence in 1962 as the immediate cause of violence between 1965 and 1986.
According to Kasozi, UPC was a disparate party without grassroots following whose support came from elected councillors and MPs who saw politics as an opportunity to ‘eat’. This led to manouvres within the party which were characterised by intrigues, conspiracy and backdoor decisions. Out of this configuration, three factions rose within the party which Kakoza terms as the right wing with Grace Ibingira as leader, the centre headed by Obote and John Kakonge who was the party’s secretary general leading the left wing faction.
Ibingira associated himself with the southern part of the country, Obote’s centre faction drew its support from the marginalised north while Kakonge found his base in the youth wingers. At first, Obote’s faction joined with Ibingira’s to get rid of Kakonge as secretary general at the party’s annual general meeting which was to be held in Gulu in 1964. All the delegates were to come from subcounty level but three days before the conference, a meeting attended by Obote, Ibingira and Nadiope at the Uganda Club, changed the rules so that Busoga was represented at subcounty level. This gave the district 684 delegates while the rest of Uganda sent 1086 delegates. Ibingira won and the real battlelines were now drawn between him and Obote.
Meanwhile, UPC’s fortunes were helped by the crossover of opposition MPs so that by July 1965, the party had 74 seats, DP nine and Kabaka Yekka, eight. Kakoza argues that although the figures did not reflect UPC’s level of electoral support, numerical strength in parliament gave Obote the legal, moral and psychological ability to use violence on his opponents in party and state.
The integration of Buganda into Uganda was a challenge Obote could have achieved by alligning himself with the different strands of politicians within the substate who were opposed to Mengo’s policies, Kakoza argues, but instead Obote deliberately demoted Baganda civil servants and demonised Buganda.
It was at this juncture that the gates of violence were opened starting with the Nakulabye incident. By 1965, the rift within UPC itself had become public. Ibingira was consolidating himself in the south and his visit to the United States attracted a lot of attention for it was thought he went to acquire funds for the final assault on Obote. Obote’s centre was also secretly active in the Congo using Idi Amin as the contact person with rebels there, a liaison which was alleged to have enriched both men in gold and money.
The details of this information fell in the hands of an MP who was in Ibingira’s camp, Daudi Ochieng, thanks to the betrayal of a European bank manager. On February 4, 1965 Ochieng moved in parliament a motion of no-confidence in Obote over the Congo allegations which was certain to be carried.
Obote reacted by arresting Ibingira and five other ministers from a cabinet meeting in an unprecedented show of force. After Ibingira and his group were out of the way, Obote turned his attention to Mutesa whom he suspected of being in Ibingira’s group. Using Amin as his commander, he ordered the attack on Mutesa’s palace forcing him to flee and abolished his kingdom.
The field was now left to Obote and Amin as the principal players. Unfortunately Obote had taught Amin how to stay in power by using force and Amin had been a good student. Suspecting each other now, the two men started recruiting into the army from their own ethnicities, Amin drawing heavily from former southern Sudan’s former rebels known as Anyanyas while Obote recruited from Acholis and Langis.
Just before Obote left for the commonwealth conference in Singapore he accused Amin to have embezzled $2,500,000 and ordered the colonel he had used to do his bidding in battles to prepare a written report for his study on his return. He was not to return.
On January 25, 1971, Amin moved his Anyanya troops against Obote’s Langis and Acholis who were remorselessly killed in a coup that saw Obote toppled with Amin as the new leader. The gates of a new chapter of violence was opened.