Why good programmes fail in Uganda and what we never learn

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OPINION

By Arthur Nuwagaba

Uganda’s long list of poverty eradication programs reads like a catalogue of ambition without accountability.

From the Entandikwa Scheme in the 1990s to the current Parish Development Model (PDM), each initiative has promised transformation, but quietly faded due to one central flaw: the absence of serious Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).

The Entandikwa Scheme, launched in 1995, aimed to provide soft loans to the poor. But without proper tracking, over 70% of the loans were never recovered.

The same fate met the Youth Venture Capital Fund and its successor, the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP). Billions were disbursed, yet recovery rates were often below 30%, and few businesses could be accounted for.

The Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), launched in 2000, aimed to transition Uganda’s agriculture from subsistence to a more commercially viable sector.

However, within a decade, the program was undermined by poor coordination among stakeholders, vague performance targets, and a lack of structured monitoring and evaluation. Similarly, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), introduced in 2001 to provide inputs and training to farmers, was plagued by issues such as ghost beneficiaries, politicised distribution, and inconsistent outcomes.

In 2013, the government introduced Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) as a successor to NAADS, hoping to improve efficiency through military-led implementation.

However, OWC too suffered from poor coordination, inadequate resources, limited technical support, and weak follow-up mechanisms.

Emyooga, a more recent initiative launched in 2019 with sh260 billion, was designed to support SACCOs across constituencies. Yet within two years, the Parliamentary Budget Office reported widespread fund mismanagement, dormant SACCOs, and no clear evidence of impact.

The GROW (Generating Growth Opportunities and Productivity for Women) project, launched in 2023 with a $217 million grant from the World Bank, was intended to economically empower women through financial inclusion, skills development, and enterprise support.

However, its implementation has faced significant setbacks, including slow fund absorption and inadequate preparedness. According to the Auditor General’s report, only $18.14m (sh66.506b) of the $22m (sh80.669b) allocated for 2024 had been disbursed. The report also highlighted several challenges, such as difficulties in accessing loans, delays in disbursement, and notable regional disparities in beneficiary participation. These challenges raise red flags about whether GROW may join the long list of ambitious programs derailed by weak Monitoring and Evaluation.

Now, the Parish Development Model, Uganda’s most ambitious decentralisation strategy, has taken centre stage.

By the end of June 2025, the government had spent sh3.3 trillion on PDM activities. But early signs have already shown that history may repeat itself.

The PDM lacks clear structures, accountability mechanisms, and transparency, with instances of ghost beneficiaries and corruption scandals.

What ties all these programs together is not a lack of funding or good policy, but a consistent failure to track progress, measure outcomes, and adjust based on data. M&E is not a luxury; it is the spine of successful policy implementation. Without it, Uganda risks continuing this costly cycle of “launch, collapse, replace.”

Uganda needs to borrow a leaf from Rwanda’s Imihigo performance contracts, which hold leaders accountable through results-based management. Uganda can draw similar lessons: fund M&E units, train local monitors, use digital tools for real-time tracking, and demand midterm evaluations, not just ceremonial launches.

As a project management professional, I believe Uganda must stop recycling failed models and start investing in systems that monitor, evaluate, and learn.

If we truly want to lift millions out of poverty, we must first ask the hard questions: Is it working? For whom? And how do we know?

The writer is an NRM cadre and a PhD candidate in Business Administration