Resolutions on Western Sahara must reflect law, not just leverage

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OPINION

By Duncan Dickson Dyogo

The protracted dispute over Western Sahara remains one of the longest unresolved legacies of colonialism in the modern international system. More than five decades after Spain withdrew from the territory in 1975, the Sahrawi people have yet to exercise their internationally recognised right to self-determination. 

Recent UN Security Council resolutions seek to reinvigorate diplomacy, but increasingly reflect political leverage and geopolitical alignments rather than the legal principles of the UN Charter. This drift risks undermining both a just peace in Western Sahara and the credibility of international law itself.

Western Sahara occupies a unique legal position as a non-self-governing territory whose decolonisation process remains unfinished. Placed on the UN decolonisation list in 1963, it is governed by the law of self-determination, not territorial sovereignty disputes. This foundation is anchored in the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960, which establishes self-determination as a universal right, and reinforced by Resolution 34/37 (1979), which reaffirms the Sahrawi people’s inalienable right to independence.

The International Court of Justice’s 1975 Advisory Opinion remains the most authoritative pronouncement: Historical ties claimed by Morocco and Mauritania did not amount to sovereignty and could not negate the Sahrawi right to determine their future through the free and genuine expression of their will.

Following Spain’s withdrawal, the Madrid Accords of 1975 attempted to arrange administrative control between Morocco and Mauritania. Yet the UN has consistently ruled that these accords transferred no sovereignty and have no legal effect on a territory still awaiting decolonisation. Political agreements, concluded without the consent of the people concerned, cannot override peremptory norms of international law; treating them as determinative erodes the principle that colonial peoples, not external powers, are the true subjects of self-determination.

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in 1991 to monitor a ceasefire and organise a referendum offering a genuine choice, including independence. More than three decades later, that referendum has never occurred.

Instead, MINURSO has gradually transformed from an operational mission implementing self-determination into a stabilisation mechanism focused primarily on maintaining a fragile ceasefire. Its mandate is renewed annually without progress toward its core objective, and, unlike most modern UN peace operations, it still lacks a human rights monitoring component, a long-standing omission shaped by political sensitivities.

Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025) extended MINURSO’s mandate but placed unprecedented emphasis on Morocco’s 2007 autonomy initiative as a basis for negotiations, describing autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as a potentially viable outcome. While supporters view this as pragmatic realism, critics warn that elevating one proposal risks pre-judging a process that international law demands remain open and inclusive: self-determination requires a people to choose freely, not to ratify a solution by stronger actors.

The latest round of negotiations on Western Sahara, convened in February 2026 in Madrid and Washington, D.C. under a renewed US–UN-supported framework, brought together the two principal parties – Morocco and the Polisario Front – alongside key observers, Algeria and Mauritania, each exerting distinct influence over the trajectory of the talks. Morocco leveraged its diplomatic backing and control over most of the territory to push its autonomy proposal as the sole realistic framework, while the Polisario Front, drawing legitimacy from international law and its rightness to represent the Sahrawi people, continued to insist on a referendum that includes independence.

Algeria, though formally an observer, significantly shapes the negotiations through its political, diplomatic, and material support to the Polisario Front, while Mauritania plays a more cautious, stabilising role aimed at preserving regional balance.

Despite facilitation by the United Nations and the United States, the absence of a breakthrough highlights a persistent imbalance in which geopolitical leverage risks overshadowing legal principles, reinforcing the need for a resolution grounded in law, not power.

Yet the credibility of these negotiations increasingly invites scrutiny, particularly regarding the role and neutrality of the facilitators themselves. The prominence of the United States – given its prior recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty claim – raises questions about whether the process is structurally tilted toward an autonomy outcome, potentially narrowing the scope of genuine self-determination.

While the United Nations retains formal stewardship of the peace process, its reliance on powerful member states and its incremental approach have often struggled to reconcile legal norms with political realities. Meanwhile, the African Union – which recognises the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a member – remains relatively sidelined despite its normative commitment to decolonisation and territorial integrity, limiting the diversity of mediation voices.

In the context of shifting global geopolitics, particularly the strategic recalibrations linked to the Middle East and great-power competition, the question arises whether current facilitators can act as impartial brokers or are themselves constrained by broader alliances and interests. This dynamic risks eroding confidence in the process and underscores the need for a more balanced, multilateral mediation framework that commands legitimacy across all parties.

While the European Union officially supports UN-led efforts, several member states increasingly back Morocco’s autonomy proposal. Yet EU courts have repeatedly ruled that Western Sahara remains legally distinct from Morocco, especially in trade and resource agreements – a clear demonstration of the divide between political diplomacy and legal reasoning.

The Western Sahara case thus exposes a deeper systemic challenge: whether law constrains power or power reshapes law. The same playbook long employed by the United States, France, and Spain – prioritising Morocco’s position at the expense of Sahrawi rights – mirrors patterns in Middle East geopolitics, where powerful alignments have repeatedly diluted or selectively applied international norms on self-determination.

When Security Council resolutions align more with geopolitical leverage than established legal principles, they risk setting dangerous precedents for other unresolved self-determination conflicts. International law derives its legitimacy not from enforcement alone but from consistency; if self-determination can be diluted for political convenience, the principle itself becomes fragile, especially for smaller or less powerful peoples.

The desire for peace and stability in Western Sahara is legitimate and shared. Yet durable peace cannot be achieved by sidelining the law in favour of political expediency. International law already provides a clear framework: Western Sahara is a Non-Self-Governing Territory whose people hold the right to determine their political future freely.

UN resolutions that prioritise leverage over legality may manage conflict in the short term, but they risk prolonging injustice and undermining the very norms the United Nations was created to uphold. A just resolution will come not from narrowing options but from restoring faith in the law – and in the right of peoples, however small, to shape their own destiny.

The writer is an independent analyst and scholar with advanced expertise in governance, international relations, peace processes, and conflict studies