Peace in southern Sudan, is the only hope for the same in northern Uganda
Jun 29, 2004
YOUR PLATFORM<br><br>The realisation of peace in southern Sudan will, almost definitely, usher in peace to northern Uganda.
YOUR PLATFORM
The realisation of peace in southern Sudan will, almost definitely, usher in peace to northern Uganda.
For 24 years, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) has been battling the Sudan Government forces for some form of self-determination for southern Sudan.
In Uganda for over 15 years the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been wreaking havoc among the populace of northern and north-eastern Uganda ostensibly to unseat the regime of the National resistance Movement (NRM), which has been at the helm in Uganda since January 1986.
Ironically, the LRA is allied to and aided by Islamist factions in the Sudan government.
The SPLA , on the one hand, led by a battle-hardened, university of Dar-es-Salaam graduate, Col. John Garang, is a well-trained, disciplined guerilla force with friends across Africa and beyond.
The LRA , on the other hand, led by a pseudo-religious illiterate, one Joseph Kony, is a band of ragtag unleashing suffering of all sorts to the population of northern Uganda.
With SPLA foe and friend can define their cause, while in the case of LRA their cause cannot be discerned, however you try. It is relatively easy to understand why someone kills in battle for a clear cause, whether you agree with it or not.
But it is far more difficult to farthom why someone would unleash wanton terror on an innocent population – largely his kin and kith – like Joseph Kony has done to the people of Acholi, Lango and Teso regions.
Ordinarily it would be a sin to merit comparative treatment between SPLA and LRA. But there are underlying factors that relate them in differebt contexts.
Firstly, the contiguity of northern Uganda and southern Sudan means that the population in the areas of both conflicts are of similar ethnicity – mostly Acholi Luos and Nilo-Hermites. It is often asserted that there are more Acholis in Sudan than in Uganda.
The bone of contention between the governments of Sudan and Uganda has been that the former sponsors LRA and the latter supports SPLA.
This scenario radically changes with a definitive peace deal between the north and the south of Sudan being signed by August. The Sudan vice-President, Ali Osman Taha and the SPLA leader, Col. John Garang, signed a frame-work deal in Nairobi in early June.
Secondly, after accusations were traded over the years, Khartoum allowed the Uganda army to operate inside southern Sudan to flush out Kony’s LRA.
Operationally this was no easy task. How could a Ugandan soldier in an operation in southern Sudan differentiate between an SPLA Acholi holding a gun to fight Sudanese soldiers and an LRA Acholi holding Kony’s gun to fight him?
Thirdly, the peace deal provides for a ceasefire, sharing of oil revenues between the north and the south, and a referendum on southern independence in six years. As such, with peace in the Sudan, the SPLA forces would want to consolidate their power base and undertake social rehabilitation and development in southern Sudan.
Fourthly, by the very terms of the peace accord the Khartoum government must stop warlike activities in the south of the country, implied by this would include any possible assistance to the LRA. Indeed there would not be any incentive for the Sudanese government to spend a coin on Kony. Through skillful negotiations, Khartoum could be persuaded to give the LRA a free bus ticket back to the shores of Lake Victoria.
In Uganda, the Kony rebellion is cast in the guise of a religious and terrorist group that over the years have meted scotched-earth strategy towards their own country. Their targets are not simply security forces, but through indiscriminate thuggery, ordinary Ugandans. They have been lawless and brutal in their tactics.
So they also will not find a bed of roses in the local population.
But before one can say quits to LRA, the Ugandan political leaders and the army have to get their act together.
Of recent political stalwarts from the north, notably Lango MPs Omara Atubo (Otuke) and Imat Cecilia Ogwal (Lira Municipality) have been talking constructively about the efforts of the army in the area. Support among the public for decisive government action against Kony is ever-mounting.
Thus, the army must now hit the terrorist hard, crushing LRA, closing any modicum of external encouragement for them and eventually apprehending Kony.
But the army must direct its fire at the rebels and avoid any mistakes which could embroil the surrounding population in crossfires. Joseph Kony: the writing is on the wall.
With the Sudan peace deal, this ugly trade of necessity will be drastically curtailed and the Karimojong denied this commercial urge to terrorise neighbours.
Ateker Ejalu
The realisation of peace in southern Sudan will, almost definitely, usher in peace to northern Uganda.
For 24 years, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) has been battling the Sudan Government forces for some form of self-determination for southern Sudan.
In Uganda for over 15 years the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been wreaking havoc among the populace of northern and north-eastern Uganda ostensibly to unseat the regime of the National resistance Movement (NRM), which has been at the helm in Uganda since January 1986.
Ironically, the LRA is allied to and aided by Islamist factions in the Sudan government.
The SPLA , on the one hand, led by a battle-hardened, university of Dar-es-Salaam graduate, Col. John Garang, is a well-trained, disciplined guerilla force with friends across Africa and beyond.
The LRA , on the other hand, led by a pseudo-religious illiterate, one Joseph Kony, is a band of ragtag unleashing suffering of all sorts to the population of northern Uganda.
With SPLA foe and friend can define their cause, while in the case of LRA their cause cannot be discerned, however you try. It is relatively easy to understand why someone kills in battle for a clear cause, whether you agree with it or not.
But it is far more difficult to farthom why someone would unleash wanton terror on an innocent population – largely his kin and kith – like Joseph Kony has done to the people of Acholi, Lango and Teso regions.
Ordinarily it would be a sin to merit comparative treatment between SPLA and LRA. But there are underlying factors that relate them in differebt contexts.
Firstly, the contiguity of northern Uganda and southern Sudan means that the population in the areas of both conflicts are of similar ethnicity – mostly Acholi Luos and Nilo-Hermites. It is often asserted that there are more Acholis in Sudan than in Uganda.
The bone of contention between the governments of Sudan and Uganda has been that the former sponsors LRA and the latter supports SPLA.
This scenario radically changes with a definitive peace deal between the north and the south of Sudan being signed by August. The Sudan vice-President, Ali Osman Taha and the SPLA leader, Col. John Garang, signed a frame-work deal in Nairobi in early June.
Secondly, after accusations were traded over the years, Khartoum allowed the Uganda army to operate inside southern Sudan to flush out Kony’s LRA.
Operationally this was no easy task. How could a Ugandan soldier in an operation in southern Sudan differentiate between an SPLA Acholi holding a gun to fight Sudanese soldiers and an LRA Acholi holding Kony’s gun to fight him?
Thirdly, the peace deal provides for a ceasefire, sharing of oil revenues between the north and the south, and a referendum on southern independence in six years. As such, with peace in the Sudan, the SPLA forces would want to consolidate their power base and undertake social rehabilitation and development in southern Sudan.
Fourthly, by the very terms of the peace accord the Khartoum government must stop warlike activities in the south of the country, implied by this would include any possible assistance to the LRA. Indeed there would not be any incentive for the Sudanese government to spend a coin on Kony. Through skillful negotiations, Khartoum could be persuaded to give the LRA a free bus ticket back to the shores of Lake Victoria.
In Uganda, the Kony rebellion is cast in the guise of a religious and terrorist group that over the years have meted scotched-earth strategy towards their own country. Their targets are not simply security forces, but through indiscriminate thuggery, ordinary Ugandans. They have been lawless and brutal in their tactics.
So they also will not find a bed of roses in the local population.
But before one can say quits to LRA, the Ugandan political leaders and the army have to get their act together.
Of recent political stalwarts from the north, notably Lango MPs Omara Atubo (Otuke) and Imat Cecilia Ogwal (Lira Municipality) have been talking constructively about the efforts of the army in the area. Support among the public for decisive government action against Kony is ever-mounting.
Thus, the army must now hit the terrorist hard, crushing LRA, closing any modicum of external encouragement for them and eventually apprehending Kony.
But the army must direct its fire at the rebels and avoid any mistakes which could embroil the surrounding population in crossfires. Joseph Kony: the writing is on the wall.
With the Sudan peace deal, this ugly trade of necessity will be drastically curtailed and the Karimojong denied this commercial urge to terrorise neighbours.
Ateker Ejalu