Rationalisation: We left undone what we ought to have done!

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OPINION

By Walter Akena

There’s a familiar line in the Anglican Book of Common Prayer: “We have left undone those things which we ought to have done; and we have done those things which we ought not to have done.” Though spiritual in origin, this sentiment aptly captures the state of Uganda’s public sector reforms, especially the controversial rationalisation policy passed by Parliament in July 2024.

The Rationalisation of Government Agencies and Public Expenditure (RAPEX) was pitched as a bold move to cut costs, eliminate inefficiencies, and streamline service delivery. But just months after its passage, key voices, including Speaker Rt Hon. Anita Among and Sheema Municipality MP Dickson Kateshumbwa, are expressing concerns.

Among questioned the logic of rationalising the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA), while Kateshumbwa lamented the deterioration of road infrastructure under the Ministry of Works due to limited supervision.

This turnaround raises unsettling questions. Did Parliament truly grasp RAPEX’s implications before passing it? And if not, how confident can citizens be in their capacity to deliberate on critical national issues?

To be fair, RAPEX wasn’t conceived in bad faith. Uganda’s public service reforms date back to the 1980s. From Structural Adjustment Programmes to Results-Oriented Management, these reforms were aimed at improving efficiency and professionalism. Semi-autonomous agencies were created to foster expertise and fast-track service delivery. Over time, however, duplication, bloated payrolls, and overlapping mandates became common, prompting the need to clean up.

But here’s where the problems start. RAPEX aimed to reduce administrative costs and streamline agencies. Yet it overlooked more glaring culprits such as a 556-member Parliament, over 140 Presidential advisors, and a proliferation of politically motivated districts and sub-units.

Instead of trimming these, the policy targeted agencies like UNRA, which, despite its flaws, demonstrated a measure of technical competence and operational independence.

More puzzling is the duplicity within the governance structure. While ministries and agencies are being downsized, similar units are retained or created under State House. What’s the logic in scrapping an agency while replicating its mandate within the Presidency?

This isn’t Uganda’s first attempt at public sector reform.

In 2003, a coordination framework was introduced, placing the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) at the centre of harmonising government programmes. Yet in practice, this coordination is fragmented across the OPM, the Presidency, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Planning Authority.

This is a classic case of "uncoordinated coordination." The problem isn’t the absence of laws or frameworks. It is a political design that ensures no single institution amasses too much control.

Public service delivery, meanwhile, continues to suffer. Performance is poor, accountability is low, and patronage-based recruitment is rampant. Despite reforms aimed at attracting qualified professionals, appointments remain heavily influenced by loyalty rather than merit.

Military and political cadres are frequently deployed to senior public offices without interviews or technical vetting. Training has given way to ideological indoctrination. Instead of being centres of innovation, public offices have become instruments of political control.

This political capture has weakened institutional autonomy and crippled state capacity. Ministries, departments, and agencies increasingly serve elite interests rather than citizens' needs.

Then there's corruption. Uganda boasts one of the most comprehensive anti-corruption legal and institutional frameworks in the region. Yet, according to the Inspectorate of Government, the country loses over shillings 9 trillion annually to corruption.

The challenge has never been a lack of laws or institutions. It is the absence of political will. Anti-corruption agencies are regularly undermined, investigations frustrated, and justice applied selectively. Corruption has evolved into a tool for political survival, used to fund elections and reward loyalty.

Ironically, the government hoped to save just shillings 1 trillion through RAPEX, barely a tenth of what is lost annually to corruption. Wouldn't it have made more sense to prioritise dismantling the entrenched culture of corruption before restructuring agencies?

Ultimately, Uganda’s reforms falter not due to poor policy but because they fail to address the political economy underpinning public administration. RAPEX may appear progressive on paper, but its implementation is marred by selective enforcement. We avoid the “sacred cows” and instead target the soft spots. Agencies are scrapped while powerful political structures remain untouched.

This is the tragedy of reform in Uganda. We consistently leave undone what we ought to have done, such as addressing structural and political distortions. And we do what we ought not to have done, like tampering with semi-autonomous agencies without credible alternatives.

If Uganda truly wants reforms that work, it must go beyond superficial fixes. We must confront the political realities that shape public administration. Only then can we rationalise not just the structure, but the soul of the state, ensuring that form, function, and purpose align in the service of citizens.

The writer is a Research Officer at the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)