Britain should lead northern Uganda’s reconstruction
Feb 23, 2009
It is Sunday morning, February 22, and my mind is occupied by two main thoughts. One is about the late Prof. Dan Mudoola who was brutally murdered in a grenade attack on February 22, in 1993 — exactly 16 years ago.
Norbert Mao
It is Sunday morning, February 22, and my mind is occupied by two main thoughts. One is about the late Prof. Dan Mudoola who was brutally murdered in a grenade attack on February 22, in 1993 — exactly 16 years ago.
A brilliant scholar who was nicknamed Uganda’s Huntington by Prof. Apolo Nsibambi due to his relentless pursuit of institution building, Mudoola, at the time of his death, was vice-chairman of the Uganda Constitution Commission (also known as the Odoki Commission). But for me, Mudoola was an intellectual mentor with whom I spent many valuable moments. Above all, his work exposed colonial distortions. And of course, he studied at Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu — my home.
The second thing on my mind is the visit of Britain’s minister for international development to Gulu. Britain being the former colonial master of Uganda is still a significant player in the affairs of the country. And Sir Samuel Baker was considered “a good imperialist†if ever there was such a thing and that is why a school was named after him. He was, to the aggrieved anti-colonial locals in Acholi, what Edmund Burke was to the American anti-colonial revolutionaries!
Having held long discussions with his predecessor about what Britain can do for northern Uganda, I wonder what new thing I can say to the new minister. When Hilary Benn visited Gulu, the Juba peace talks had not yet started and he was under the impression that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was just a handful of disorganised zealots. He was due to meet President Museveni and I decided to share with him a complete organogram of the LRA structure and organisation (which I had obtained from impeccable foreign intelligence sources) with the intention of disabusing him of any oversimplified versions of the conflict in northern Uganda.
I am sure that prepared him against the usual dismissive stance characteristic of the Uganda government’s narrative about the LRA. So what do I tell the new minister? Perhaps the starting point is what William Faulkner wrote: “The past isn’t dead and buried. In fact, it isn’t even past.â€
The northern question is still an issue. What we call the “northern question†is in fact about social differentiations and inequalities that the British colonial regime bequeathed to the independent state of Uganda. What we seek from Britain is a sense of responsibility about what is going on in Uganda and northern Uganda.
The current predicament of northern Uganda was perhaps best captured by the outrage expressed by Jan Egeland, then UN under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency aid coordinator when he visited northern Uganda in October 2004. Jan Egeland said: “Where else in the world have there been 20,000 kidnapped children? Where else in the world have 90% of the population in large districts been displaced? Where else in the world do children make up 80% of the terrorist insurgency movement? For me, the situation is a moral outrage …
A much bigger international investment (is needed) — in money, political engagement, diplomacy and also more concerted efforts to tell the parties there is no military solution… there is a solution through reconciliation, an end to the killing and the re-integration and demobilisation of the child combatants.â€
Jan Egeland’s strong words were largely responsible for the international support that was given to the Juba peace talks. To that extent, his outrage was pivotal. During the Juba peace talks, the US, which had listed the LRA among international terrorist organisations, decided to send an envoy, Tim Shortley, to represent it in the talks. Sweden and other European countries also sent diplomats, but Britain did not.
Instead, it was fiddling with a hard-line resolution in concert with the US to the UN Security Council seeking to authorise military action against the LRA. Eventually in the wake of strong pro-peace talks lobby, the resolution was shelved. One other irony is that Sir Samuel Baker school has been adopted for renovation by Belgium and not Britain! Yet Britain fermented what has become known as the Northern Question.
Before the Second World War, all ethnic groups in Uganda were represented in the army that fought alongside Britain in the war. These veterans were critical actors in the anti-colonial struggle.
After 1945, Britain, in a deliberate move to divide and rule, decided that it was wiser to recruit the army mainly from northern Uganda.
That is how people like Idi Amin came into the picture.
In his book, Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Uganda, Mudoola says: “Groups…. which had benefited by the colonial presence, acquired sub-cultures of possessionâ€. This is the politics of Ebyaffe.
According to Mamdani, in a 1972 visit, Amin went to Makerere with a full battalion of troops. He said: “I came with a full battalion of troops so that when you raise your heads from your books, you know who has power.†Amin then added: “On my way, I stopped at Mulago (the university teaching hospital) and I looked at your medical records and I saw that most of you are suffering from gonorrhea.†Then he paused and said: “I will not tolerate you spreading political gonorrhea in Ugandaâ€. This attitude of “might is right†exists even in today’s Uganda.
After 1945, the relatively sparsely populated northern Uganda was dominant in the military. Power was thus not about numbers, but military might. This situation continued until 1986 when Museveni and his NRA turned the tables.
So what can Britain do? After 1945, Britain found itself in a dilemma. To actualise its divide and rule policy she recruited most of its military from the north. The north saw itself as a military power, while the South saw itself as the civil service reserve. The Northerners thus viewed themselves as the group to dominate the army. The gun and the military became the North’s ebyaffe. In the absence of military dominance, what is the alternative? What institutional framework can give a sense of belonging? If you remove the gun what do you replace it with?
Yet Britain has not focused on these historical distortions. Post-conflict reconstruction in the north presents Britain with an opportunity to redress wrongs it visited on Uganda.
It is Sunday morning, February 22, and my mind is occupied by two main thoughts. One is about the late Prof. Dan Mudoola who was brutally murdered in a grenade attack on February 22, in 1993 — exactly 16 years ago.
A brilliant scholar who was nicknamed Uganda’s Huntington by Prof. Apolo Nsibambi due to his relentless pursuit of institution building, Mudoola, at the time of his death, was vice-chairman of the Uganda Constitution Commission (also known as the Odoki Commission). But for me, Mudoola was an intellectual mentor with whom I spent many valuable moments. Above all, his work exposed colonial distortions. And of course, he studied at Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu — my home.
The second thing on my mind is the visit of Britain’s minister for international development to Gulu. Britain being the former colonial master of Uganda is still a significant player in the affairs of the country. And Sir Samuel Baker was considered “a good imperialist†if ever there was such a thing and that is why a school was named after him. He was, to the aggrieved anti-colonial locals in Acholi, what Edmund Burke was to the American anti-colonial revolutionaries!
Having held long discussions with his predecessor about what Britain can do for northern Uganda, I wonder what new thing I can say to the new minister. When Hilary Benn visited Gulu, the Juba peace talks had not yet started and he was under the impression that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was just a handful of disorganised zealots. He was due to meet President Museveni and I decided to share with him a complete organogram of the LRA structure and organisation (which I had obtained from impeccable foreign intelligence sources) with the intention of disabusing him of any oversimplified versions of the conflict in northern Uganda.
I am sure that prepared him against the usual dismissive stance characteristic of the Uganda government’s narrative about the LRA. So what do I tell the new minister? Perhaps the starting point is what William Faulkner wrote: “The past isn’t dead and buried. In fact, it isn’t even past.â€
The northern question is still an issue. What we call the “northern question†is in fact about social differentiations and inequalities that the British colonial regime bequeathed to the independent state of Uganda. What we seek from Britain is a sense of responsibility about what is going on in Uganda and northern Uganda.
The current predicament of northern Uganda was perhaps best captured by the outrage expressed by Jan Egeland, then UN under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency aid coordinator when he visited northern Uganda in October 2004. Jan Egeland said: “Where else in the world have there been 20,000 kidnapped children? Where else in the world have 90% of the population in large districts been displaced? Where else in the world do children make up 80% of the terrorist insurgency movement? For me, the situation is a moral outrage …
A much bigger international investment (is needed) — in money, political engagement, diplomacy and also more concerted efforts to tell the parties there is no military solution… there is a solution through reconciliation, an end to the killing and the re-integration and demobilisation of the child combatants.â€
Jan Egeland’s strong words were largely responsible for the international support that was given to the Juba peace talks. To that extent, his outrage was pivotal. During the Juba peace talks, the US, which had listed the LRA among international terrorist organisations, decided to send an envoy, Tim Shortley, to represent it in the talks. Sweden and other European countries also sent diplomats, but Britain did not.
Instead, it was fiddling with a hard-line resolution in concert with the US to the UN Security Council seeking to authorise military action against the LRA. Eventually in the wake of strong pro-peace talks lobby, the resolution was shelved. One other irony is that Sir Samuel Baker school has been adopted for renovation by Belgium and not Britain! Yet Britain fermented what has become known as the Northern Question.
Before the Second World War, all ethnic groups in Uganda were represented in the army that fought alongside Britain in the war. These veterans were critical actors in the anti-colonial struggle.
After 1945, Britain, in a deliberate move to divide and rule, decided that it was wiser to recruit the army mainly from northern Uganda.
That is how people like Idi Amin came into the picture.
In his book, Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Uganda, Mudoola says: “Groups…. which had benefited by the colonial presence, acquired sub-cultures of possessionâ€. This is the politics of Ebyaffe.
According to Mamdani, in a 1972 visit, Amin went to Makerere with a full battalion of troops. He said: “I came with a full battalion of troops so that when you raise your heads from your books, you know who has power.†Amin then added: “On my way, I stopped at Mulago (the university teaching hospital) and I looked at your medical records and I saw that most of you are suffering from gonorrhea.†Then he paused and said: “I will not tolerate you spreading political gonorrhea in Ugandaâ€. This attitude of “might is right†exists even in today’s Uganda.
After 1945, the relatively sparsely populated northern Uganda was dominant in the military. Power was thus not about numbers, but military might. This situation continued until 1986 when Museveni and his NRA turned the tables.
So what can Britain do? After 1945, Britain found itself in a dilemma. To actualise its divide and rule policy she recruited most of its military from the north. The north saw itself as a military power, while the South saw itself as the civil service reserve. The Northerners thus viewed themselves as the group to dominate the army. The gun and the military became the North’s ebyaffe. In the absence of military dominance, what is the alternative? What institutional framework can give a sense of belonging? If you remove the gun what do you replace it with?
Yet Britain has not focused on these historical distortions. Post-conflict reconstruction in the north presents Britain with an opportunity to redress wrongs it visited on Uganda.