Uganda’s Presence In Congo Is For Stability

Mar 16, 2003

Honourable <b>Amama Mbabazi</b> presented a speech to Parliament on the situation in Ituri in DR Congo Last Tuesday. Below is the full statement justifying why the UPDF is resident in the DRC<br>

The UPDF has been accused of creating a long standing conflict

When Uganda signed the Lusaka cease-fire Agreement in July 1999 after protracted negotiations, we were confident that it answers the internal dimension to the conflict which is being addressed through the inter-Congolese dialogue. We were all confident it answered the external dimension to the conflict which Uganda also addressed through our own efforts of defeating armed terrorists who had been operating from the Congo and the United Nations supported programme of disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration of these terrorists.
Uganda was the first country to radically implement its obligations under Lusaka by unilaterally withdrawing most of its units from the Congo.
Before the total withdrawal of the UPDF, the United Nations requested Uganda to maintain a force in Bunia for sometime to avoid genocide which was about to take place there.
It is against this background that the Luanda Agreement signed in September 2002 between President Joseph Kabila and President Yoweri Museveni facilitated by President Dos Santos was signed, providing a legal basis for UPDF to stay in DR Congo and ensure security for the people of Ituri before its total withdrawal.
Background to the Hema-Lendu conflict.
Whereas our investigations so far point to the conflict between the two communities having started in 1911 and continued in 1965, 1967, 1979, 1981 and 1992, the fighting which started in Ndjugu in April 1999 has its seeds in the land law and corrupt legal system of land administration in the Congo.
According to this law, on expiry of two years the registrar, without any other claimant challenging such application, the interest of the applicant is automatically registered and the applicant gets title for it.
In 1996, three prominent and rich Hema landlords applied for land from the landboard in Kisangani which was occupied by Lendus on customary tenure basis.
The three Hemas namely Singa-Kodjo, Lobo Tsoro and Savo families had already acquired large land concessions from the Belgian administration.
In April 1999, the three were granted leases by the land supervisor and started evicting Lendus who occupied the same land had since time immemorial and who were not aware of the application or grant of the said title. This led to intense fighting between the two communities with very heavy loss of lives and destruction of property.
Other factors which delayed the immediate resolution of the conflict include:
l A rebellion which was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem and bearing in mind the size and absence of infrastructure in Congo, failed to solve the problem politically by mobilising the population to address their land grievances when law and order returns to the Congo.
l Mistakes by some of our commanders who, acting in ignorance of the history of the problem, and ill trained in administration of justice, were used by some groups against others and failed to execute their mission in an impartial manner.
A number of community leaders have since established links with us and when our investigations are complete, disciplinary action will be taken against any officer implicated in this.
l The failure by the United Nations and the international community to either provide an effective force to protect the people and disarm the militias or give Uganda the mandate to do so beyond the one battalion which was guarding Bunia Airport. Uganda was being criticised for staying in the DR Congo but condemned for proposing to withdraw from the DR Congo.
l The Kinshasa government, especially under the late President Kabila, sought to use the grievances of the Lendus as a destabilising force against Uganda’s presence in eastern DR Congo by arming them. The Lendus who lacked military leadership turned their newly acquired arms against innocent civilians indiscriminately in all the 18 communities of Ituri leading to general instability.
l Due to the attacks by the Lendu combatants and the withdrawal of UPDF from all the territories of Ituri except Bunia town, some Hema leaders came to Uganda in search of arms to use in the inter tribal war. Uganda refused to arm them on a sectarian basis as we could not guarantee the proper use of those arms.
These leaders went to another country which armed them.
Initially, we understood the reason behind these Hema moves of self defence but the Union of Patriotic Congolese (UPC) leadership which has been incharge of Ituri for the last eight months (mainly from the Gegere, a Hema sub group), started a programme of using their newly acquired arms to conquer other tribes, was reluctant to accept the Ituri pacification programme and was being used by other forces interested in undermining the Lusaka and Luanda Agreements on DR Congo and to threaten the security of Uganda.
A disagreement emerged within the UPC on the number and type of weapons received. The country which gave them weapons delivered more than what they had asked for and the type of weapons received included anti-aircraft systems, anti tank and anti personnel mines, heavy artillery and air defence systems which could neither be for self defence against Lendus or for an inter-tribal conflict.
Uganda has taken deliberate steps to implement the Luanda Agreement by:
l Facilitating a tripartite meeting involving Ministers from the DR Congo government, with Thomas Lubanga on the need for the IPC as the best platform to address security issues in Ituri especially to address the complaint by UPC that the DR Congo government was still arming the Lendu.
l Raising of the question of secret air dropping of arms against the spirit of Lusaka and Luanda Agreements with relevant regional leaders and the signatories of Lusaka Agreement.
l Facilitating a meeting between Thomas Lubanga of UPC and Mbusa Nyamwisi of RCD-ML attended by an observer from the DR Congo government in which the two forces ceased hostilities as a way of setting the IPC forward by signing the Kampala understanding last November 15.
l Facilitating various meeting in Uganda between Thomas Lubanga UPC and Lendu leaders in which the Lendus agreed to cease hostilities, start joint patrols and start IPC. Unfortunately Lubanga’s group refused to sign the Arua Agreement and take steps to launch the IPC.
l Arranging in Dar-es-Salaam a meeting between President Kabila and Chief Kahwa (then belonging to UPC) with a view of removing all the obstacles to Ituri Pacification Commission.
l Sending many special delegations to Bunia to engage the UPC leadership on the dangers of using the gun to conquer other tribes which have accepted dialogue.
On the February 7 and 8 2003, the UPDF High Command after reviewing the security situation on the country and the region, advised H.E. the President to seek a no objection from President Kabila to the extension of the mission of UPDF in the Congo to include taking all necessary measures to enable Ituri pacification to take place leading to the withdrawal of UPDF from the Congo.
From the February 9 to 10, 2003 H.E. the President of Uganda met H.E the President of DR Congo under the hosting of H.E President Mkapa and Angola was represented by Minister of External Affairs Hon Miranda in which the Presidents agreed to establish a new frame work for Ituri Pacification Commission, a new calender beginning on February 17 2003 to be followed by the withdrawal of UPDF from Bunia by March 20, 2003 when, it was planned, the IPC will have completed its work.
Their excellencies condemned those who continue to supply weapons to armed factions in Ituri region resulting in escalation of violence and human suffering and also agreed to a ministerial level meeting on implementation of what was agreed to be held on the February 14 2003 in Luanda, Angola.
In the Dar-es-Salaam meeting, UPC was represented by Mr Lubanga who agreed to all the proceedings and resolutions.
On the February 14, 2003 in the Angola meeting, Uganda was represented by Hon, Col. Otafiire and Hon. Col Mayombo and attended by all the signatories of the Luanda Agreement including MONUC where it was agreed, among others, that Uganda provides security for all activities of the Ituri preparatory Committee and Ituri pacification Commission starting from February 17 till March 20, 2003.

It also put in place the formula of representation to the IPC to include notables, the business community, civil society, traditional chiefs, interest groups and military forces.
It also put in place a mechanism for considering the political aspirations of the protagonists in Ituri through the special envoy to the Secretary General of the United Nations for the inter Congolese dialogue.
The UPC leadership was immediately briefed by MONUC and Uganda on the outcome of the Luanda meeting and Uganda appointed Brig. Kale Kaihura CPC UPDF and Maj Muhoozi of the CO of the 53 Battalion in Bunia to represent it on the Ituri pacification preparatory committee.
Immediately after the Luanda meeting UPC issued a statement condemning MONUC and the UN for being partial, Uganda for being against pacification and the Kinshasa government for continuing war in Ituri.
Actions by the UPC since the Luanda meeting of February 14, 2003.
l Changed the programme of the Ituri Pacification preparatory Committee from February 17, 2003 to March 3, 2003 without any satisfactory reason.
l Has been broadcasting anti Uganda and anti MONUC, anti DRC government propaganda on the Bunia Radio.
l Rejected the formula agreed to in Luanda of representation on Ituri preparatory committee.
l Started a parallel Ituri Pacification Commission excluding other dominant and armed factions in Ituri.
l Accused Uganda, without any evidence of responsibility for arming Lendus and massacring people in Bogoro when UPDF had no forces there.
l On February 24, 2003 after informing Gen Diallo the MONUC Commander that the IPC was a non starter, Gen Daillo’s plane was shot at in a territory controlled by UPC.
l Forcing at gunpoint VOA journalist Mike Alelenge to broadcast a story that Brig. Kale had been taken hostage in order to force UPDF out of Bunia. This was done by UPC Ministers Rafiki and Beiza.
l Falsely alleging that UPDF had killed two UPC soldiers and refusing an investigation of the matter when the soldiers had died in an area occupied by UPC.
Events Leading to the clash on March 6, 2003.
l On March 1, 2003, UPDF received Intelligence that UPC was purchasing food from Goma and Bunia town and stock pilling supplies for a long war with UPDF.
l On the March 3, 2003, UPC took a UPDF I.O Capt Birungi hostage till UPDF gets out of Bunia. He was later released after UPDF intervened.
l On March 4, 2003, UPC gave UPDF ultimatum to leave Bunia town or else be attacked by UPC. UPDF withdrew from the detachment at Yambio and at Police Headquarters in town to avoid the conflict.
l In a letter dated March 4, 2003 from Brig Kale to Thomas Lubanga of UPC copied to MONUC Brig Kale raised five points of concern to UPDF which included UPC laying ambushes on Bunia Airport Road against UPDF soldiers, sniping UPDF soldiers at water points, deploying in areas controlled by UPDF, verbal abuse and other provocative attacks against UPDF and requested him to put an end to this peacefully.
l On the March, 5 2003, UPDF received confirmatory intelligence from a UPC defector and Chief of Military Intelligence Commander Ali of UPC plans encouraged by a foreign country to attack UPDF position at Dele and the airport. The source had been in the meeting when the orders were given.
That the UPC had been promised reinforcements from that foreign country through the airfields of Mongwalu, Urumu, Bambu and Bule.
The plan included, simultaneous launching of 1600 Ugandan dissidents of Lt Cols Mande, Kyakabaale and Col Muzoora who had been reorganising from Ituri, with the knowledge of UPC into Uganda from Aboro Hills near Fataki N.E of Bunia town.
We shared this Intelligence with MONUC and some friendly foreign governments.
Attack on UPDF positions.
l On the March 6, 2003 at about 0715 Uganda time UPC forces attacked a UPDF detachment at Dele and the Airport position using mortars and heavy weapons. UPDF repulsed them and went ahead to capture the whole of Bunia town. The main UPC force withdrew northwards to Nizi and to Fataki and Mungbwalu directions. Other forces that had been at camp Ndruma withdrew southwards and re-organised at Nyakunde. The UPC has been waiting for reinforcements by air at Bule Mungbwalu and Irumu airfields.
l During the initial shelling one UPDF soldier died and 14 were injured. Two soldiers died later due to the injuries. There were 17 UPC soldiers counted dead and many UPC casualties and the UPDF captured a lot of arms and ammunition that had been recently supplied. These include many anti tank and anti personnel mines.
l There was no damage to property during the fighting as only light weapons were used in town. However one building belonging to one Piero, which was said to have been storing fuel, caught fire. Another building belonging to Tibasiima that had been used as mortar position to shell UPDF position was damaged during neutralising fire.
l There was isolated looting by Lendu militias who took advantage of the fighting. The situation was immediately put under control by the UPDF and many properties returned to their owners.
l Five civilians died and 40 were injured.
l Concurrent to this there were disagreements within Lubanga’s group. On March 1, 2003 there was a mutiny led by commander Jerome Kakawavu Bakande sector commander based in Aru. His area of responsibility extended to Aliwara. Commander Jerome sited the following for his action:
— That the UPC Movement under Lubanga was an obstacle to the process of pacification on Ituri region and the unification of DR Congo in general.
— The UPC was continuously practicing tribalism, nepotism, selfishness, favouritism and non transparency an indication that the movement was not prepared to cooperate in the March 3, 2003 scheduled agreement for the control of Ituri.

Proposed course of action: 1. The government of Uganda has decided to
l Deploy adequate forces to stabilise the whole of Bunia town and the environs.
l Secure roads to Bunia to ensure supply of food to the town.
l Contact and facilitate humanitarian agencies for distribution of medicine and food to the population.
l Make urgent preparations with MONUC to start the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) to fill the political vacuum by an agreeable and all inclusive administration.
As soon as this is implemented the UPDF will withdrawal all its troops from Congo and hand over Ituri to the transitional government of Congo.
Interahamwe/Ex-Far/Alir/Mai Mail Links
Uganda would like to put on record that it has never organised or has plans to organise in Uganda or anywhere in the area it controls in Congo, Interahamwe, Ex-Far, Alir or Mai Mai with the intention of attacking or conducting a proxy war against Rwanda as is persistently being claimed in the Rwanda media. There is a reliable mechanism to investigate these allegations ably chaired by Rt. Hon Claire Short on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom.
Uganda shall strictly adhere to this London understanding in her relations with Rwanda, to the Lusaka and Luanda Agreements and in her relations with DR Congo.

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