The problem is the motive behind appointments of RDCs and advisors
Sep 02, 2003
MPs are pressurising President Yoweri Museveni to cut down the number of presidential advisors and Resident District Commissioners.
MPs are pressurising President Yoweri Museveni to cut down the number of presidential advisors and Resident District Commissioners. As a result, a decision has been taken to trim the number of the RDCs and presidential advisors, according to the Minister for the Presidency, Kirunda Kivejinja.
MPs clamouring for reducing the number of RDCs and advisors are not tackling the core of the problem. The real problem is not that there are too many RDCs (129) and advisors (33).
The problem is that these appointments appear to be increasingly calculated to reward Movement loyalists or to appease certain social or political constituencies.
Even if only a few RDCs and advisors are retained, if the main consideration for their appointment is to distribute posts among Movement loyalists, they will not serve a useful purpose.
At times presidential appointments have been used as an instrument of election maneuvers.
For example, Naava Nabagesera’s appointment followed an acrimonious fight between her and Movement diehard Margaret Zziwa over the Kampala woman seat.
Often these appointments have been dished out as ‘handouts’ to Movement loyalists who miss out in the ministerial appointments or election to parliament. Some Movement loyalists now think that they can only catch the eye of the President, if they contest in elections.
Many people have scooped appointments as presidential advisors and assistants, ambassadors, RDCs, members of the Constitutional commissions and regulatory agencies or directors of state corporations in this manner.
The number of RDCs would not matter, if they actually monitored and inspected the local governments’ activities.
But because of the political circumstances under which they are appointed, RDCs tend to see themselves as Movement mobilisers/cadres whose primary responsibility is to monitor and crack down on the activities of the real or imaginary Movement opponents.
Since most local government officials are Movement loyalists, the RDCs find it difficult to expose their sleaze.
In many instances, RDCs have found it much safer to join the ‘eating’ at the district. Those who have tried to expose the corrupt district officials, have ended up burning their fingers and regretting it. Often, where an RDC refuses to join in the ‘eating’, is where you hear of a district council demanding the transfer of an RDC. But such an RDC is rarely rewarded.
Since most LC5 chairpersons and councillors are Movement diehards, it is more politically expedient for the appointing authority to transfer or sack the RDC, thus unknowingly facilitating unchecked thieving!
MPs clamouring for reducing the number of RDCs and advisors are not tackling the core of the problem. The real problem is not that there are too many RDCs (129) and advisors (33).
The problem is that these appointments appear to be increasingly calculated to reward Movement loyalists or to appease certain social or political constituencies.
Even if only a few RDCs and advisors are retained, if the main consideration for their appointment is to distribute posts among Movement loyalists, they will not serve a useful purpose.
At times presidential appointments have been used as an instrument of election maneuvers.
For example, Naava Nabagesera’s appointment followed an acrimonious fight between her and Movement diehard Margaret Zziwa over the Kampala woman seat.
Often these appointments have been dished out as ‘handouts’ to Movement loyalists who miss out in the ministerial appointments or election to parliament. Some Movement loyalists now think that they can only catch the eye of the President, if they contest in elections.
Many people have scooped appointments as presidential advisors and assistants, ambassadors, RDCs, members of the Constitutional commissions and regulatory agencies or directors of state corporations in this manner.
The number of RDCs would not matter, if they actually monitored and inspected the local governments’ activities.
But because of the political circumstances under which they are appointed, RDCs tend to see themselves as Movement mobilisers/cadres whose primary responsibility is to monitor and crack down on the activities of the real or imaginary Movement opponents.
Since most local government officials are Movement loyalists, the RDCs find it difficult to expose their sleaze.
In many instances, RDCs have found it much safer to join the ‘eating’ at the district. Those who have tried to expose the corrupt district officials, have ended up burning their fingers and regretting it. Often, where an RDC refuses to join in the ‘eating’, is where you hear of a district council demanding the transfer of an RDC. But such an RDC is rarely rewarded.
Since most LC5 chairpersons and councillors are Movement diehards, it is more politically expedient for the appointing authority to transfer or sack the RDC, thus unknowingly facilitating unchecked thieving!