The big questions on Juba peace agreement

Aug 30, 2006

EXCITEMENT has greeted the coming into force of the cessation of hostilities between the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Top on the conditions in the truce agreement is the requirement to have all LRA fighters assemble in three weeks’ time at designa

By Emmy Allio

EXCITEMENT has greeted the coming into force of the cessation of hostilities between the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Top on the conditions in the truce agreement is the requirement to have all LRA fighters assemble in three weeks’ time at designated points in southern Sudan.

According to the plan, the LRA fighters in northern Uganda will move to Owiny Ki Bul in Eastern Equatoria State on the eastern side of the River Nile and those in the DRC at Ri-Kwangba in Western Equatoria State on the western side of River Nile.

But, is it time to jubilate the end of the war or end of the LRA advent? An examination of the circumstances around the peace talks and other surrounding events, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the LRA leadership is based, gives quite a different picture repugnant to the peace process. This then calls for caution. Otherwise, there may be a green snake hiding in Christmas tree!

Why LRA is still talking peace in Juba

Past attempts to end the war through peaceful means failed. This time, why has it been easy to bring LRA to the negotiating table? Is it that Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants want peace to return to northern Uganda or southern Sudan?

In my view, six reasons brought LRA to the negotiating table and it is these same points that can guarantee peace.

  • The intensive military pressure on the rebels was heightened when Sudan government okayed the UPDF to hunt LRA wherever the rebels are hiding inside Sudan. This blanket permission was given when majority of the rebels had safely entered Garamba National Park. Nonetheless, continued military pressure completely stopped further free movement of the rebels from northern Uganda to southern Sudan or vice versa. The joint UPDF and SPLA operations also stopped further exodus of the rebels to Garamba.


  • The establishment of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) was the turning point in the LRA and Khartoum government relations. Although it is questionable whether Khartoum government has completely abandoned LRA. Past attempts to end the war failed because LRA was comfortable in Juba city and all over Eastern Equatoria state. Vice President of Sudan, Salva Kiir said that as soon as they entered in Juba and set up their government, they found it impossible to co-exist with the LRA “because it would be like living with a snake in the same house.” He said that they gave LRA three options: pursue the line of peace with Uganda under SPLM/A mediation, quit southern Sudan or face fire. LRA chose the line of peace.


  • The indictment by the ICC of the top LRA leadership made the world a very small place for the LRA leadership. This was complimented by Uganda’s parliament which amended the amnesty law to exclude the five top LRA leaders from amnesty. The ICC indictment was followed up by Interpol, the global police network, which issued arrest warrants against the rebel leaders. This explains why much time was spent by the rebels and their collaborators on asking ICC to withdraw the warrants of arrest.


  • The United Nations Security Council last month stayed a resolution that calls for a joint military operation against the rebels in Garamba by UPDF, MONUC, SPLA and the Congolese army (FARDC). This resolution was to empower MONUC to operate under chapter seven of the UN Charter which calls for use of force. The resolution also called for arrest and prosecution of not only the top LRA commanders but their sponsors and collaborators. This directly targets the LRA supporters in the diaspora, a group that directly contributes to the continuation of the war as a way of living in luxury in USA and Europe. If the LRA war ends, these people will have no justification to cling to the soft lifestyle they are enjoying under the banner of political refugees.


  • The determination of Uganda government to reach a peaceful resolution was exemplary. It was inconceivable that President Yoweri Museveni whose hard-line position on impunity is well documented could bend as low as allowing for cessation of hostilities with butchers of people! Two factors may have played a role. Firstly, despite the LRA atrocities on the population in northern and eastern Uganda, the same population is being manipulated against the government by the opposition. This is noted in the voting pattern in the February presidential and parliamentary elections. Secondly, the government is keen to portray an image of a peaceful Uganda ahead of the forthcoming Commonwealth summit.


  • The cooperation of the Kinshasa government and MONUC played in LRA’s favour because it left Uganda and GoSS with one option; to talk to the rebels. Kinshasa and MONUC opposed UPDF and SPLA wish to pursue LRA into Garamba.


  • The gains of the truce
    The cessation of hostilities agreement is only one of the five items on the agenda of the peace talks in Juba. But it was the most stinking point.

  • The truce portrays President Museveni’s government as one willing to talk to its adversaries. Before this, the opposition portrayed Museveni as a warrior and not a peace maker. But by doing so, the government is attempting to wrestle from the opposition the credit of being alternative peace makers. That explains why opposition politicians, many of whom used the LRA master card to garner votes in the North and the East, have been clamouring to get attention in the Juba talks. It is because they had campaigned on the grounds that Museveni has failed to bring peace and hence the alternative in the FDC. Indeed, FDC swept votes in the war-ravaged areas in Kasese, northern Uganda and Teso region.


  • The remnants of LRA in northern Uganda and southern Sudan have been operating under extremely hard conditions. Unlike in the past where they roamed the country side, this time, they are hiding and only they come out in search of food. But it is in search of food in the gardens that the UPDF has been killing or capturing them.


  • The women and children kept in captivity by LRA will use this opportunity to get their freedom to return home. This is also a trying moment for the LRA leadership whose entire army comprises abducted children who will be ready to gain their freedom at the earliest opportunity.


  • Threats to the peace agreement
    The truce which came into effect on Tuesday will be followed with further peace talks in Juba aimed at reaching a comprehensive peace agreement. The peace process faces several challenges. But if international pressure prevails, these loopholes can be addressed.

  • Majority of the LRA leadership and fighters are currently in Garamba National Park in northeastern DRC. They fled there under pressure from the UPDF. Garamba National Park, which covers 4,900 square kilometres is currently under LRA control and other armed groups that used to dwell there have fled. The LRA in Garamba lives in total peace and have plenty of game meat to enjoy. Because they are not under military or political pressure, nothing can compel them to cross the border to Sudan to assemble as agreed in Juba.


  • As the truce was coming into effect on Tuesday, the LRA in Congo was behaving quite differently. Instead of heading to Ri-wangba in Western Equatoria State, about 150-200 LRA rebel fighters, women and children left Garamba on August 22, and walked to Kusu, Amee, Ameri and Katanga areas in Aru and Mahagi zones in Ituri. Security sources said that the rebels want to open a front against the UPDF along the borders with Nebbi district.


  • The political and military contradictions in the DRC maybe exploited by the LRA to suit them and ensure their continued survival. In Ituri, the Congolese Liberation Movement (MRC) rebels occupy the countryside while MONUC and FARDC hold the townships. Because LRA is not MRC’s enemy, the two may live side by side as a matter of convenience. Matters are made worse by Uganda’s recent expulsion of MRC leaders from Uganda which has created bad blood between Kampala and the Ituri rebels.


  • While in Ituri and Garamba, LRA may easily join hands with ADF/NALU rebels who are in Eringety game reserves, Bundiguya forests or Gety mountainous areas of Ituri. Remnants of the Peoples Redemption Army (PRA) are also believed to be in the nearby Bilingi and Watsa zones. This same location has remnants of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels. If these Ugandan rebels join in Ituri, they will hit at Uganda oil interests along Lake Albert and River Semliki. In this case, a new peace initiative maybe needed to address all Ugandan rebel groups that are on Congo soil.


  • The power struggle between President Joseph Kabila and his vice-President Jean Pierre Bemba is a case in point. Both leaders are gearing to face each other in run off polls slated for October 29, 2006. Peace in DRC will depend on the outcome of the polls and the reaction of the international community. If chaos reigns in DRC, then LRA will enjoy its stay there. Similarly, when SPLA and Khartoum fought each in Sudan, this ensured LRA’s survival.


  • Conclusion

    Whereas the truce and subsequent comprehensive peace agreement are important, the real pressure from the UN Security Council and ICC should be maintained.

    A peaceful resolution of the electoral related chaos in DRC will also be appreciated. What is paramount is that LRA has no standing army. The peace process has created an enabling environment for the abducted children to escape from captivity.

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