Our history: How NRM picked UNLF umbrella

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OPINION

April 13 marks 47 years since Yusufu Lule was sworn in as Uganda’s fourth president. This moment symbolised the end of one of the darkest chapters in the country’s history and the beginning of a difficult political transition.

The ceremony came just days after the fall of Idi Amin on April 11, 1979. Nearly half a century later, the consequences of Amin’s eight-year rule continue to echo through Uganda’s political development. Many of the country’s present-day challenges, particularly in infrastructure, public services, and institutional capacity, cannot be fully understood without reflecting on the destruction of the 1970s.

When Amin was toppled, Ugandans who had fled into exile returned under the banner of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). This coalition had formed to remove Amin and rebuild the country after nearly a decade of state collapse. Its military wing, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), working alongside the Tanzania People’s Defence Force, routed Amin’s forces and forced him into exile.

The fall of Amin opened an opportunity for national renewal. Uganda had endured years in which Parliament had been dissolved, governance had been conducted by decree, and institutions had either collapsed or been severely weakened. The UNLF, therefore, inherited a country that needed urgent political stabilisation and reconstruction. However, its failure to hold together subverted what had been an earlier attempt at no-party politics.

The UNLF essentially functioned as an umbrella political arrangement, an early form of no-party governance, bringing together Ugandans of different political affiliations in pursuit of a common goal: to rebuild the country, institute the rule of law, and restore national stability. Had it succeeded, Uganda might not have waited for the National Resistance Army (NRA) and its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), to introduce a form of no-party democracy in which individual merit took precedence over partisan loyalty.

Old political parties, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP), played a big role in weakening the fragile UNLF umbrella. The two pre-independence political parties had their origins partly in religion. UPC was aligned with the Anglican Church, while DP was associated with the Catholic Church. They wanted multiparty politics.

Lule’s swearing-in was greeted with enormous public enthusiasm. Many Ugandans saw him as a transitional figure who could help steer the country toward democratic reconstruction after years of dictatorship. There was also hope that he would rebuild the economy and end the scarcities of essential commodities such as sugar, soap, and salt that had dogged the country.

But his tenure proved extremely short.

Lule was removed from office after 68 days and replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, who attempted to maintain the UNLF umbrella arrangement while preparing the country for national elections. He positioned himself as a leading candidate.

Binaisa failed to consolidate power, and his attempt to outmanoeuvre pro-UPC figures collapsed. The Military Commission, an organ of the UNLF, took power. Chaired by Paulo Muwanga, the commission had six members: Yoweri Museveni as vice chairman, and Col. Tito Okello, Lt. Col. David Oyite Ojok, Lt. Col. William Omaria, and Maj. Zed Maruru.

Muwanga was Milton Obote’s frontman. He worked through the commission to ensure Obote’s return to power after being overthrown by Amin in 1971.

With Binaisa removed, the Military Commission effectively became the de facto government, with Muwanga operating as the country’s most powerful figure. To conceal this UPC strategy, a Presidential Commission was created, headed by Saulo Musoke, Polycarp Nyamuchoncho, and Yoweri Hunter Wacha-Olwol. On paper, the Presidential Commission was the governing authority. In reality, power remained firmly in the hands of the Military Commission led by Muwanga, which proceeded to prepare for elections.

During this period, Museveni was increasingly marginalised and played little direct role in shaping the Military Commission’s direction. Instead, he went on to form the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) in preparation for national elections in 1980.

Muwanga, who oversaw the electoral process, announced results that returned Milton Obote, who had been toppled by Amin in 1971 and the UPC to power. In the new government, Muwanga was rewarded with the powerful positions of Vice President and Minister of Defence.

The election results were widely disputed. Allegations of widespread rigging emerged, particularly from DP, which believed it had won the vote. Museveni rejected the results and launched an armed struggle against the Obote government, arguing that the electoral process had been fundamentally flawed. Through the NRA, he fought a guerrilla war in the Luwero Triangle that lasted five years.

During the war, the NRM, the political structure, espoused no-party democracy principles. It was the NRA’s political wing. This arrangement closely resembled the earlier UNLF model, which was a political umbrella.

When the NRA captured power in 1986, the new leadership introduced what became known as the Movement system, a form of no-party democracy built around the principle of individual merit rather than political party competition.  It was supported by grassroots governance structures known as Resistance Councils, later renamed Local Councils (LCs). UNLF had a 10-cell system as its grassroots structure.

The LCs established a nationwide network of no-party political participation extending from the village level upward and became the backbone of Uganda’s local governance system.

As in the case of UNLF, advocates for political pluralism, including UPC and DP, opposed the new no-party system and also denounced the LCs. However, the councils gradually became entrenched in Uganda’s political organisation.

When Uganda eventually returned to multiparty politics through the 2005 referendum, the architects of the Movement system formed NRM as a political party and took over the LCs, a powerful grassroots advantage. On this, it built its organisational strength. Because these councils existed in almost every village, parish, and district, they provided a ready-made structure for political mobilisation across the country.

Today, the LCs remain one of the NRM’s strong political pillars.

Nearly half a century after Amin’s fall, the lesson remains clear. The collapse of institutions during the 1970s produced not only economic damage but also profound political consequences that reshaped Uganda’s governance trajectory.

The missed opportunity of the UNLF coalition, or umbrella, the return to multiparty politics in 1980, and the eventual rise of the Movement system all stemmed from the turbulent period that followed Amin’s fall. To understand Uganda today, it is necessary to revisit those historic moments, especially April 1979, which provide important context.

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