LRA still backed by Sudan â€" SPLA
Mar 19, 2006
The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has embarked on reconstruction of southern Sudan following a peace agreement with Khartoum in January 2005.<b> Emmy Allio</b> was in Yei last week and interviewed SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Maj. Gen. Bior Ajang Duto, about the L
What was the role of the LRA in your war with the government of Sudan?
The LRA was used by the enemy to exhaust our forces and ammunition. By planting land mines and ambushing our vehicles, they were an obstacle in our advance to capture the government-controlled towns in all areas of Western and Eastern Equatoria. We have lost many trucks and people because of the LRA. In several instances, they saved the Sudanese army, which could not come out of their garrisons.
Why was it so difficult to fight the LRA?
The LRA was trained in anti-guerrilla tactics by the Sudanese army. They don’t use the roads. They are scattered in small groups and know how to use the cover of the bush. They don’t stay in one place but are highly mobile. Most of the time, we didn’t even know they were in the area where we were going to attack. They would take us completely by surprise. Of the 25 militias used by the Sudan government to fight us, the LRA was the most dangerous.
Why were they so dangerous?
Because of the way they ambushed us at close range. And because of the way they killed and tortured defenceless displaced people, the weakest and the most vulnerable, by chopping them up with machetes, by cutting lips, ears and arms or by putting padlocks in people’s mouths. Their famous tactic of tying bamboo sticks around people’s heads and hitting the sticks, was perfected here. Hundreds of civilians were slaughtered in massacres like Palutaka, Parajok, Amer, Atebi and Laboni in the Imatong mountains, causing massive displacement. It suited the scorched earth policy of some people in Khartoum, who want the land with all its natural resources — water, oil and fertile soil — but not the people.
What was the role of the LRA in the conflict between Uganda and Sudan?
The government of Sudan convinced Kony that the SPLA was the main obstacle in their way to capture power in Uganda. ‘If it had not been for the SPLA, you would have taken Kampala long time ago’, they would tell him. Therefore, the SPLA had to be defeated first, in order for the LRA to have free passage and for the Sudan government to be able to give them full support. Of course, the radicals in the Sudan government had their own agenda. Their ideology was to Islamise and Arabise the entire continent, starting with Southern Sudan, and then penetrate the rest of Africa through Uganda. The LRA was used to carry out that plan. If Kony, once in power, would not have followed that agenda, they would have turned against him too.
Since the 2005 peace agreement, the SPLA controls most of the south but the LRA is still there. Why have you not managed to eliminate them?
For the same reason the Ugandan army was not able to eliminate them in northern Uganda. They use guerrilla tactics. And they go for unarmed civilians. Furthermore, we believe that the LRA is still being supported by the Khartoum government. The Sudanese army is delaying pulling their troops out of the South. There are still dozens of garrisons on the roads from Torit and Yei to Juba. These are places the LRA would operate and get supplies from.
Why would the government of Sudan continue supporting the LRA?
The radical group, led by Hassan el Tourabi (leader of the National Islamic Front) and Ali Nafi (deputy chairman of the ruling National Congress), does not want the South to secede. This will be decided in a referendum in 2011. We are now in the process of reorganising ourselves from a guerrilla into a regular army. The radicals want to keep us unorganised. They want to prove that the SPLA has failed to secure the people, bring back the refugees and deliver the services.
Could the LRA attacks be aimed at closing the newly opened trade route with Uganda?
The ambushes on the main roads suit the government well. Ugandan traders, de-miners and road workers have been targeted. We believe they want to block the Uganda road so that we completely rely on Khartoum again. Prices in Juba have halved since Ugandan goods started flooding the market here. The traders in northern Sudan, mostly army commanders and their relatives, are not happy with this new development. They lost their monopoly and their profits have been drastically reduced.
Are you optimistic about the future?
Surely, the LRA war will end. According to the peace agreement, the SPLA will have taken over all garrisons in Southern Sudan by the middle of 2007. Once we control the entire South, there will be no way of supplying the LRA. All their outlets will be closed. In two years time, there will be no more LRA rebels in Congo or Sudan.
Ends
The LRA was used by the enemy to exhaust our forces and ammunition. By planting land mines and ambushing our vehicles, they were an obstacle in our advance to capture the government-controlled towns in all areas of Western and Eastern Equatoria. We have lost many trucks and people because of the LRA. In several instances, they saved the Sudanese army, which could not come out of their garrisons.
Why was it so difficult to fight the LRA?
The LRA was trained in anti-guerrilla tactics by the Sudanese army. They don’t use the roads. They are scattered in small groups and know how to use the cover of the bush. They don’t stay in one place but are highly mobile. Most of the time, we didn’t even know they were in the area where we were going to attack. They would take us completely by surprise. Of the 25 militias used by the Sudan government to fight us, the LRA was the most dangerous.
Why were they so dangerous?
Because of the way they ambushed us at close range. And because of the way they killed and tortured defenceless displaced people, the weakest and the most vulnerable, by chopping them up with machetes, by cutting lips, ears and arms or by putting padlocks in people’s mouths. Their famous tactic of tying bamboo sticks around people’s heads and hitting the sticks, was perfected here. Hundreds of civilians were slaughtered in massacres like Palutaka, Parajok, Amer, Atebi and Laboni in the Imatong mountains, causing massive displacement. It suited the scorched earth policy of some people in Khartoum, who want the land with all its natural resources — water, oil and fertile soil — but not the people.
What was the role of the LRA in the conflict between Uganda and Sudan?
The government of Sudan convinced Kony that the SPLA was the main obstacle in their way to capture power in Uganda. ‘If it had not been for the SPLA, you would have taken Kampala long time ago’, they would tell him. Therefore, the SPLA had to be defeated first, in order for the LRA to have free passage and for the Sudan government to be able to give them full support. Of course, the radicals in the Sudan government had their own agenda. Their ideology was to Islamise and Arabise the entire continent, starting with Southern Sudan, and then penetrate the rest of Africa through Uganda. The LRA was used to carry out that plan. If Kony, once in power, would not have followed that agenda, they would have turned against him too.
Since the 2005 peace agreement, the SPLA controls most of the south but the LRA is still there. Why have you not managed to eliminate them?
For the same reason the Ugandan army was not able to eliminate them in northern Uganda. They use guerrilla tactics. And they go for unarmed civilians. Furthermore, we believe that the LRA is still being supported by the Khartoum government. The Sudanese army is delaying pulling their troops out of the South. There are still dozens of garrisons on the roads from Torit and Yei to Juba. These are places the LRA would operate and get supplies from.
Why would the government of Sudan continue supporting the LRA?
The radical group, led by Hassan el Tourabi (leader of the National Islamic Front) and Ali Nafi (deputy chairman of the ruling National Congress), does not want the South to secede. This will be decided in a referendum in 2011. We are now in the process of reorganising ourselves from a guerrilla into a regular army. The radicals want to keep us unorganised. They want to prove that the SPLA has failed to secure the people, bring back the refugees and deliver the services.
Could the LRA attacks be aimed at closing the newly opened trade route with Uganda?
The ambushes on the main roads suit the government well. Ugandan traders, de-miners and road workers have been targeted. We believe they want to block the Uganda road so that we completely rely on Khartoum again. Prices in Juba have halved since Ugandan goods started flooding the market here. The traders in northern Sudan, mostly army commanders and their relatives, are not happy with this new development. They lost their monopoly and their profits have been drastically reduced.
Are you optimistic about the future?
Surely, the LRA war will end. According to the peace agreement, the SPLA will have taken over all garrisons in Southern Sudan by the middle of 2007. Once we control the entire South, there will be no way of supplying the LRA. All their outlets will be closed. In two years time, there will be no more LRA rebels in Congo or Sudan.
Ends