Ceasefires on paper, war on the ground in Eastern Congo

By Louella Ataro

Eastern Congo is not short of peace initiatives. It is short of peace. A new mediation track emerges, a ceasefire is announced, and a communiqué promises de-escalation.

Yet civilians in North Kivu and South Kivu keep paying the price. The hard truth is this. We keep negotiating events, not the architecture of conflict.

In February 2026, Angola’s President João Lourenço proposed a ceasefire to begin on February 18, and the Congolese government accepted the principle of a ceasefire linked to a freeze of positions (Africanews, 2026).

That announcement mattered because it signalled political willingness to stop the slide. But the region has learned a lesson. A ceasefire is not peace, and a press statement is not compliance.

Qatar also reported that the United Nations would deploy a ceasefire monitoring team following Doha-mediated engagement connected to a truce mechanism (Reuters, 2026). Monitoring is essential because, in the absence of verified information, rumours replace facts and escalation becomes framed as self-defence. 

Still, monitoring alone cannot resolve the deeper problem. Eastern Congo is a layered negotiation environment where multiple conflicts operate simultaneously.

There is the local layer, defined by disputes over land, identity, customary authority, and livelihoods. There is the armed-group layer, where factions compete for territory and road taxation. There is the interstate layer, shaped by regional security anxieties and allegations of external support. 

Finally, there is the political-economy layer, where mineral extraction and cross-border trade networks reward armed control more than civic governance.

One of the quieter reasons mediation repeatedly fails in eastern Congo is that those who live the conflict are rarely treated as parties to the solution.

Negotiations tend to prioritise state officials, armed actors, and regional guarantors, while local communities appear only as beneficiaries of decisions made yet their grievances are not peripheral.

They fuel recruitment, retaliation, and displacement. When communities are excluded, agreements are signed without legitimacy, and implementation becomes fragile because local actors do not recognise the deal as their own.

A negotiation that treats Congo as a single table with two parties will fail. Spoilers operating in one layer can sabotage progress in another. A local grievance can become a recruitment narrative.

A battlefield gain can harden bargaining positions. A regional diplomatic shift can trigger retaliation on the ground. Mediation succeeds only when these layers are disciplined into one coherent process with sequencing.

Recent diplomacy suggests movement toward greater coherence, but the risk of fragmentation remains high.

The African Union, together with the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, has been coordinating a panel of facilitators and engaging regional leaders to consolidate diplomatic efforts around the eastern Congo crisis (African Union, 2026).

Consolidation is not bureaucratic vanity; it is conflict-management hygiene. When mediation tracks compete, party’s forum-shop.

They delay in one track, deny commitments in another, and cherry-pick obligations that benefit them.

There is also a strategic bargaining dimension that mediators must confront honestly. In eastern Congo, leverage is not only military, it is also economic and diplomatic.

Reuters reported that Kinshasa has offered the Rubaya coltan mine, currently under the control of the March 23 Movement, among the assets referenced in discussions surrounding a minerals cooperation pact with the United States (Reuters, 2026).

Minerals thus become bargaining currency. But this dynamic creates a danger. If negotiations ignore who governs mines, who taxes trade routes, and who benefits from extraction, violence remains a profitable negotiation strategy.

So, what should change from an African mediation and negotiation perspective?
First, unify the process, then protect it.

The African Union, East African Community, and Southern African Development Community should sustain a single political track, a single ceasefire and security track, and one verification mechanism, with aligned incentives and consequences.

This reduces ambiguity, limits stalling tactics, and creates a shared set of expectations.
Second, sequence commitments.

Negotiations should begin with enforceable security measures that directly protect civilians: humanitarian access guarantees, buffers around population centres, agreed humanitarian corridors, and clear rules governing the movement of forces.

At the same time, a higher-level diplomatic track must address interstate tensions, including allegations of external support and the presence of cross-border armed groups. 

In parallel, community-level dialogue should operate through local peace committees, women and youth representation, customary leadership engagement, and victim-centred mechanisms to address land and restitution disputes linked institutionally to the formal negotiation tracks.

Third, build compliance into the agreement. A ceasefire must include joint incident-investigation teams, shared incident logs, and agreed response procedures.

Consequences for violations must be predictable and credible, including diplomatic isolation, targeted restrictions, and conditional regional incentives tied to compliance.
Fourth, negotiate the political economy.

Sustainable peace must address governance over mining and cross-border trade. This includes traceability systems, transparent licensing, revenue-sharing arrangements for local communities, and joint oversight mechanisms.

If economic incentives remain outside the agreement, armed actors will remain embedded within the economy of conflict.

Eastern Congo does not need another headline ceasefire. It needs a disciplined negotiation architecture that reflects the complexity of the conflict, prioritises civilian protection, and makes compliance rational. Mediation is not a meeting. It is a system.

The writer is a lands ministry official.