You do not need dead bodies to win a war

Dec 28, 2008

OPERATION ‘Lightning Thunder’ has been labelled a ‘flop’ by some Ugandans. However, when you look at the objectives of the attack, it was not a failure. Of course, one of the objectives may have been to kill rebel leader Joseph Kony or bring him back, but this should not have been the major

By Joshua Kato

OPERATION ‘Lightning Thunder’ has been labelled a ‘flop’ by some Ugandans. However, when you look at the objectives of the attack, it was not a failure. Of course, one of the objectives may have been to kill rebel leader Joseph Kony or bring him back, but this should not have been the major objective.

Decapitating the Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) ability to wage war was the major objective of this operation and this can be done even without killing Kony. In a war like the one against the LRA, it should be more of denying him the ability to fight, cutting off his supply routes even if his men are not killed.

The operation may not have succeeded in capturing Kony or even killing many of his men, however, the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) managed to occupy the declared ‘impenetrable’ camps of Garamba. When Kony fled to Garamba, he thought he could not be found by the UPDF.

Military analysts looked at all the options and declared that Garamba was a fortress. One of them said: “If the UPDF ever dares to attack Kony in Garamba, all the UPDF soldiers will be annihilated.” Annihilation in military terms means that ‘there will be no survivors. However, after the air-raids, and entrance into the camps, the UPDF has not yet faced any major counter-attacks from the LRA.
Wars are not won by killing most of your enemies and parading their bodies before the media. Objectively, wars are mainly won by decapitating your enemy’s ability to fight.

Operation commander Brigadier Patrick Kankiriho put it clearly. “Ugandans should not be interested in only seeing dead bodies,” Being a veteran of the Luweero war (1981-86), he knows what it means for your enemy to push you away from your camps.

In the early 80s, the most trying period of the Luweero bush war, for the National Resistance Army (NRA), was the period between February and September 1983. This was when the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) launched their greatest offensive.

The UNLA forced the NRA to move away from their established camps around Semuto, Kapeka, Masulita and Nakaseke to the semi-arid areas of Ngoma in Luweero, where there was no food.

Just like the case is with Lightning Thunder, the UNLA did not have dead bodies of NRA soldiers to boast of, but they had one major asset, they had captured and occupied former NRA bases. Famous camps like Mondlane, Nkrumah and Lutta were taken over by the Government soldiers.

Just like the LRA, the NRA had stayed in these bases for over two years. They had established farms for sources of food, just like Kony had in Garamba. Most of their war-making abilities were centred around these camps.

If it was not for massive re-organisation, the UNLA had virtually won the war. And under the circumstances, the LRA cannot compare themselves to the NRA. The NRA survived because they had a very supportive population. In fact, as they withdrew to Singo, they moved with most of the population.

On the other hand, the LRA is over 231 miles away from her ‘mother’ population and in a hostile country. Both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Sudan have denounced them. The Central African Republic has also done the same. This means that re-organising will be difficult. When they were chased away from Sudan, they still had the DRC bushes to settle in. Now that they have been chased away from the DRC, where are they going?
In the attacks in Garamba, the UPDF managed to destroy one major asset, food supply.

The rebels had grown over 10,000 acres of food, that could feed a division for many years. All this, grown in a whole two years was abandoned. Training of recruits was also stopped.
The rebels morale was affected, knowing that they are being watched and attacked in a sanctuary that they once considered far away from their enemies.

When the UPDF launched ‘Operation Iron Fist’ in 2001 and occupied Kony’s camps in Jabelain and Rubang-tek (Southern Sudan), again, some people labelled the operation a failure because Kony was not killed. However, it was because of Iron Fist that Kony was finally forced to talk peace with the Government. Not only that, desertions from amongst his officers increased.
Further, the fact that for the first time, a joint force from all concerned countries attacked the LRA is a victory in some sense. For many years, the LRA was seen as a Ugandan problem.

Then, it was seen as a Ugandan and Sudanese problem, after the Government reached an agreement with the Sudanese governments against the LRA. But now, it is seen as a regional problem, since both the DRC and the Central African Republic are on board. This will deny Kony sanctuary from all corners of the region.

The organsisation of the UPDF logistics for this attack should also be commended. During Iron Fist, pictures of soldiers in tattered uniforms were seen. The attacking forces moved on foot for hundreds of miles and by the time they reached their target, many were tired. They ran out of food supplies and went hungry. Their morale was low. This time round, however, most of the soldiers were airlifted to near the object using helicopters.

Those from Kampala were airlifted on a giant Hercules C130, not hired, but owned by the Ministry of Defence to the Sudan, before they entered Garamba. The fact that the UPDF deployed more than three MIG-23s and more than five helicopter gun-ships on a mission hundreds of miles away from the country is commendable.

The LRA are still capable of carrying out attacks in the region and we should not be surprised if in the next few days, members of the LRA enter northern Uganda again. It should be remembered that as Iron Fist kicked him hard in 2002, Kony attacked parts of Teso. Some people said he was becoming more powerful, however, those were signs of a desperate dying horse.

Without the bases in Sudan and the DRC, the LRA cannot effectively wage war on Uganda. Instead of critising the operation, Ugandans should support it. Gradually, Kony will be history.

The writer is a journalist

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