Chopper Directive Came From Above, Says Besigye

Day eight of the probe commission into the purchase of combat helicopters for the army. Justice Julia Ssebutinde heads the commission assisted by Mr. Geoffrey Kiryabwire. Maureen Owor is the lead counsel and Robinah Gureme Rwakoojo is secretary. The commission has summoned the eighth witness, Col Dr Kizza Besigye. The commission officials had forgotten to bring a Bible for Besigye to swear with. Anne Mugisa, Alfred Wasike, and Milton Olupot covered the proceedings. Owor: what is your name? Kizza Besigye (KB) (flanked by his lawyer, Oscar Kihika): Kizza Besigye, I am a colonel. I am 45 years of age. I obtained a bachelor's degree in medicine and surgery from Makerere University in 1980. I did an officers' training course in 1990 in Bombo. I joined the NRA in 1982. while still in the bush, I did my training at a place called Kitema Masanga, Semuto, Bulemezi, Luweero. I served in the mobile forces of the NRA in charge of medical services. In 1985, I was appointed as Director of Medical Services, but between 1986 and 1991, I was not in the direct service of the army. From 1986-1987, I was the Minister of State for Internal Affairs. From 1987 December to 1990, I was a minister in the President's Office and National Political Commissar. In 1991, I was appointed commanding officer of the Mechanised Regiment of the NRA, in 1993 I was the CLE (Chief of Logistics and Engineering) till 1997 or 1998 when I was appointed an advisor in the Ministry of Defence, a post I held till retirement in October 2000. Owor: what does the CLE do, or at least in your time? KB: the CLE had the functions of undertaking procurement, purchases for the military stores except arms and ammunition, the function of storage of those stores, all except arms and ammunition, distribution of stores and again except arms and ammunition, had the role of maintenance of all barracks and stores maintenance of all motor vehicles, land and equipment and also had the responsibility of civil construction of barracks and stores. Owor: who would keep arms and ammunition? KB: the storage of arms and ammunition is the responsibility of an officer called IGME (the Inspector General of Military Equipment) who also distributes them on the instructions of the Army Commander. The procurement of classified stores to the best of my knowledge was undertaken...by different procedures at different times. Owor: are helicopters classified stores? KB: combat helicopters. Owor: was your office ever involved in procurement of helicopters? KB: yes. Owor: tell us the procedures you followed. KB: if I could categorise the stages of procurement in general into the identification of suppliers, drawing up of a contract, supplying of the required materials as constituting the procurement process. May be I would start by identifying the need for the item, identification of the suppliers. Identifying the need would normally originate from the end user. Owor: what happened in the case of the helicopters in question? KB: one would expect the need to be from the directorate of air force and air defence and they would have to specify them. The technical specification of the required items...this need would be discussed by the Army Commander and possibly in some cases with the Commander-in-Chief himself. Owor: what about yourself? KB: the CLE, in our case, did not have that responsibility and was not used in that exercise. Owor: so it would not get to you? KB: once the need has been identified and specified, then it would be referred to the ministry of defence. Owor: who in the ministry of defence would this need be referred to? KB: to the Secretary for Defence then, now PS. Owor: what was the role of the Secretary for Defence? KB: the role of the PS, depending on how the need has been communicated to him, quite often it took the direction of how it came...he would get the offers of the materials and the attendant financial requirements and cause a meeting to discuss the various offers. Owor: would the CLE be involved? KB: sometimes...it was not a constant... Owor: how did your office get involved in the purchase of the helicopters? KB: I first got to know about the need for purchase of the helicopters through a meeting with the Minister of State for Defence, Hon Amama Mbabazi, on the 5th of November 1996. The minister informed us that he had been forced to prematurely terminate his visit to his constituency because he had been urgently summoned to come and handle an urgent matter...he went ahead to read us a letter addressed to him by HE the President, which also had an offer for supply of combat helicopters known as MI-24 which had now been referred to the Minister of State for Defence with a directive to acquire the four helicopters immediately. Owor: is that the letter dated 24th of October 1996 which talks about two MI-24(v) and MI-24(p) manufactured not earlier than 1988? What happened? KB: yes, madam. The Minister of State for Defence informed us that the matter was very urgent and that we were required to take immediate steps to implement this directive. A discussion ensued as you might have seen in the minutes, it was decided that a team should be sent to inspect the said aircraft. Owor: just before that decision, if you look the minutes, did the Minister of State for Defence show you the offer? KB: I did not see the offer during the meeting. I subsequently saw the contract. Owor: the offer is dated 25th of July 1996. KB: I saw it this morning, but it was talked about in the meeting. The pre-occupation of the meeting was to take steps to implement the directive. Owor: it looked puzzling that the user department didn't need more aircraft. KB: there was extensive discussion on whether we needed more aircraft...one of the reasons advanced was that they would have no pilots, it would take a couple of years to train them. The other argument was that the other equipment was in very bad shape, others were in factories and the Ministry of Defence had failed to pay...they felt that we would rather use money to maintain what we had than spend on others...so there was actually an extensive debate on that matter, which suggested that this procurement had not been originated by them or by their prior involvement. Owor: that a decision had already been taken? KB: they referred to the directive of the President ...what was at issue now was the implementation of the President's directive. Owor: could that explain the next minute? KB: precisely. The debate was whether we would buy them and have them packed at Entebbe while we train pilots...you see, they must first be trained from small fixed wing aircraft at the Soroti Flying School... There was also a problem of how we would use the aircraft...even some of the people at Soroti had started escaping because the Ministry of Defence had failed to pay fees at Soroti. Owor: Look at C, minute 2, did Dr Mbonye express the sentiment that he had just seen the offer? KB: I don't recollect that. Owor: what did the meeting mean by technical team? KB: technical team would refer to officers of the department of airforce who would have some technical knowledge on helicopters or aircraft, who would go to look at the aircraft and give us a report of their impressions. Owor: move to minute 4, D...(reads)...the offer included... KB: there was a lot of discussion about those (p)s, (v)s and things like that relating to models of aircraft...I recollect that the airforce people were giving information relating to those (v)s, (p)s about which was more recent. the people offering the aircraft were also changing their offers. Owor: did the suppliers explain? KB: CSC was not at the meeting. Owor: did you know the purchase price? KB: No, madam. But as indicated in that minute, it was also noted that it was not clear. It was decided that the Secretary for Defence should get those clarifications. Owor: I would like to take you to B...(reads). ..a technical team should be prepared to go to Ukraine... KB: I know it was led by Col Masaba. Owor: the composition that team was not discussed at the meeting? KB: no, madam. Owor: didn't you discuss their terms of reference? KB: no, madam...but talking about terms of reference and in all cases of procurement that I am aware of, there is a significance lacooner. There are no procedures as to who would form technical teams,... as to what constitutes a technical inspection, so again it is done as differently as there are cases. Owor: what is the role of the IGME? KB: this officer called IGME, in spite of that name, his precise role is store-keeper. He does not do more than that, he just keeps his stores securely locked (laughter). Owor: any guidelines on the selection of teams? KB: unfortunately, there were none. It was raised on a number of occasions as a serious problem, discussed at various meetings, it was even a subject on which advice was given following foreign technical teams but unfortunately, till I left, I know that no such procedures were established. Owor: did you have a role in the purchase? KB: yes, madam. After these preliminary meetings, I was at...a much later stage invited to the office of the Minister of State for Defence and I was advised that the aircraft and related materials were ready for shipment and I was appointed to go with some technical officers to inspect the materials before shipment. Owor: when were you called to go? KB: in May 1997. Owor: were you told where the aircraft were? KB: Belarus. Owor: were you informed about the change from the Ukraine to Belarus? KB: there is confusion in my mind but what I know ...is that these suppliers initially had helicopters in the Ukraine...some of our people went to the Ukraine, saw them and did not like them so the suppliers got other helicopters in another town, Owor: have you ever heard of CSC? KB: I have never heard of them. Owor: what about a pre-qualified list in the ministry? KB: what may be referred to as pre-qualified suppliers may be the people who used to supply us more often. Owor: not a pre-qualified list? KB: no, but pre-qualified by who? (laughs) Owor: on what note did the meeting end? KB: that a team should go immediately to look at this equipment and upon its return, report and a contract concluded and the procurement finalised. The whole meeting had a very urgent atmosphere about it. Owor: what does urgent mean? KB: no time frames were discussed but the urgency of the matter was high up...as I indicated, the Minister of State for Defence had been hurriedly summoned from his remote home area to deal with this matter...everybody is expected to act without wastage of any moment and indeed it was indicated in the minutes, any delay could be a subject of disciplinary action. Owor: but couldn't an officer ask for more time within the framework of urgent? KB: if there was a problem, it could have been referred back to the President but with the same sort of urgency. Owor: there is a report by Col Masaba. Do you recall seeing that report? KB: I recall that this report was read out to a meeting called by the Minister of State for Defence. Owor: are those the minutes of that meeting? KB: yes. Owor: before the meeting, had you been told what Masaba was going to do? KB: I only knew about what Masaba was going to do in this meeting. Owor: some people in that meeting seem to have read the report while others had not. Did you see Masaba's report? KB: it was read in the meeting. I hadn't seen it before. Owor: is there anything you can tell the commission about Masaba's team? KB: I don't recollect whom he went with on the inspection tour. Owor: all we have are pages 1 and 2...is there anything else that was discussed which is not in the minutes? KB: only essential elements. Owor: what do you consider as essential elements? KB: he reported that the helicopters were there, that there was a problem of years of manufacture, that the ones he saw were manufactured between 1981 and 1986. He reported that they were in good condition, he gave the impression that they were impressed. Owor: he attached a protocol, official guarantees on overhaul...did he explain the documents? KB: I don't recollect. I looked at the documents this morning but I think their main import is to authenticate the goods they intended to supply. Owor: had you known about BT? KB: no, madam. Owor: did you discuss the years of manufacture? KB: that was an area deliberated upon. It was misleading to say that... there could not have been a model of the MI-24 manufactured in 1986...the impression I recollect is that he convinced the meeting that the years of manufacture being earlier than 1988 was not a crippling factor... Owor: do you recall seeing this revised report? KB: No, but it was referred to. Owor: training would take about a year? KB: a year? More than a year. What they were talking about was converting the pilots of the MI-17 to fly the MI-24s. Owor: was the period of 12 weeks discussed? KB: I don't recall. Owor: do you recall the matter of the MI-35s? KB: yes. Owor: did you discuss them? KB: he was coming with that proposal if I recollect well. He seemed to be talking while in possession of a proposal to supply such. He said they were very similar to the MI-17s and other advantages. But the overriding consideration of the meeting went back to the directive. Owor: did you discuss a sales agent from Kazan who had given false information? KB: I can't recollect the details. Owor: was the issue of the cost of the MI-35s brought up? KB: not that I recollect. Owor: was there any further research done? KB: the minister and the meeting wanted to be absolutely sure that the mix-up was authoritatively clarified...that the MI-35 idea was also required to be more accurately compared with MI-24s. Owor: it seems the task was given to Masaba. Do you know if he did it? KB: he could have reported back...not to my recollection. Owor: look at minute 3...(reads)...availability of money, no budgetary provisions for helicopters? KB: definitely. Owor: was it an adhoc thing? KB: like all other provisions of the ministry of defence, it is expected that things should be budgeted for. Unless it comes unexpectedly like this matter. This was large sum of money clearly beyond what would be provided for. Owor: in minute B, the PS suggested US$13m. why the US$13m? KB: I don't recollect. Owor: that alternatively the suppliers would accept promissory notes. KB: the source of funding was discussed but I don't recollect what kind of credit. Owor: was there any other discussion? KB: I can't venture to suggest. It is more than five years ago. I tend to suspect that this meeting could have given guidance on how to proceed with contractual arrangements. But I am not sure. Owor: was the CLE given any tasks? KB: none. Owor: what was the mood of this second meeting? KB: I must say this urgency was more or less a permanent feature even years after the urgency had been declared. Owor: did you know who were CSC? KB: no. Owor: did you ask who they were? KB: we did not go into the character of suppliers. We discussed the need to get comparative prices, we only had a story from one supplier. It was a concern of the meeting that there should be an attempt to get some other offer for comparison purposes. Not so much to change the suppliers but to see that his terms were reasonable. (Commission resumes at 11.45am) Kiryabwire (GK): Is it your testimony that as CLE, you wouldn't attend some of these meetings? KB: Yes. GK: But you would attend some of the meetings? KB: Yes. GK: Why was this? KB: That would be the discretion of those calling the meeting. I do not know the criteria. GK: Were you invited to the meeting of November 1996? KB: Yes. GK: How many years were you CLE by then? KB: Four years. GK: By this time, you would have acquired some experience? KB: Yes. GK: Is that why you were invited? KB: As I said earlier, I don't know the criteria but it is possible. GK: Would you be expected to share your experience as a CLE in this meeting? KB: Yes. Once you are invited, you would be expected to participate fully. There would be no restrictions imposed to ones contribution. GK: Taking your experience at this time, would you feel this meeting was significantly similar or different to the other meetings you had had earlier? KB: I think this one was rather a departure from the meetings I had attended before...in that there was now a directive to the minister and to the army Commander to undertake and a high level of urgency attached to it and also an offer...subsequently, I think it became fairly common for the President to direct the minister to conclude a deal for the supply of classified equipment and other supplies with a particular supplier. GK: You have been talking of the urgency, what is this urgency? KB: In terms of the directive to the minister read earlier this morning (reads out selected phrases) "I therefore direct you to immediately...utmost urgency..." both 'immediately' and 'urgently' were underlined and my lord, the minister had been summoned. GK: Was the underlying cause of the urgency known to you? KB: No. But it would mean operations. That is the interpretation I would put to it, but it was not discussed here....actually, I may also recall that about the same time of 1996, there was a significant level of fighting in northern Uganda, which gave the background of the feeling in all of us as behind the urgency. It was even disclosed in the meeting that the directive was sent when the president was in Gulu. But it was not discussed. GK: In November 1996, was there need for combat helicopters? KB: I'm not aware personally. I'm only aware that there was need for other types of combat aircraft and some steps had been taken to acquire them... GK: How about the helicopters? KB: I'm not aware.. GK: We have had evidence here that there was need for combat helicopters since 1991 and it was not possible because of funds. KB: I don't know, but it is quite possible. I wouldn't know about the classified requirements. GK: Did you contribute to the meeting? KB: I, of course, participated actively in the meeting. I can't say which aspects now, but one area I was concerned with was having no comparison between the source offered to the minister and any other source. GK: You mean for comparative prices? KB: Not only prices, but also offers...up to that time, my experience of directives from the president did not go to this extent as this one of submitting offer from a particular supplier. So it is not easy for me to compare that with other earlier experiences, but it would be logical for me... GK: During your general testimony, you mentioned four stages of identification of needs, identification of supplier, drawing of the contract, supply the materials... We have seen the first one, how about the second? Did you not attempt to obtain further and better particulars of the supplier? KB: Yes, identification and integrity of the supplier would be an important matter, had the supplier not come from the President in the manner it did. You may note that the nature of handling directives from superior authority...what has been vetted by superior authority... GK: Was it said that the Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSC) was already cleared? KB: That was subsumed, having been handed down from the President. GK: Did you know any person behind CSC? KB: No. It was just a company. GK: Why didn't you find out? KB: It was emphasised that the decision had already been taken...some decisions had been assumed taken... It wasn't an issue whether that person is reasonable or not. GK: I thought the nature of the person would be part of that test? KB: One would assume that that was done before the superior authority handed it down. If anyone thought it was not good, he could have raised it, but I had no reason to believe that the company was bad. GK: It surprises us why it was simply left out, directive or no directive... KB: The airforce did identify their requirements... They were only told just as I was told. They were even contesting it, asking do we really need craft...a supplier was already identified. GK: When we compare...we start seeing variances. Coming to the directive, we wonder now to what extent the directive story could be altered...we start hearing of alternative supplier, alternative craft...we are wondering... KB: That urgency continued to permeate the subsequent meetings....possibly one could have re-examined the whole matter at a certain stage... what was done between October and January was to send a team to see the aircraft and also select those which we would take so that the contract would be undertaken. GK: Then the fact that some aircraft as specified by the Commander-in-Chief were not available, wouldn't that be the first red flag? KB: Yes, in fact the discrepancies as to the models...was an opportunity to re-examine the whole idea. GK: why didn't it occur to you? KB: The urgency remained. I think the minister was still intent on implementing the directive and he discouraged any deviations. GK: So is it your testimony that the minister....why couldn't that have been the right time to read deeper into the transaction? KB: I think he wanted to clear something but also to do it with the same urgency. GK: It is clear there was sufficient deviation from the Commander-in-Chief's specifications, regarding the model...we see MI 35, MI 17-4, ... KB: May be you haven't fully appreciated the import of what I said earlier. I said that having been originated to come from higher offices of the President and Commander-in-Chief, the lower officers would be... reluctant... the integrity of CSC came more into focus when the details of their unreliability came to defence...they (defence) still didn't stop. GK: At what stage was this? KB: When we were verifying. GK: We will come to that later...Did you understand the (CSC) to be manufacturers, agents or agents of agents of the manufacturers? KB: The type of supplier was not discussed, but it was understood that CSC was an agent...the items were coming from the former Soviet Union countries. So this could be an agent or middleman. GK: An agent or middleman are not quite the same... KB: At that time, I could not tell whether these were commissioned agents. It was not discussed at that time. GK: The letter of offer, was it discussed how it originated? KB: No...it was not discussed where the President got it from... GK: We have testimony that it was first presented to Salim Saleh who sent it to the Army Commander, who sat on it from July to October.... KB: No, certainly it was not disclosed at any of the meetings. Ssebutinde: I would like some light shed on the procedure you laid out this morning. You said the need was identified by the end user.... and also your statement that there was considerable insurgency in the north, who then would be the the end user here, the UPDA Air Force or those in combat in the north? KB: The airforce. The need could have been identified by the infantry commander because the airforce would only supplement them. So the infantry commander would involve the airforce to discuss appropriate aircraft for his needs. The airforce would take the responsibility to specify. Ssebutinde: Does the Commander-in-Chief have the prerogative to ask for specific classified equipment without asking the end user? KB: There was no established procedure. So I can't say he is acting out of or in line with procedure. But I have seen several instances when he purchased... Ssebutinde: Was it his prerogative? KB: It was not disallowed. There was nothing to disallow it. Ssebutinde: What kind of areas would he exercise this power? KB: Any classified supplies. Ssebutinde: During the tea break, you supplied Counsel with some documents (reads them). How different are these from the president's directive? I'm just wondering, throw some light on it. KB: I don't think they were substantially different. My be express expeditiously but I said the 1996 incident was unfamiliar to me. Those are subsequent and I was saying that subsequently, it seemed to have become more common for this to happen. Besigye said he could not take responsibility for what happened. He said there was lack of proper planning in the army. He said there was nothing he could do to change anything. He also said he did not think the Army Commander, Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu, could have done anything to stop the purchase. (Hearing continues) Ends