EDITOR: Sudanese fluid situation escalated into violence on April 15, 2023, following years of two feuding power brokers: Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the country’s de facto leader and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who leads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The hostilities have claimed more than 700 lives, scores of injuries, thousands of internally displaced persons and an influx of refugees.

Sudan has had a history of a series of coups as a means of change of government since gaining its independence from United Kingdom (UK) in 1956.

After ousting Omar Bashir in 2019, a transition government was formed among SAF, RSF and the civilian leaders represented by the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) led by Adalla Hamdok, selected as an interim President to last three years in preparation for democratic transition.

In October 2021, the two generals staged a coup and deposed the civilian Prime Minister, without any ideological clarity in sight.

Both Generals are obstacles to the path of Sudanese democratic transition, only pursuing self-interests of power and plunder and bear primary responsibility for the current conflict in the country.

The current conflict is gradually culminating into what fits the trope of a failed state and potentially threatening a prolonged civil war.

The Sudanese internal political weakness, external factors of radical Jihadist movement, perils of geopolitical polarity and plunder of resources will fuel chronic strife, leading to possible proliferation of illicit arms and human trafficking, internal displacement and refugees’ influx, potentially threatening a spillover to the region.

Sudan is vast and in a politically fluid neighbourhood of Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The domino effect may expand and deepen more to the region’s hornets’ nest.

In a broader perspective, the timing of Sudanese war is bad for Africa, coinciding with the current game changer….from unipolar to multipolar world. The de-dollarisation and the rush by wealthy economies to establish gold reserves to back their currencies, the new innovation of batteries use in transport, energy and telecom industries and the emerging multi-polarity, render global powers to scramble for Africa’s endowed rare earth elements and positioning of geographical strategic locations like Port Sudan.

The region and possibly the entire Africa may become front of the new type of preventive proxy war as it dissolves into a civil war driven by contagious volatility. Foreign players have since become key integral parties to what currently prevails in the country. The ‘devil’ of Sudan’s politics and security lies in the detail of the 2019 transitional constitution, the coalition agreement framework and the whole machination of peace[1]building backed by the United Nations and United States, which is gradually culminating into the current clash of parties.

Part of peace-building effort supported by same foreign interests was a reproduction of agreements that were made in South Sudan in 2013 and 2016 which led to civil wars.

The institutional reform made the civilian Prime Minister to preside over the army factions that he had no control over. The framework proposed integration of two army factions without spelling out clear deadline. This created competition that incentivised the two Generals to build up their respective forces looking forward to possible merger. The whole thing of the transition coalition was a bad deal and well predicted to a clash. The US’ interest and that of the West is to negate Russia’s and China’s already entrenched presence in Sudan and the region.

Russia has interests in Sudanese resources and particularly a close eye on possible strategic naval base of Port Sudan. Russia and Sudan reviewed the navy base final draft agreement on February 9, 2023 awaiting ratification. The agreement allows Russia to set up a naval base with up to 300 troops and to simultaneously keep up to four navy ships, including nuclear-powered ones. The base would enable the Russian navy’s presence in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The agreement is to last 25 years with automatic 10-year periods of renewal. The increased presence of the Russian fleet in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, a close proximity around Middle East and southern Europe, a geopolitical gesture that won’t pass without a challenge from the West.

Indeed, immediately after the Khartoum’s attack, a 700 UN member contingent was swiftly relocated to Port Sudan, in search for a safe haven, possibly a gimmick to deter possible Russian positioning.

One would speculate by wondering as to whether it is a coincidence of events of final review of the agreement of Port Sudan between Sudan and Russia on February 9, and escalation of hostilities on April 25, in Khartoum.

China is another party which dominates the global resources value chain with key interest in Sudan, Africa’s third largest producer of gold. China, too, has geopolitical ambitions with a navy base in close proximity of Djibouti. Saudi Arabia, together with United Arab Emirates (UAE), are other two key players with resources, political and military interests in Sudan.

There is need for peaceful settlement, an inclusive Sudanese-owned process mediated by regional players. Credit goes to swift action taken by African Union (AU) for the framework of Trilateral Mechanism (AU-UN-IGAD) in concert with League of Arab States, led by Saudi Arabia already fostering simultaneous mediation initiative.

The Sudanese potential conflict has been brewing and should have been detected and averted through early warning mechanisms hence a critical need to strengthen our regional institutions.

Sudanese conflict stands as a test of relevance of the region’s institutions’ capacity to offer African solutions to African problems, and the time is now. “There is no more time to lose before it is too late,” — Vanessa Frazier.

The writer is an entrepreneur and policy analyst