Judiciary clarifies PRA
Feb 08, 2007
The judiciary wishes to respond to the legitimate concerns that have been raised in various fora, particularly so in the print and electronic media, regarding the management of the various court cases involving the Peoples’ Redemption Army (PRA) suspects.
By Lawrence Gidudu
The judiciary wishes to respond to the legitimate concerns that have been raised in various fora, particularly so in the print and electronic media, regarding the management of the various court cases involving the Peoples’ Redemption Army (PRA) suspects.
The judiciary takes this opportunity to clarify as follows:
Fourteen of the PRA suspects who are charged with treason, were granted bail by the High Court of Uganda on November 16, 2005. They did not sign bail bond forms due, apparently, to what appeared to be heavy and extra-ordinary military presence within the precincts of court and were returned to prison.
The PRA suspects challenged their detention in the Constitutional Court, which declared that the charges against the suspects, and their trial and detention by the General Court Martial were illegal and unconstitutional; and that the bail granted by the High Court still stands and should be effected by the High Court.
The High Court’s process seeking to effect the Constitutional Court’s order to release the PRA suspects, was interrupted by an application filed in court by the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions seeking a review of the suspects’ bail and directions on how to implement the order of the Constitutional Court. The High Court was duty bound to hear and rule on that application first to be able to effectively dispose of the issue of the suspects’ bail. However, when the application came up for hearing, the entire defence team of lawyers declined to attend court; whereupon, all the accused requested an adjournment of about one month to enable them engage new lawyers. The court granted that request and adjourned the matter to March 1, 2007.
In the meantime, the substantive treason case against all PRA suspects remains part-heard before the High Court. Now that all outstanding preliminary applications in that case, including the series of references to the Constitutional Court have been concluded, the High Court will resume hearing the substantive case itself.
It is common knowledge that when a case is pending determination by a court of law, the rule of sub judice applies. This means that issues pending before the court for determination are prohibited from being discussed or commented upon outside the court, because to do so would create a parallel forum for determining the dispute. We must, therefore, refrain from trying the PRA suspects in the parallel court of Public opinion. We must all allow the court process to evolve undeterred and uninfluenced by public views and sentiments on the matter uttered outside the court’s own process.
Moreover, the twin tenets of the independence of the judiciary and of the rule of law dictate that when exercising their judicial function, the courts must be left to be independent, and must not be subjected to the control or direction of any person or authority. Similarly, a judicial officer who is trying or hearing a case is afforded the same independence and freedom from interference by any person or authority at all even by his own superiors. Indeed, not even the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice or the Principal Judge can influence or interfere in the judicial function of any judicial officer at all, however junior that officer maybe.
It is well-known that the judiciary and its officers, as a matter of practice, tradition and etiquette transacts its business of adjudicating cases only in court, without descending from the seat of justice to discuss, let alone, transact, its business in the public domain.
In the same vein, it is imperative for the public to know that in the discharge of their judicial function, judicial officers are guided by the law and the facts of the case, and the requirements of their judicial oath to do justice to all, without discrimination, and without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.
In conclusion, it needs emphasising over and over again that when a court makes an order, practical enforcement of that order is carried out not by the court itself, but by the relevant agencies of the state. In the instant case of the PRA suspects, the concerned enforcement agencies would include, in particular, the Prisons Service. It is for this reason that Article 128(3) of our Constitution requires that “all organs and agencies of the state shall accord to the courts such assistance as may be required to ensure the effectiveness of the courts.â€
It is self-evident therefore that a judicial officer who issues an order, should not be envisaged to get off the bench and descend into the executive arena to execute that order. The responsibility to execute court orders is constitutionally apportioned to other agencies of the state by virtue of, among others, Article 128(3) of the Constitution. And it is the duty of these agencies to play their respective roles.
In this regard, the Constitution in its various provisions, minces no words. It imposes a solemn duty and a grave undertaking on the part of each one of the three arms of the state, thus:
Articles 79(3) states that “Parliament shall protect this Constitution and promote the democratic governance of Uganda.â€
Article 99(3) states that “It shall be the duty of the President to abide by, uphold and safeguard this Constitution and the laws of Uganda
Article 126(1) states that “Judicial power is derived from the people and shall be exercised by the courts ... in the name of the people and in conformity with law and with the values, norms and aspirations of the people.â€
The writer is the Acting Chief Registrar of the Courts of Judicature
The judiciary wishes to respond to the legitimate concerns that have been raised in various fora, particularly so in the print and electronic media, regarding the management of the various court cases involving the Peoples’ Redemption Army (PRA) suspects.
The judiciary takes this opportunity to clarify as follows:
Fourteen of the PRA suspects who are charged with treason, were granted bail by the High Court of Uganda on November 16, 2005. They did not sign bail bond forms due, apparently, to what appeared to be heavy and extra-ordinary military presence within the precincts of court and were returned to prison.
The PRA suspects challenged their detention in the Constitutional Court, which declared that the charges against the suspects, and their trial and detention by the General Court Martial were illegal and unconstitutional; and that the bail granted by the High Court still stands and should be effected by the High Court.
The High Court’s process seeking to effect the Constitutional Court’s order to release the PRA suspects, was interrupted by an application filed in court by the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions seeking a review of the suspects’ bail and directions on how to implement the order of the Constitutional Court. The High Court was duty bound to hear and rule on that application first to be able to effectively dispose of the issue of the suspects’ bail. However, when the application came up for hearing, the entire defence team of lawyers declined to attend court; whereupon, all the accused requested an adjournment of about one month to enable them engage new lawyers. The court granted that request and adjourned the matter to March 1, 2007.
In the meantime, the substantive treason case against all PRA suspects remains part-heard before the High Court. Now that all outstanding preliminary applications in that case, including the series of references to the Constitutional Court have been concluded, the High Court will resume hearing the substantive case itself.
It is common knowledge that when a case is pending determination by a court of law, the rule of sub judice applies. This means that issues pending before the court for determination are prohibited from being discussed or commented upon outside the court, because to do so would create a parallel forum for determining the dispute. We must, therefore, refrain from trying the PRA suspects in the parallel court of Public opinion. We must all allow the court process to evolve undeterred and uninfluenced by public views and sentiments on the matter uttered outside the court’s own process.
Moreover, the twin tenets of the independence of the judiciary and of the rule of law dictate that when exercising their judicial function, the courts must be left to be independent, and must not be subjected to the control or direction of any person or authority. Similarly, a judicial officer who is trying or hearing a case is afforded the same independence and freedom from interference by any person or authority at all even by his own superiors. Indeed, not even the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice or the Principal Judge can influence or interfere in the judicial function of any judicial officer at all, however junior that officer maybe.
It is well-known that the judiciary and its officers, as a matter of practice, tradition and etiquette transacts its business of adjudicating cases only in court, without descending from the seat of justice to discuss, let alone, transact, its business in the public domain.
In the same vein, it is imperative for the public to know that in the discharge of their judicial function, judicial officers are guided by the law and the facts of the case, and the requirements of their judicial oath to do justice to all, without discrimination, and without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.
In conclusion, it needs emphasising over and over again that when a court makes an order, practical enforcement of that order is carried out not by the court itself, but by the relevant agencies of the state. In the instant case of the PRA suspects, the concerned enforcement agencies would include, in particular, the Prisons Service. It is for this reason that Article 128(3) of our Constitution requires that “all organs and agencies of the state shall accord to the courts such assistance as may be required to ensure the effectiveness of the courts.â€
It is self-evident therefore that a judicial officer who issues an order, should not be envisaged to get off the bench and descend into the executive arena to execute that order. The responsibility to execute court orders is constitutionally apportioned to other agencies of the state by virtue of, among others, Article 128(3) of the Constitution. And it is the duty of these agencies to play their respective roles.
In this regard, the Constitution in its various provisions, minces no words. It imposes a solemn duty and a grave undertaking on the part of each one of the three arms of the state, thus:
Articles 79(3) states that “Parliament shall protect this Constitution and promote the democratic governance of Uganda.â€
Article 99(3) states that “It shall be the duty of the President to abide by, uphold and safeguard this Constitution and the laws of Uganda
Article 126(1) states that “Judicial power is derived from the people and shall be exercised by the courts ... in the name of the people and in conformity with law and with the values, norms and aspirations of the people.â€
The writer is the Acting Chief Registrar of the Courts of Judicature