A crucial period of Museveni’s 40-year rule that we choose to forget

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OPINION

By Rene Ndyomugyenyi, NYA

There is a saying that ‘while the future may be hazy, the past is known and verifiable and serves as a permanent reference point’. In other circles, they say that ‘even a fool who does not know where they are going, will at least tell you a thing or two about where they are coming from’.

So, for those of age to reflect on the past, those who have conveniently forgotten (Bebwas) to repent, and those without information to learn, this missive on Uganda’s volatile past serves to heal all. Yes, President Museveni has been the President of this great country for 40 years, having taken power in January 1986.

However, the deliberate and absurd distortion by those of age at the time, and a misconception by the subsequent generations who are often misled and exploited by the perennial naysayers, is that Museveni’s 40 years in power have been entirely rosy, and as such, he has had more than enough time to implement his mission objectives, but so far he has not met their fancy expectations.

While the misinformed and ill-informed categories can be forgiven, the same cannot be said for those of age, but desperately seek to distort, rewrite and or erase some indelible facts. One such fact is that NRM inherited a failed state in January 1986, suffering from extreme institutional/state decay, political insecurity, and economic collapse from decades of bad governance and conflict, with no single entity controlling legitimate force.

The second permanent fact is that, in July 1986, barely seven (07) months after NRM had taken power, remnants of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), supported by Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), formed a group called Uganda Peoples Defence Army (UPDA), led by Brig Odong Lateck and Otema Alimadi (Foreign Minister in Obote's regime) and attacked NRA’s 28th Battalion at Bibia.

Much as the attacking force was defeated, the attack marked the beginning of war that lasted over two (02) decades, with Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement emerging in November of the same year. In 1987 in Eastern Uganda, Force Obote Back Again (FOBA) led by Nelson Omwero, Charles Korokoto, Aggrey Awori and Uganda People’s Army (UPA) led by Hitler Eregu, Nathan Okurut launched attacks against NRA positions in Busia and Bukedi areas.

In the same year, 1987, knowing that NRA forces were now stretched in the North and East, Amon Bazira allied with the Bukonzo secessionists’ called Rwenzururu Movement to form the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and launched attacks against NRA installations in the Rwenzori Region. 

In 1988, three more groups emerged, these were the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, the Ninth October Movement (NOM) based in Kenya and commanded by one Dan Opito and the West Nile Bank Force (WNBF) based in Zaire and Sudan, commanded by Juma Oris, simultaneously launched attacks in Nwoya, Katakwi, Arua, Nebbi and Moyo Districts. In 1989, National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by Sam Luwero and 1994 Uganda National Democratic Alliance (UNDA) commanded by Majors Herbert Itongwa and Mpiso operated in Central Uganda by assaulting police, prisons, and military installations in Luwero.

The Bunyoro region was not spared either. In 1994, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) announced its presence in Buseruka Hoima District and subsequently in Rwenzori Region. Between 1996 and 2001, four more groups entered the combat theatre, namely; Gen Smith Apon Acak’s Citizens Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP), Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII) in West Nile, federalist forces of National Freedom Army (NFA), & Uganda Federal Democratic Front (UFDF) sprung up in Central region and finally Peoples’ Redemption Army (PRA), which was pre-emptively attacked by UPDF and defeated in Congo. 

All the above insurgencies had the same sponsors (financial, equipment and troops), notably, the radical Islamist regime of Omar Bashir and Hassan Al Turabi in Sudan and imperialists Mobutu in Zaire and Habyarimana in Rwanda, they provided rear bases, training (from as far as Afghanistan) and supplied sophisticated equipment including jet fighters for aerial support. At some point, LRA and ADF had state issue sophisticated weapons to NRA/UPDF, not in use by UPDF.

In fact, at some point, they were even superior in numbers, US Army AfriCom estimates that between 1987 and 2006, LRA alone had 20,000 fighters, whereas the Uganda Amnesty Commission Report of 2007 states that 22,000 rebels benefited from amnesty from 2000 to 2007. 

Amid all the combat operations within Uganda, the Commander in Chief, His Excellency, executed multiple attacks against countries sponsoring terrorism in Uganda. Working with like-minded allies, military excursions were carried out in Rwanda, Arab Sudan (facilitating the birth of South Sudan), and Zaire (deposing Mobutu 2000 miles away) and yet, at no point did President Museveni seek international community help.

A request by the United Nations to establish a base in Northern Uganda in support of UPDF was summarily rejected; instead, in the spirit of Pan-Africanism, he deployed troops where the same international actors had failed, i.e. Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, DRC, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

On account of commitment, patriotism, Wananchi support, the unrivalled combat field crafts of NRA/UPDF, diplomacy and strategic leadership and command, the whole of Uganda was (save for the cattle rustling skirmishes) finally secured for the first time in its history with the defeat of LRA in 2009.

Until then, governable and productive Uganda was confined to around 45% of the total surface area of the country, with Karuma Bridge being the boundary between safety and combat in the whole of Northern Uganda, Rubirizi District marking the end of safety into the Rwenzori region, and Mbale, Pallisa and Kapchorwa Districts buffering Eastern Uganda.

The rest of the country was a war zone: no local revenue, no tourism, no investments, no agro-production, no infrastructure construction, no employment opportunities, no amenities, just internally displaced camps, youth local defence units, tension/uncertainty, misery and deaths. The story of the effects of this insecurity on our economy is told by the collated GDP figures; at 1986 it was $3.92 billion, 1993 it was at $3.22 billon, 2001 at $5.84 billion, $25.13 billion in 2009, $48.77 billion in 2023 and currently the nominal GDP is standing at $66 billion.

Formation of all the above insurgencies had similar ingredients/patterns. Their reactionary authors, largely political entrepreneurs, some affiliated to political parties, were motivated by ordinary pride of state power, not a quest to change or improve anything. They recruited fighters along ethnic lines in homogenous societies, used religion fragmentation and propaganda of deliberate socio-economic marginalisation, for example, in Teso, the insurgency leaders recruited by lying to the wananchi that Museveni was colluding with the Karimojong to steal their cattle, and lastly, these groups were sponsored by anti-Pan-Africanist countries.

The above background challenges the thinking of the belligerents who demand to see UPDF out of law and order keeping operations during elective politics. There is a saying that ‘if you fetch and carry your water, you understand the value of every drop’. NRA/UPDF has fought and secured Uganda at a very high cost; they are the experts and custodians of peace, and they are also accountable for insecurity.

As such, they should not be seen only as an instrument of war that the government of the day can direct and order to defend it, but instead as experts and partners in the defence and development of the nation. ''While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other''. – Mao Tse-Tung. The Army are servants of a democratic state and live under its control, but this submission depends on the interaction of the military subsystems with the democratic institutions like the Electoral Commission, Judiciary and Parliament, which are assigned the role of guiding the democratic and just values.

It is naive to assume that the military as a profession exists in a void or space and that they are supposed to be blind from dynamics of society at large, particularly those that threaten the well-being of the nation. They cannot be isolated as some 'infected' group that should not interact or socialise with civil institutions, but on the other hand, let them retain the power and means to act against them through organised violence.

At least not an army with a purpose like UPDF, which started with 27 armed men, withstood the AIDS scourge in the 1990’s, the force reduction instigated by the World Bank, and the withdrawal of thousands of NRA fighters of Rwandese descent. These occurrences left them thin on the ground (estimated to be around 45,000 at 1992), but they still managed to defeat dozens of insurgent groups and their foreign sponsors on their turf. No, UPDF will not buckle and allow a retrograde, not when they are at full capacity (ideologically, numerically, welfare, skills and equipment).

Therefore, as we belch from the excesses of peace and prosperity, to an extent of forgetting that 23 of Mr Museveni’s 40-year rule was to lay the foundation of total peace, let us consciously reflect on our volatile past. In the words of the 16th President of the USA, Abraham Lincoln, who led America through the Civil War, "In the end, it's not the years in your life that count. It's the life in your years."

                                                                                                 The writer is a lawyer