Bashir is walking in Idi Amin's shoes

By Samuel Baligidde

GOING by reports of skirmishes and sound of war drums on the South Sudan-Sudanese border and the alleged renewing of the Sudanese Government’s support for the LRA, it looks like Uganda is once again on the path of a war it does not want but cannot avoid in its very backyard.

Realists often distinguish between status quo and revisionist states and use this distinction as the basis for identifying two alternative paths to war. One path involves a direct conflict of interests between the two states and calculations by one side that this conflict is better resolved by war than by peace!

‘Either we end up in Juba and take everything or they end up in Khartoum and take everything’, the Sudanese President is reported to have said recently. Aggressions by Hitler’s Germany in the Second World War and Saddam’s Iraq in 1990 come to mind, though each of these cases is complex.

The other path to war involves Uganda and South Sudan; two more security-seeking states, each of whom is more interested in maintaining its current position than in extending its influence.

The explanation of the conditions and processes through which such security-seeking state can still end up in war is a distinctive contribution to what those of us in the business of academic gymnastics call Realist Theory. 

According to Jervis and Glaser, because the absence of a higher authority requires states to depend on their own actions or perhaps those of allies for their security, because of the uncertainty regarding the present and future intentions of Sudan, and the dire consequences for Uganda’s failure to prepare for possible predatory actions, Uganda must take certain actions (diplomacy, re-armament, strategic alliances) to protect itself against current and future threats.

Because of the inherent uncertainty about the intentions underlying the belligerent actions of Sudan, the offensive and defensive potential of Uganda’s weapons systems, and the tendency toward worst case analysis in the context of extreme uncertainty, even defensively motivated actions should be perceived as threats to the security of our country. Uganda must urgently respond with measures to protect itself.

Problem is, these may be perceived as threatening to Sudan, and the ensuing action–reaction cycle might lead to spirals that can escalate to full scale war.

Realists debate what compelling anarchic structures and the security dilemma actually are, or how status quo states without expansionist motivations get locked in conflict spirals that end up in war.

Offensive Realists Mearsheimer and Zakaria argue that the international system is so hostile and unforgiving that uncertainty about the future intentions of the adversary combined with extreme worst-case scenarios lead states to adopt offensive strategies, which may lead to war.

Defensive realists Snyder, Glaser and Van Evera might argue that security is not as scarce as offensive realists suggest, that regional anarchy does not in itself force States into conflict and war, and that moderate behaviour and defensive strategies work to provide security. If states behave aggressively, it is not because of systemic pressures but domestic challenges and pathologies.

One possible causal mechanism in the security path to war would involve a joint pre-emptive strike by Uganda and South Sudan based on the likelihood of their adversary launching a major attack and if war has become inevitable, it is better to initiate it.

If Uganda faces a perennial adversary who is also a Khartoum proxy, anticipates a power transition on its northern flank and initiates a preventive war to maintain the status quo or if South Sudan initiates war to recover territory lost in previous skirmishes and re-establishes the earlier status quo, is that predation or security-seeking?

The analytical distinction between predation and security-seeking is not clear, and the two can mutually reinforce each other. Bashir seems to have chosen the path Idi Amin took when he attacked Tanzania in 1978. The endgame is history but the contagion of the example predictable.

The writer is an academic and former diplomat