Israel-US, Iran war and its strategic shockwaves across African continent

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OPINION

By Simon Mulongo

The confrontation between Israel and the US on one side, and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the other, has moved from calibrated deterrence to sustained warfare. After the 12-day war of June 13-24, 2025, hostilities escalated again between February 26 and March 1, when co-ordinated US and Israeli strikes targeted Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure. In the opening wave, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed. Tehran responded with ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israeli and US positions in the Gulf. The conflict has entered an unstable phase marked by leadership decapitation, succession management, and open missile exchanges.

The military imbalance is evident but not decisive. The US spends over $800b annually on defence, Israel about $24b, while Iran’s official budget is under $30b. Washington and Tel Aviv command superior air power, intelligence, and missile defence systems. Iran relies on missile saturation, drones, and aligned armed networks. Rather than matching force symmetrically, Tehran seeks to raise economic and political costs. The war is, therefore, not only about firepower but resilience and strategic stamina.

Succession planning in Tehran had been prepared for years. Within hours of Khamenei’s death, a temporary leadership mechanism was activated and the constitutional process began. Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has emerged as the dominant crisis manager and likely successor. This signals continuity, not ideological retreat. Concessions on uranium enrichment or missile capability remain unlikely because both are tied to regime identity and deterrence doctrine. The probability of sustained confrontation, therefore, remains high.

For Africa, the war’s most immediate consequence is economic transmission through energy and maritime trade. The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly 20% of globally traded oil. The Bab el-Mandeb strait carries about 9% of seaborne petroleum trade and between 10 and 12% of global maritime commerce; in 2018, approximately 6.2 million barrels per day passed through it. These corridors are arteries of global supply.

Shipping patterns have adjusted. Insurers have raised war risk premiums, several lines have reduced Red Sea transits and rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10 to 14 days to voyages. During earlier disruptions, vessel traffic declined by more than 50% in some periods and freight rates rose by 15 to 30% within weeks. Similar pressures are re-emerging.

For African economies, the implications are layered. First is fuel inflation. A sustained increase of $10 to $15 per barrel in oil prices can add billions of dollars to Africa’s import bill. Many states import refined petroleum, so higher prices transmit quickly to pumps. When diesel rises, transport costs follow and feed directly into food prices.

Second is food security. East Africa imports significant quantities of wheat and fertiliser. Higher freight costs raise landed prices. If fertiliser costs rise by 10%, production costs increase, compressing margins and lifting retail prices months later. Inflation becomes persistent.

Third is fiscal strain. Governments face pressure to subsidise fuel. Subsidies widen deficits, limited foreign exchange reserves trigger currency depreciation, and depreciation further raises import costs, reinforcing inflation and fiscal stress.

The Horn of Africa illustrates how economic and security risks merge. Djibouti hosts multiple foreign military bases at the entrance to the Red Sea. Sudan’s instability and drone proliferation intersect with wider regional alignments. Somalia’s coastline presents vulnerabilities for illicit flows, while Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions add sensitivity. External war accelerates internal fragility.

Within the East African Community, the vulnerability is measurable. Kenya’s Port of Mombasa handled about 41 million tonnes of cargo in 2024; more than 13 million tonnes are in transit. Uganda accounts for over half and depends on Mombasa for roughly 95 to 98% of its seaborne imports. When Red Sea shipping slows or costs increase, the effect reaches Kampala within weeks.

Uganda’s inflation averaged 3 to 4% in 2025 following stabilisation, yet transport and energy remain sensitive. If oil prices rise by $15 per barrel, pump prices adjust quickly. Food constitutes roughly 40% of expenditure for lower-income households. A two-percentage-point rise in inflation reduces purchasing power, with small traders and urban households absorbing the shock first.

Beyond economics lies strategic pressure. Uganda must balance security co-operation with Western partners against broader commercial diplomacy. Polarisation narrows diplomatic space, and increased militarisation around ports and sea lanes could reshape regional alignments.

The war is not distant. It is visible in fuel stations, market prices, and shipping schedules across East Africa. The killing of Iran’s supreme leader reinforced regime continuity and hardened positions. As escalation persists, Africa’s exposure lies less in missiles than in markets. In a connected global system, geopolitical shock travels fastest through energy flows and trade corridors. Resilience now depends on diversification, regional co-ordination, and disciplined strategic positioning.

The writer is a PhD candidate (UoN) and governance & security consultant at EMANS Frontiers Ltd