The battles behind the war

On the day of Mandela’s state funeral, Robert Kabushenga examines the role of Angola and Fidel Castro’s Cuba in handing South African forces the defeat at Cuito Cuanavale, an act that forced them to abandon apartheid and release Nelson Mandela from prison

As the global community and the mass media embark on the process of deifying the late Nelson Mandela, it would be a gross injustice for his legacy not to interpret the history of the struggle against apartheid correctly.

In today’s world of queasy reality shows, Harry Potter and a bizarre pop culture, it would be a travesty to dumb down the importance of Mandela’s achievements.

Mandela did not liberate South Africa by himself (no man could have), he was part of a struggle of millions in South Africa and around the world.

Multiple events conspired to bring down the hated system of apartheid. One of the most important military episodes that directly contributed to the demise of apartheid is what we are going to investigate in this article.

That event was the famous Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. The events leading up to the titanic conflagration at Cuito Cuanavale began on April 25, 1974, when leftist junior officers in the Portuguese military overthrew the authoritarian regime of Marcelo Caetano.

This bloodless leftist coup d’état came to be known as the Carnation Revolution. The Portuguese junior officers had been spurred into action by the bloody colonial conflicts in Portugal’s African empire.

There, the Portuguese military was being bled white by African nationalist insurgencies, demanding an end to imperialism. The bulk of these Portuguese casualties were being suffered in Guinea-Bissau (then called Portuguese Guinea) at the hands of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde or PAIGC. PAIGC was led by the revolutionary Amilcar Cabral.

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Nelson Mandela at his inauguration in 1994

The Carnation Revolution sought to end the bloody colonial wars and ensure a Portuguese retreat from its empire. In Angola, this meant entering into negotiations with African nationalists as soon as possible.

The warring parties in Angola signed the Alvor Accords in January 1975, which created a coalition government between the three main African nationalist movements, that is, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

The Alvor Accords also set a clear date for Angolan independence, November 11, 1975. Before the ink could dry on the Alvor Accords, the three main African nationalist organisations started manoeuvring for power. By July 1975, Agostinho Neto’s MPLA had managed to violently expel the other organisations from the capital Luanda.

The FNLA retreated to the north of the country and, with the help of Mobutu’s Zaire, prepared to counter attack. UNITA withdrew to its power base in the south and south-east of the country. Holden Roberto’s FNLA received troops and equipment from Mobutu Sese Seko and quickly gained ground in the north of the country.

By October 1975, the FNLA was breathing down on Luanda. In the south of the country, the South Africans sent mechanised columns across the border from Namibia (then South West Africa) and openly intervened in support of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA on October 14, 1975. The South African intervention was codenamed Operation Savannah.

It now became a race to seize Luanda from the MPLA (by both UNITA and FNLA) before November 11, 1975. The South African intervention prompted Cuba’s leader Fidel Castro to launch an operation of his own Operation Carlota, to block any attempt at capturing Luanda and to save the MPLA government.

On November 4, 1975, Castro sent the first 100 artillery specialists to Luanda. They were the first of a 650-man contingent of Special Forces. With these early Cuban reinforcements, the MPLA was able to crush the FNLA advance on Luanda at the Battle of Quifangondo on November 10, 1975.

At Quifangondo, the Cubans used artillery to devastate the FNLA advance. The FNLA as a fighting force ceased to exist soon after that. By February 1976, the Cubans and MPLA (specifically the MPLA’s armed wing called the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) had captured the last FNLA positions in the north.

FNLA’s Portuguese mercenaries and South African advisers (under General Ben de Wet Roos) all fled. With Cuban reinforcements streaming into Luanda by air and sea, the MPLA was able to turn its attention to the South Africans, who were making a rapid and very violent advance from the south.

Operation Savannah had quickly seized a large chunk of territory in southern Angola, led by ferocious commanders like Lt. Col. Jan Breytenbach, the South African mechanised columns (largely comprised black Angolan troops or Bushmen from Namibia) cut deep into southern Angola.

Breytenbach was the founding father of South African Special Forces, Airborne Forces and the feared 32 Battalion (known as the ‘Buffalo Soldiers’).

Town after town fell to the South Africans until Breytanbach’s advance along Angola’s southwestern coast was halted by strong Cuban forces at the town of Porto Amboim.

Cuban negotiator, Jorge Risquet

The Cubans (on Castro’s orders) had blown up the bridge over the powerful Queve river. This, plus the fact that the Cubans and Angolans were dug in on the other side and had powerful artillery forces, put an end to Breytanbach’s charge through southern Angola. Breytanbach’s onslaught was brought to a halt around November 13, 1975; his mechanised column called ‘Taskforce Zulu’ had advanced 3,000km in 33 days.

There were a number of other important battles fought after this, for example, the Battle of Ebo where the South Africans lost six armored vehicles and a number of soldiers.

A South African reconnaissance plane was also shot down at the Battle of Ebo. Nonetheless, by December 11, Operation Savannah was winding down and the South Africans started withdrawing. Fidel Castro and the Cubans therefore had been the principal power responsible for the survival of Agostinho Neto’s MPLA government.

Had it not been for them there is little doubt that (in spite of the heroic efforts of the Angolans) the South African mechanised columns would have closed in on Luanda. By the end of 1976, the Cuban build up in Angola had reached 35,000 troops plus tonnes of equipment.

After assuring the survival of the MPLA and the independence of Angola, the Cubans largely took a back seat and allowed FAPLA and the newly-arrived Soviet advisers to manage the war.

By 1987, a larger and better equipped FAPLA (after years of counterinsurgency operations against UNITA) was planning a major operation in south east Angola.

In the period between 1976 and 1987, the South Africans carried out numerous operations to weaken FAPLA and aid their UNITA allies. UNITA had held on to the areas in south east Angola bordering Namibia and South Africa herself controlled the rest of Angola’s southern border.

Apartheid South Africa’s pre-occupation was always to prevent the insurgents of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) from establishing bases in southern Angola, from where they could threaten Namibia. South Africa had run Namibia as one of her provinces since 1915; in Namibia the same Apartheid policies that were in force in South Africa subsisted.

FAPLA and her Soviet advisers called the impending offensive Operacion Saludando Octubre, which is Spanish for “Operation Greeting October”. One wonders why they called the operation Greeting October.

Maybe they thought it would all be over by October 1987. They were to be bitterly disappointed. Operation Greeting October involved an offensive from the small south eastern town of Cuito Cuanavale by three infantry brigades and one armoured brigade in the direction of the UNITA-held town of Mavinga.

To reach Mavinga, FAPLA would have to effect a crossing of the River Lomba, which runs to the north of that town. It would involve approximately 6,000 FAPLA and about 80 tanks.

Nelson Mandela holds the arm of South Africa’s apartheid-era president Pieter W Botha

Within the town of Cuito Cuanavale itself, and in its vicinity, FAPLA deployed another four brigades. The Cubans warned that such a large operation directed at the heartland of UNITA territory would provoke a response from the South Africans, but this advice was ignored. The operation got underway in August 1987 and by the 28th of that month, FAPLA had reached the northern banks of the Lomba.

Sure enough, the South Africans came hurtling out of north eastern Namibia like a swarm of angry wasps to oppose any crossing of the Lomba. From September 9 to October 10, in fierce fighting, the South Africans halted FAPLA’s attempts to cross the Lomba. This fighting led to the annihilation of an entire FAPLA brigade (the 47th Armored Brigade) and the mauling of the other three.

The casualties and the amount of equipment destroyed were immense. FAPLA and her Soviet advisers were forced to retreat 190km back towards Cuito Cuanavale. The South Africans pursued and pressed the devastated brigades against the Cuito river (which was the last obstacle before entering the town).

On November 9, the South Africans renewed the attack; they concentrated their artillery and airstrikes on the 16th infantry brigade. After taking a terrible pounding, the 16th brigade was able to escape annihilation by crossing the bridge over the River Cuito. Then the South Africans turned their attention to the 21st infantry brigade (commanded by the legendary Angolan commander N’Geleka).

After a severe beating, it too managed to cross Cuito. Notwithstanding, some elements of these four brigades never made it across the River Cuito i.e. to the west bank of the Cuito.

Nelson Mandela and Fidel Castro. Cuba and Angola’s defeat of South African military forces put pressure on South Africa’s Apartheid government to negotiate, eventually leading to the release of Nelson Mandela and the end of apartheid

They were effectively cut off on the eastern bank (due to the accurate artillery and air bombardments of the bridge over the Cuito) and the South Africans proceeded to squeeze the life out of them. Attempts to cross the Cuito bridge became a near death experience.

Life was not any better for the brigades (now up to seven of them) that hunkered down within Cuito Cuanavale itself i.e. in the town. The accurate and destructive bombardment by South African Valkyries (an artillery system manufactured by apartheid South Africa) made life hellish, to say the least.

One Soviet adviser described the situation in Cuito Cuanavale thus: ‘If it is suddenly quiet you begin to go crazy, wondering why the enemy does not fire and what they have in mind.’

Despite these massive setbacks. the fighting spirit and discipline of the Angolan soldiers never wavered. They conducted themselves in a truly heroic fashion.

With units pinned down on the eastern bank of the Cuito, relentless shelling and airstrikes of the town and constant ambushes by UNITA on the Cuito Cuanavale–Menongue road (the sole re-supply route for the defenders), the situation was looking very dire for FAPLA. On November 15, 1987, the Angolan government requested for urgent assistance from Fidel Castro.

He responded immediately, sending up to 1,500 first rate Cuban troops into Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban military expert General Arnaldo Ochoa took charge of the defenses at Cuito Cuanavale.

These Cuban reinforcements reached Cuito Cuanavale by December 1987. On January 2, 1988, the South Africans launched another assault on the units trapped on the eastern bank. On the 3rd, they managed to destroy the bridge over the Cuito by means of a ‘smart’ bomb.

Cuban engineers quickly managed to construct a wooden footbridge in its place, which they named Patria o Muerte (Fatherland or Death). After repeated assaults by the South Africans (and mounting losses on the part of FAPLA) the Cubans decided to adjust the defenses east of the Cuito.

The defenders on the eastern bank were withdrawn to an area called the Tumpo Triangle, which was closer to the town of Cuito Cuanavale. The Tumpo Triangle was ideally suited for a deliberate defense, the Cubans lay an extensive minefield in the area. On February 25, and later, on March 23, the South Africans made determined thrusts to try and push FAPLA and the Cubans back across the Cuito river.

Both were brought to ‘a grinding and definite halt’[2] in the words of Breytenbach. The beating the South Africans got was so severe that these members of the ‘master race’ (according to the racist Apartheid ideology), these ‘supermen’ abandoned their much-cherished tanks on the battlefield. The myth of the invincibility of the Boers had been shattered.

In addition, in these final assaults, the South Africans were finally able to get a taste of the intense artillery bombardment they had dished out so generously to FAPLA, courtesy of the Cubans.

Cuban MIG-23s that were technologically superior to the ageing South African Mirages, Buccaneers and Canberras were able to take and retain control of the skies above Cuito Cuanavale. March 23, 1988, marked the last time the South Africans attempted to assault the FAPLA-Cuban bridgehead in the Tumpo Triangle.

Characteristic of the cunning of Fidel Castro, after assuring that Cuito Cuanavale would not fall to the South Africans, he started planning a much larger and decisive operation, the likes of which southern Africa had never seen.

As the South Africans exhausted themselves trying to breach the Angolan and Cuban defense in the Tumpo Triangle, a force of 50,000 Cuban troops and an estimated 1,000 tanks landed at the port town of Namibe (in the south west). This massive force had been transported across the south Atlantic straight from Cuba.

The landings took place around April 1988. The Cubans started to advance in the direction of the Namibia border. Now, not only were the best troops South Africa had (who were at Cuito Cuanavale) threatened with encirclement, but Namibia itself was susceptible to an invasion.

Cuban engineers repaired the runways at Cahama and Xangongo (only 300km from the Namibian border). This permitted Cuban MIG-23s to threaten northern Namibia.

The MIG-23s had demonstrated their superiority to the ageing South African Mirages (a consequence of the UN arms embargo on South Africa) earlier at Cuito Cuanavale.

If the South Africans were in any doubt about the seriousness of Castro’s intentions (and the precariousness of their situation) this was put to rest on June 27, 1988. On that day, a squadron of MIG-23s bombed the Ruacana and Calueque dams in both Namibia and Angola, cutting off water supply to a large portion of northern Namibia.

These attacks also killed 12 South African soldiers. Cuban MIG-23s flew unopposed over northern Namibia; they had control of the skies. The attack on the Ruacana and Calueque dams marked the end of the Battle for Cuito Cuanavale and South Africa’s involvement in Angola.

A ceasefire was signed in August at Ruacana in northern Namibia and a full peace accord signed on December 22, 1988, in New York. The peace accord between the Angolans, Cubans and South Africans led to the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Angola.

This peace agreement was mediated by the celebrated American diplomat Chester Crocker. In conclusion, without the defeat at Cuito Cuanavale, and the sense of vulnerability that it generated within the white minority regime in South Africa, it is uncertain whether the Apartheid state would have embraced any negotiations with the African liberation movements.

The release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC (and other liberation movements) and the beginning of negotiations were all predicated on the humiliation that the hitherto ‘invincible’ White Afrikaner army had suffered at the hands of the Cubans and Angolans.

Indicative of this loss of face are the words that Jorge Risquet (Castro’s shrewd negotiator at the 1988 talks) told Pik Botha (the South African foreign minister) at a particularly thorny juncture in the negotiations. Risquet reputedly fell on Botha ‘like a ton of bricks’[3].

 “The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of black refugees ... is over”

[4] an enraged Risquet said. He added that South Africa was acting as though it was ‘a victorious army, rather than what it really is: A defeated aggressor that is withdrawing... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield.”

[5] The sun had set on the last white minority regime on the African continent.

[1] Gennady Shubin & Andrei Tokarev, Bush War, The Road to Cuito Cuanavale, Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd, 2011, p54

[2] Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cuito_Cuanavale, (accessed on 10th December 2013)

[3] Remembering Cuba’s Sacrifice for African Liberation, http://blackagendareport.com/node/10320, (accessed on 11th December 2013) [4] Ibid [5] Ibid