How did LRA rebels beat UPDF defence?

Feb 24, 2004

Barely three weeks after the rebels butchered about 50 people at Abia internally displaced people’s (IDPs) camp in Lira, they hit again next door in Orit, Ogur sub-county in Erute north county.

By Denis Ocwich

Barely three weeks after the rebels butchered about 50 people at Abia internally displaced people’s (IDPs) camp in Lira, they hit again next door in Orit, Ogur sub-county in Erute north county.

This time, over 200 people were massacred at Barlonyo camp in Cuk-Adek village, about 25kms from Lira town.

That is the biggest number ever to be killed in a single rebel attack since the 1995 one on Atiak, Gulu where over 200 lost their lives.

As Lira mourns the puzzle remains: How did the rebels sneak through the UPDF security to massacre such a large number of Ugandans?

No one has all the answers but some local leaders think the main solution lies in doubling the number of Amuka boys, deploying more UPDF soldiers and equipping them with better weapons, let alone paying them good allowances.

“If we want to solve this problem militarily, then let us have enough soldiers and equipment to fight the war,” says Daniel Omara Atubo, the vice chairman of Lango Parliamentary Group (LPG) which last November walked out of parliament in protest of the war. He says the rebels have sophisticated weapons.

Atubo also MP Otuke, one of the worst hit areas of Lira has been asking for more troop deployment to protect the majority of the population displaced in the camps and elsewhere.

“Where is the UPDF?” Atubo asks with disappointment. He claims that instead of the Amuka boys being left to guard the camps, as promised by President Museveni, they were now being deployed on the frontlines.

“The massacre in Abia and the one in Orit have proved that the enemies (rebels) are moving in large groups of between 200 - 300,” he says. Only about 40 Amuka boys were reportedly deployed in Orit.

Charles Angiro, Erute North MP, says all the 480 grass thatched huts in the Barlonyo camp were burnt down. Whereas some people were clobbered to death, others were either incinerated in the huts or shot at point blank.

“The enemies came at around 6.30pm and overpowered the Amuka. They then started shooting people in their houses,” reveals Angiro. He corroborated the information that the LRA was using powerful guns like 82 recoilless, 62mm, grenades and “some bullets which were very strange.”

Other arms carried by the rebels reportedly included 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns, B-10 anti-tank and rocket propelled guns (RPGs).

“The rebels approached the camp from three fronts-north, east and south. And we are wondering why the army left Amuka militia on their own without UPDF assistance,” complains Angiro.

He observes that the Amuka boys were ill equipped, with AK-47 rifles and only two magazines of ammunition. When the bullets were over, they had to run.

“This is outrageous! For the rebels to take three hours killing people, what is the army doing? If I were Museveni I would sack all the commanders,” says an irate elder.

According 2nd Lt. Chris Magezi, the UPDF 5th Division spokesperson in Lira, the army reponded at 9.00pm (two-and-half hours later) with armoured carriers and reinforcement from town.

On why there were only Amuka and no UPDF at the camp, Magezi says the plan to recruit the Amuka, Arrow boys and other militia forces was to deploy them at the camps and let the UPDF do the work of surveillance and pursuing the rebels on main roads and in the bushes.

“And it is paying off very well,” he boasts, adding: “But we are going to review it, so that if possible we can start incorporating some regular forces (UPDF) among the militia at the camps.”

Franco Ojur, district chairman, blames it partly on the management of the army. “The UPDF management is not proper,” he says, adding that the method of protecting civilians in the camps was wrong. The army, he notes, is camped on only one side.

“The army should create a ring all round the camp, especially at night,” proposes Ojur. “The LRA are using superior weapons. So our forces need to be given superior weapons to counter the attacks,” he says. “In the absence of superior weapons, even the commanders won’t do much.” A security personnel on condition of anonymity says, on the fateful day, the locals tipped security about the imminent rebel attack. But they responded nearly three hours later.

The nearest UPDF detachment is eight kilometres away at Ogur trading centre, where the main IDP camp shelters over 20,000 people.

Magezi says the army gets information on the rebel attacks from both the locals and UPDF intelligence personnel. “Definitely we get the information,” he admits.

But adds that the rebels used machine guns to mow down several people within a short time before the army reinforcement arrived.

“We have a sizeable force in charge of the security there, but I cannot give you the number,” Magezi responds, when asked about the soldiers at Ogur.

Many people from Lira are of the view that there are few badly commanded, and poorly motivated soldiers. Some soldiers and local guards reportedly put on torn uniforms, bathroom sandals and are not paid well.

“How do they expect soldiers in the war zone to work under such conditions,” wonders Okello, a trader. Most people want Museveni to camp in Lira and plug the loopholes.

Angiro says his constituency, which has been prone to the recurrent LRA bloody attacks, had few soldiers: “In November, I told the President to establish a brigade in Ogur. Maybe they are in the process of establishing it.”

Minister Felix Okot - Ogong (MP Dokolo) is also upset by what he calls failure to protect the people.

“How do we have over 4,000 people (IDPs) who are not well-guarded? I am annoyed,” says Okot, the overall co-coordinator of the Amuka popular campaign. But he does not want to apportion blame. “So we need to sit down and redesign our strategy. The gaps that exist have to be filled,” he says.

The biggest problem, he points out, was with the border of Lira and Pader from where the rebels keep popping into Lira to unleash terror. “The only solution is to seal off the border,” he stresses, adding that the issue of more soldiers was automatic.

But he disagrees with those who think the UPDF is abdicating from its role. “The army and the Amuka boys have worked very hard,” he commends. “If that was not the case, the rebels would have by now headed as far as Kyoga, South of Lira district... we have moved very far.”

Magezi says it is impossible for the army to completely shield the civilians. “...we are dealing with a terrorist group. You can even see what is taking place in Iraq, with all the strength of the coalition forces, they still kill people.”

Last month, over 10,000 Amuka militiamen, trained with the full backing of the government and local leaders, were passed out to help the UPDF in the anti-Kony offensive in Lango.

However, some locals claim the Amuka boys, now under the command of UPDF Lt. Col. Innocent Oula, do not have all the required weaponry, including walkie-talkies and mobile phones to boost communication.Okot says they are in the process of buying the gadgets.

Although they are to earn a sh60,000 monthly wage, other people propose better packages to boost their morale for swift response.

According to Musa Ecweru, Soroti RDC, the army and local militia have the capacity to beat the rebels. He says the attacks in Lira should not demoralise Amuka. “The LRA uses the tactics of banditry to try to terrorise people into submission. They want to demoralise people in areas where resistance is just starting. They tried that in Teso...,” says Ecweru, one of the architects of Arrow boys in Teso, the role model for Amuka

“I am grieving with the people of Lira and the youth of Teso are going to support the people of Lirain the struggle.”

“The days of LRA are numbered,” he maintains, adding that the killing in Lira should even be the more reason for the Langi to be determined to wage the mass struggle against the rebels.

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