Views On The War In The North
Mar 02, 2004
RECENTLY, Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels turned their guns and machetes on the Langi, leaving the country and the international community at a loss. <b>Joyce Namutebi, Denis Ocwich and Grace Matsiko</b> interviewed some people about the persistence of the war and this is what they
ATUBO
Question: Why in your view has government and the UPDF failed to rout out LRA in the north and north-east all these years?
Answer: One of the main reasons is the will and capacity of government. This has been lacking. There are people in government who have underrated the problem in the North and North-East. There is also a negative group who believe that as long as the war is low key and is mainly in the North and can be contained there, it is not a priority.
Politically it has also been used by some leaders in the Movement to divide the country and mobilise support in Buganda and the West by projecting the northerners as people who want to come back and kill them as they did under Idi Amin and Tito Okello. It is a scarecrow.
Also the consciousness of the nation was not sufficiently aroused to know what was happening in the North. The international community was blocked from knowing what is happening in the north by Movement propaganda, saying it is a small problem and that the killers in the north want to come back to power.
The Sudan factor has complicated the war. It made it possible for Kony to have some foreign support and reinforcement. Army deployment was poor and the equipment not there.
What do you say to allegation that there is no goodwill on the part of the people to end war in Lango because you do not support Museveni?
People in the north are not stupid to slit their throats. We may not give full support to Museve-ni's government but half of the MPs from Acholi are in the Movement. The whole of Kitgum supports Museveni- (Oryem Okello, Hillary Onek, Jane Odwong). The Kitgum district council is Movement.
The whole of West Nile is for Museveni, 50% of Teso is for him and 30% of Lango is with him.
He (Museveni) is to blame for lack of full support. He has got a negative attitude towards the North regarding development and political employment. On ministers, see how we have been marginalised.
When he arrived in 1986/7 he had 100 percent support in Lango and even Teso. We were grateful to the National Resistance Army (now UPDF). They came in time to chase Tito Okello's army but Museveni did not reciprocate.
Instead of exploiting the political goodwill, he relaxed. The biggest mistake he did was to allow Karimojong cattle rustlers to rampage Lango and Teso. They looted all our cattle, raped women, destroyed property and people started wondering if this was the Museveni we supported.
We had rebel activities in Lango fighting NRM government between 1987 to 1989 but immediately this internal rebellion against Movement began, the people of Lango rejected it.
Despite the goodwill we gave to government, the Karimojong continued to terrorise us. Polit-ical leaders including myself were arrested and locked up (1990/1) and this annoyed the people. For me the goodwill is still there. It's a question of how Museveni handles it.
See what Museveni has given to Baganda and Westerners, but what has he done for us?
You have now come up to support Government to end the war. Who are the Amuka and what does the word Amuka mean?
Amuka is a rhino, a symbol of the Lango tribe. It is the massive recruitment to counter invasion of Kony. It is good. They (Amuka) are doing a wonderful job. They are asking government to equip and look after them.
What is their strength?
Up to about 10,000.
How competent are they?
Their competence depends on continuous training, proper welfare and adequate military equipment. The arrangement was that Amuka go into lighter operations while UPDF, the mobile combat. So far, they have done a wonderful job. They have done very well in Moroto County, Erute South and Dokolo. Most successes have been in Oyam County under the command of Maj. Okello Engola.
The reason why they are not very successful in Erute North and Otuke is that these areas border Pader district, where the rebels are based.
There are allegations that Amuka boys could be rebels. It is alleged that they go to government and get the guns after which they disappear to join he rebels. What is your comment?
I am not aware of any cases. The recruitment of Amuka has been so strict that if it is true, it should have been known already. The method used is that everybody who wants to join comes through the village authorities and it is them who know and recruit them.,
With the latest developments in the Lango sub-region (killing of the Acholis), what can Government and the people do to ensure this does not happen again.
There has not been any ethnic killings. The problem is not tribal, the problem is the anger of the people against government. I call the recent incident where there was a riot for three hours, small. Security forces killed two people and two others were killed by the rowdy crowd.
I deny there have been tribal killing but because of years of being subjected to rebel activity and cattle rustling, there are definitely tribal feelings between Lango and Acholi, Lango and Teso, and Teso and Karimojong.
Following rebel attacks on camps and incidences of burning them, are they still useful?
I am totally disgusted with the situation in camps. The camps have been an unnecessary tragedy, which was forced on the people with the idea that safety would be guaranteed to them.
The worst tragedy in camps is the human and social tragedies. The Environment is horrible, there is no food, education, sanitation, water and so on.
We are hoping that the war will quickly end and people go back to their homes.
The alternative to camps is to provide security in larger areas for instance the people could be put in one sub-county and security provided instead of putting them in small camps.
What should be done to end the war?
Government should have the determination and will before we think of anything else. Enough resources must be availed to end the war. Govern-ment must have superior military capability and once it shows this, it can be able to defeat Kony or push him into dialogue.
Government should listen and get support from the international community and involve them. The international community should pressure Sudan to stop aiding Kony. Government should also restore civil relations with Sudan.
It should not be merely formal diplomatic relations but we should be seen to be genuine to have good neighbourliness between Sudan and Uganda.
Parliament and the donor community want the North to be declared a disaster area. What do you say?
I welcome it if it will focus local and international attention to the north to end the war, and post war reconstruction.
ECWERU
Question: Why in your view has the UPDF failed to rout out LRA from the north?
Answer: I do not think the UPDF has failed. Over time, it has had a lot of successes, but the problem has been; one: the foreign support and the sanctuary that LRA has always enjoyed. Whenever UPDF put a lot of pressure, it (LRA) has had a fall-back position. Now that we have solved the question of foreign support, and there is going to be effective government in Southern Sudan. There will be no excuse, Kony must be eliminated.
In your view, why did the Arrow boys succeed in Teso, but the Amuka appears to be failing in Lango?
You know, these militia are a community response to a common problem. So the most fundamental factor on their success is unity of purpose. Therefore, all the leaders in the region must unite to ensure that these groups succeed.
Amuka needs to have structures like Arrow. Structures which help to check its own internal weaknesses and strength, as well as those of the UPDF so that they can forge a formidable partnership.
The two must work in partnership. There should never be suspicion between the militia and the UPDF.
For example, they must have structures for both policy coordination and military coordination. These are lacking in Lango. Some commanders who are weak can deceive them that they are on the ground whereas they are not. If you have such structures for coordination, it can be checked.
The Arrow leadership is willing to go and share its experience with Amuka and Frontier Guards of Acholi.
I will be in the north next week with some Arrow commanders. We would be naive to think that Teso is safe when Lango is in chaos.
Lango must be secured at all costs. Right now the Arrow boys are undergoing rigorous training to work with all categories of weaponry and to improve their capacity.
That also needs to be done in Amuka.
We must also work on the moral of the Amuka. They should be given credit where they have succeeded, and the leaders must visit and assess them. No one should work by remote control.
What do you say about allegation that there is no goodwill, on the part of the people, to end the war, because they do not support President Museveni?
The majority of the people in the north do not want LRA. But LRA is created, promoted and mystified by a small clique of leaders, particularly from Acholi sub-region, with a few foreigners who don't wish Africa well.
Some of them are posing as priests, or church ministers or donors, others as diplomats. Some of them want to create a Liberia in Uganda, others want to create a Sierra Leone, so that they can come and exploit our resources, in the name of restoring order.
But the good thing, Ugandans are very vigilant. And I want to tell Ugandans that our destiny is in our hands.
I am also disappointed with people who propose talks with LRA. The LRA represents a threat to civilisation.
These are people who can make people cook and eat corpses.
You said the LRA is a creation of some local leaders. Do you mean there are rebel supporters in the north?
A section of leaders, certainly. They fear if LRA is destroyed, then their relevance will not be there any more. If Acholi is pacified, then true accountable leaders will emerge, and these leaders who have survived on sentiments will disappear in thin air.
The leaders in Acholi - the ministers, the MPs, et cetera - must join the auxiliary groups, lest we hold them responsible for failing to respond to a national obligation.
Do you think Acholi leaders are not doing enough to end the problem?
They never condemn the LRA. All the time they condemn the government, and portray themselves as victims, without proposing remedies.
They always tell the world that the government has hidden agenda on Acholi, and that helps to fuel tension between the government and the people.
Parliament and the donor community want the north declared a disaster area. What do you say about it?
Declaring north a disaster area? No. Most of the people who support that have dubious intentions; they want to legitimise the LRA so that at the end of the day, there will be peace keeping, for example. And the LRA will be able to again recruit, receive support from well-wishers and hold the whole country at ransom. We should not allow a small group of primitive bandits to hold 26 million Ugandans at ransom, they must be defeated militarily. It is true the north needs intervention; anybody who wants to help the north can channel the assistance through the ministry of disaster preparedness.
Are the camps still useful, since they are being attacked?
The camps are still very necessary. I am sure if the camps had not been created, the situation would have been worse. The camps have helped to deny Kony manpower through abductions. So the camps are still necessary for as long as Kony is still active in some areas.
The problem in Ogur, for example, the information I had was that there was infiltration of the camp (at Barlonyo) by some rebels who were posing as IDPs, and therefore they had mastered the pattern of security in the camp.
We need to put in place a system to scrutinise the people in the camps. Like in Teso, people know all the IDPs, so the strangers are easily nabbed.
In addition, every camp must be guarded by a tested commander, not trial and error. Security roads, like the one from Adwari-Acanpii via Orum (in Lira) must also be opened quickly
And finally the capacity of the UPDF and Amuka must be built for their ability to respond in all directions.
What can the government do to end Kony?
First of all, concentrate and put more resources in the war against LRA, and pursue LRA with a lot of vigour without resting.
All available money should be used for buying equipment.
BANTARIZA
Question: What lessons does UPDF draw from the attack on IDP camps especially the Barlonyo where several people died?
Answer: These things happen in any human system. It is because the Commander, Lt. Emmanuel Mulindwa, made a mistake. He allowed an ungazetted camp to develop around the Amukas. He did not communicate to the above offices and the camp grew. As the Commander-in-Chief said, he would have been harsher on him had he not been a good commander in Kitgum before.
Are the camps still necessary now that they are being attacked by the LRA left and right?
First of all it is not true they are being attacked left and right. There were 42 camps in Lira alone. Out of these, it is only Abia, Aloyi and Barlonyo that have been attacked but Aloyi has been having better security. All the attacks have been repulsed. Three out of 42, it can't be fair to say that they have been attacked left and right.
Now we have amalgamated them, 42 into 20-21 camps. When they are amalgamated they are more manageable and reinforced with better arms. The lesson is not to keep many camps scattered everywhere and strech our capacity.
How do you compare the performance of Arrow Boys in Teso to Amuka in Lango?
Amuka boys are still fresh young people where-as in Teso, there was an element of ex-rebels, ex-servicemen and retired soldeirs; they brought together their experience.
For Lango, the boys were fresh and when we said instead of passing them out this weekend let us pass them out next week, many went home. That showed they were not tough people, yet they needed more training.
Do you have a system in place to ensure that Amuka, Arrow Boys and the Frontier Guards are disciplined and do not in future turn their guns against the population?
These militia are under the Command of the UPDF. If they become indisciplined they will be disciplined. There is no possibility of them turning their guns against the people. We are here.
What does the UPDF need to end the war?
Everybody's cooperation-both inside here and outside.
Why do I say this? When we capture some of these boys, they say some of our leaders, say that we should not come out until 2006. Here they publicly denounce LRA, but secretly support them.
We need people to have a position, they are either with us or with the terrorists. This is because those who are telling boys not to come out until 2006 want to say that Museveni did not defeat us by force of arms. They want to say that he has fought us and failed.
What if Museveni is here until 2015? This is the level of opportunism we have.
How has the creation of ghost soldiers impacted on the performance of the UPDF?
The issue of ghost soldiers is exaggerated. In Artillery Division Headquarters in Masindi, I am giving you classified information, they got six ghost soldiers. Can six ghost soldiers affect the performance of say a battalion? This is a number we can loose on the battlefront and still continue. The only effect of ghost soldiers is that the money that we have got simply goes into the hands of the few.
In light of what has been happening between the UPDF and the EU head of delegation, do we see a fall out between the army and the donors?
I am not happy with The New Vision. They simply misrepresented this story; it was mutilated to get enough space for the story. It was out of context. Our quarrel with His Excellency Illing (Sigurd, Head of the European Commission in Uganda) is not that he got in contact with Kony but he wrote to Kony a year ago promising to help him in peace talks, materially and politically. Kony ignored him and Illing is saying government should create a conducive climate for talks. We are saying Illing, you failed to create that climate yourself because Kony is not interested in talks, why are you unfairly pushing government, giving the impression that government is not doing enough to create good climate for talks. What climate did his contact with Kony produce, erahi? (where is it?) He is only creating the wrong impression of us.
There are reports that Kony has attained sophiscated weapons. Has the UPDF established its source ?
Whether he gets those sophiscated weapons or not we shall kill him or capture him. We have been capturing Anti-aircraft guns. The ant-aircrafts are the 12.7mm guns, we captured two recently. We recovered a B10, this gun can destroy a tank.
There have been reports that the uniforms worn by the rebels resemble those of the UPDF and the militia fighting LRA?
But you know Ugandans have a very short memory, if not, they are dishonest.
Where do the uniforms come from? Don't they come from Nytil and Picfare?
How does a collaborator fail to get the uniforms, when he can get an anti-aircraft?
What the Amuka are using is the same as the ones used by the Mujaha-sdeens in Sudan (A pro-Sudan government militia). If you did not know; now you should know.
Ends
Question: Why in your view has government and the UPDF failed to rout out LRA in the north and north-east all these years?
Answer: One of the main reasons is the will and capacity of government. This has been lacking. There are people in government who have underrated the problem in the North and North-East. There is also a negative group who believe that as long as the war is low key and is mainly in the North and can be contained there, it is not a priority.
Politically it has also been used by some leaders in the Movement to divide the country and mobilise support in Buganda and the West by projecting the northerners as people who want to come back and kill them as they did under Idi Amin and Tito Okello. It is a scarecrow.
Also the consciousness of the nation was not sufficiently aroused to know what was happening in the North. The international community was blocked from knowing what is happening in the north by Movement propaganda, saying it is a small problem and that the killers in the north want to come back to power.
The Sudan factor has complicated the war. It made it possible for Kony to have some foreign support and reinforcement. Army deployment was poor and the equipment not there.
What do you say to allegation that there is no goodwill on the part of the people to end war in Lango because you do not support Museveni?
People in the north are not stupid to slit their throats. We may not give full support to Museve-ni's government but half of the MPs from Acholi are in the Movement. The whole of Kitgum supports Museveni- (Oryem Okello, Hillary Onek, Jane Odwong). The Kitgum district council is Movement.
The whole of West Nile is for Museveni, 50% of Teso is for him and 30% of Lango is with him.
He (Museveni) is to blame for lack of full support. He has got a negative attitude towards the North regarding development and political employment. On ministers, see how we have been marginalised.
When he arrived in 1986/7 he had 100 percent support in Lango and even Teso. We were grateful to the National Resistance Army (now UPDF). They came in time to chase Tito Okello's army but Museveni did not reciprocate.
Instead of exploiting the political goodwill, he relaxed. The biggest mistake he did was to allow Karimojong cattle rustlers to rampage Lango and Teso. They looted all our cattle, raped women, destroyed property and people started wondering if this was the Museveni we supported.
We had rebel activities in Lango fighting NRM government between 1987 to 1989 but immediately this internal rebellion against Movement began, the people of Lango rejected it.
Despite the goodwill we gave to government, the Karimojong continued to terrorise us. Polit-ical leaders including myself were arrested and locked up (1990/1) and this annoyed the people. For me the goodwill is still there. It's a question of how Museveni handles it.
See what Museveni has given to Baganda and Westerners, but what has he done for us?
You have now come up to support Government to end the war. Who are the Amuka and what does the word Amuka mean?
Amuka is a rhino, a symbol of the Lango tribe. It is the massive recruitment to counter invasion of Kony. It is good. They (Amuka) are doing a wonderful job. They are asking government to equip and look after them.
What is their strength?
Up to about 10,000.
How competent are they?
Their competence depends on continuous training, proper welfare and adequate military equipment. The arrangement was that Amuka go into lighter operations while UPDF, the mobile combat. So far, they have done a wonderful job. They have done very well in Moroto County, Erute South and Dokolo. Most successes have been in Oyam County under the command of Maj. Okello Engola.
The reason why they are not very successful in Erute North and Otuke is that these areas border Pader district, where the rebels are based.
There are allegations that Amuka boys could be rebels. It is alleged that they go to government and get the guns after which they disappear to join he rebels. What is your comment?
I am not aware of any cases. The recruitment of Amuka has been so strict that if it is true, it should have been known already. The method used is that everybody who wants to join comes through the village authorities and it is them who know and recruit them.,
With the latest developments in the Lango sub-region (killing of the Acholis), what can Government and the people do to ensure this does not happen again.
There has not been any ethnic killings. The problem is not tribal, the problem is the anger of the people against government. I call the recent incident where there was a riot for three hours, small. Security forces killed two people and two others were killed by the rowdy crowd.
I deny there have been tribal killing but because of years of being subjected to rebel activity and cattle rustling, there are definitely tribal feelings between Lango and Acholi, Lango and Teso, and Teso and Karimojong.
Following rebel attacks on camps and incidences of burning them, are they still useful?
I am totally disgusted with the situation in camps. The camps have been an unnecessary tragedy, which was forced on the people with the idea that safety would be guaranteed to them.
The worst tragedy in camps is the human and social tragedies. The Environment is horrible, there is no food, education, sanitation, water and so on.
We are hoping that the war will quickly end and people go back to their homes.
The alternative to camps is to provide security in larger areas for instance the people could be put in one sub-county and security provided instead of putting them in small camps.
What should be done to end the war?
Government should have the determination and will before we think of anything else. Enough resources must be availed to end the war. Govern-ment must have superior military capability and once it shows this, it can be able to defeat Kony or push him into dialogue.
Government should listen and get support from the international community and involve them. The international community should pressure Sudan to stop aiding Kony. Government should also restore civil relations with Sudan.
It should not be merely formal diplomatic relations but we should be seen to be genuine to have good neighbourliness between Sudan and Uganda.
Parliament and the donor community want the North to be declared a disaster area. What do you say?
I welcome it if it will focus local and international attention to the north to end the war, and post war reconstruction.
ECWERU
Question: Why in your view has the UPDF failed to rout out LRA from the north?
Answer: I do not think the UPDF has failed. Over time, it has had a lot of successes, but the problem has been; one: the foreign support and the sanctuary that LRA has always enjoyed. Whenever UPDF put a lot of pressure, it (LRA) has had a fall-back position. Now that we have solved the question of foreign support, and there is going to be effective government in Southern Sudan. There will be no excuse, Kony must be eliminated.
In your view, why did the Arrow boys succeed in Teso, but the Amuka appears to be failing in Lango?
You know, these militia are a community response to a common problem. So the most fundamental factor on their success is unity of purpose. Therefore, all the leaders in the region must unite to ensure that these groups succeed.
Amuka needs to have structures like Arrow. Structures which help to check its own internal weaknesses and strength, as well as those of the UPDF so that they can forge a formidable partnership.
The two must work in partnership. There should never be suspicion between the militia and the UPDF.
For example, they must have structures for both policy coordination and military coordination. These are lacking in Lango. Some commanders who are weak can deceive them that they are on the ground whereas they are not. If you have such structures for coordination, it can be checked.
The Arrow leadership is willing to go and share its experience with Amuka and Frontier Guards of Acholi.
I will be in the north next week with some Arrow commanders. We would be naive to think that Teso is safe when Lango is in chaos.
Lango must be secured at all costs. Right now the Arrow boys are undergoing rigorous training to work with all categories of weaponry and to improve their capacity.
That also needs to be done in Amuka.
We must also work on the moral of the Amuka. They should be given credit where they have succeeded, and the leaders must visit and assess them. No one should work by remote control.
What do you say about allegation that there is no goodwill, on the part of the people, to end the war, because they do not support President Museveni?
The majority of the people in the north do not want LRA. But LRA is created, promoted and mystified by a small clique of leaders, particularly from Acholi sub-region, with a few foreigners who don't wish Africa well.
Some of them are posing as priests, or church ministers or donors, others as diplomats. Some of them want to create a Liberia in Uganda, others want to create a Sierra Leone, so that they can come and exploit our resources, in the name of restoring order.
But the good thing, Ugandans are very vigilant. And I want to tell Ugandans that our destiny is in our hands.
I am also disappointed with people who propose talks with LRA. The LRA represents a threat to civilisation.
These are people who can make people cook and eat corpses.
You said the LRA is a creation of some local leaders. Do you mean there are rebel supporters in the north?
A section of leaders, certainly. They fear if LRA is destroyed, then their relevance will not be there any more. If Acholi is pacified, then true accountable leaders will emerge, and these leaders who have survived on sentiments will disappear in thin air.
The leaders in Acholi - the ministers, the MPs, et cetera - must join the auxiliary groups, lest we hold them responsible for failing to respond to a national obligation.
Do you think Acholi leaders are not doing enough to end the problem?
They never condemn the LRA. All the time they condemn the government, and portray themselves as victims, without proposing remedies.
They always tell the world that the government has hidden agenda on Acholi, and that helps to fuel tension between the government and the people.
Parliament and the donor community want the north declared a disaster area. What do you say about it?
Declaring north a disaster area? No. Most of the people who support that have dubious intentions; they want to legitimise the LRA so that at the end of the day, there will be peace keeping, for example. And the LRA will be able to again recruit, receive support from well-wishers and hold the whole country at ransom. We should not allow a small group of primitive bandits to hold 26 million Ugandans at ransom, they must be defeated militarily. It is true the north needs intervention; anybody who wants to help the north can channel the assistance through the ministry of disaster preparedness.
Are the camps still useful, since they are being attacked?
The camps are still very necessary. I am sure if the camps had not been created, the situation would have been worse. The camps have helped to deny Kony manpower through abductions. So the camps are still necessary for as long as Kony is still active in some areas.
The problem in Ogur, for example, the information I had was that there was infiltration of the camp (at Barlonyo) by some rebels who were posing as IDPs, and therefore they had mastered the pattern of security in the camp.
We need to put in place a system to scrutinise the people in the camps. Like in Teso, people know all the IDPs, so the strangers are easily nabbed.
In addition, every camp must be guarded by a tested commander, not trial and error. Security roads, like the one from Adwari-Acanpii via Orum (in Lira) must also be opened quickly
And finally the capacity of the UPDF and Amuka must be built for their ability to respond in all directions.
What can the government do to end Kony?
First of all, concentrate and put more resources in the war against LRA, and pursue LRA with a lot of vigour without resting.
All available money should be used for buying equipment.
BANTARIZA
Question: What lessons does UPDF draw from the attack on IDP camps especially the Barlonyo where several people died?
Answer: These things happen in any human system. It is because the Commander, Lt. Emmanuel Mulindwa, made a mistake. He allowed an ungazetted camp to develop around the Amukas. He did not communicate to the above offices and the camp grew. As the Commander-in-Chief said, he would have been harsher on him had he not been a good commander in Kitgum before.
Are the camps still necessary now that they are being attacked by the LRA left and right?
First of all it is not true they are being attacked left and right. There were 42 camps in Lira alone. Out of these, it is only Abia, Aloyi and Barlonyo that have been attacked but Aloyi has been having better security. All the attacks have been repulsed. Three out of 42, it can't be fair to say that they have been attacked left and right.
Now we have amalgamated them, 42 into 20-21 camps. When they are amalgamated they are more manageable and reinforced with better arms. The lesson is not to keep many camps scattered everywhere and strech our capacity.
How do you compare the performance of Arrow Boys in Teso to Amuka in Lango?
Amuka boys are still fresh young people where-as in Teso, there was an element of ex-rebels, ex-servicemen and retired soldeirs; they brought together their experience.
For Lango, the boys were fresh and when we said instead of passing them out this weekend let us pass them out next week, many went home. That showed they were not tough people, yet they needed more training.
Do you have a system in place to ensure that Amuka, Arrow Boys and the Frontier Guards are disciplined and do not in future turn their guns against the population?
These militia are under the Command of the UPDF. If they become indisciplined they will be disciplined. There is no possibility of them turning their guns against the people. We are here.
What does the UPDF need to end the war?
Everybody's cooperation-both inside here and outside.
Why do I say this? When we capture some of these boys, they say some of our leaders, say that we should not come out until 2006. Here they publicly denounce LRA, but secretly support them.
We need people to have a position, they are either with us or with the terrorists. This is because those who are telling boys not to come out until 2006 want to say that Museveni did not defeat us by force of arms. They want to say that he has fought us and failed.
What if Museveni is here until 2015? This is the level of opportunism we have.
How has the creation of ghost soldiers impacted on the performance of the UPDF?
The issue of ghost soldiers is exaggerated. In Artillery Division Headquarters in Masindi, I am giving you classified information, they got six ghost soldiers. Can six ghost soldiers affect the performance of say a battalion? This is a number we can loose on the battlefront and still continue. The only effect of ghost soldiers is that the money that we have got simply goes into the hands of the few.
In light of what has been happening between the UPDF and the EU head of delegation, do we see a fall out between the army and the donors?
I am not happy with The New Vision. They simply misrepresented this story; it was mutilated to get enough space for the story. It was out of context. Our quarrel with His Excellency Illing (Sigurd, Head of the European Commission in Uganda) is not that he got in contact with Kony but he wrote to Kony a year ago promising to help him in peace talks, materially and politically. Kony ignored him and Illing is saying government should create a conducive climate for talks. We are saying Illing, you failed to create that climate yourself because Kony is not interested in talks, why are you unfairly pushing government, giving the impression that government is not doing enough to create good climate for talks. What climate did his contact with Kony produce, erahi? (where is it?) He is only creating the wrong impression of us.
There are reports that Kony has attained sophiscated weapons. Has the UPDF established its source ?
Whether he gets those sophiscated weapons or not we shall kill him or capture him. We have been capturing Anti-aircraft guns. The ant-aircrafts are the 12.7mm guns, we captured two recently. We recovered a B10, this gun can destroy a tank.
There have been reports that the uniforms worn by the rebels resemble those of the UPDF and the militia fighting LRA?
But you know Ugandans have a very short memory, if not, they are dishonest.
Where do the uniforms come from? Don't they come from Nytil and Picfare?
How does a collaborator fail to get the uniforms, when he can get an anti-aircraft?
What the Amuka are using is the same as the ones used by the Mujaha-sdeens in Sudan (A pro-Sudan government militia). If you did not know; now you should know.
Ends