Genesis Of Barlonyo Massacre
Mar 05, 2004
LAST week the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels attacked a camp for the internally displaced in Barlonyo, Lira district, killing more than 150 people. President Yoweri Museveni held a press conference on Wednesday over the massacre.
LAST week the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels attacked a camp for the internally displaced in Barlonyo, Lira district, killing more than 150 people. President Yoweri Museveni held a press conference on Wednesday over the massacre. Below is the text in full:
On the 21st of February 2004, a massacre was carried out in Barlonyo village, Ogur sub-county, Lira district.
The facts of the massacre were as follows: There was a small Internally Displaced People’s Camp (IDPC) that had grown up around an Amuka detachment that had been put in that, otherwise, deserted area in order to monitor movement by terrorists.
Such detachments should not have any population around them because they are not adequate to guard an IDPC.
Besides, if a detachment gets bogged down in guarding an IDPC, it will not concentrate on its work of monitoring terrorist movements, carrying out ambushes, etc.
They will become a protection force rather than being a reconnaissance and fighting force. Moreover, Barlonyo had too few people - 4,000 - to be an IDPC.
Since many people had been internally displaced by October last year, (1.4 million people), you cannot afford to have IDPCs of 4,000 people each. They would be too many to defend.
Normally, IDPCs have from 20,000 to 60,000 persons each. That is how the 1.4 million were distributed in 249 IDPCs - an average of 20,000 each.
Therefore, Barlonyo was due to the laxity of the officials involved - army and civilians. They should not have allowed an IDPC to develop around a detachment that was dedicated for another purpose. Such mistakes happen when there is some calmness. We should always be vigilant.
Anyway, on the 21st of February, around 6.30 p.m., a terrorist group from Odhiambo’s group, numbering about 70 (60 armed and 10 unarmed), attacked this Amuka detachment. Civilians informed the Amukas that terrorists were seen approaching.
It seems the Amukas were confident of repulsing the terrorists because they did not tell people to run away. The real problem, however, was that the Amukas of Barlonyo had no communication with the large forces of UPDF in that area.
If only they had informed the division commander in time, what eventually became a disaster would have been an opportunity.
The fast and superior UPDF forces would have been over the area in thirty minutes or less. The massacre then would have been on the terrorist as has been happening in other incidents in the recent past.
Nevertheless, Ugandans need to be informed of the efforts the Army was making to rid Uganda of these terrorists immediately before Barlonyo and after.
Let me start with the 18th of February 2004, at a place called Corner Abichel, north east of Patongo, where our forces killed 37 terrorists and 35 abductees - so called families of the terrorists- meaning sex slaves and the children they have produced, were liberated.
On 19th February, 40 terrorists were killed at Owony Odwee near Omot.
On the 20th of February, 30 terrorists were killed at Keji Keji. The attack on Barlonyo on the 20th of February was part of the desperate actions of the terrorists to react to their continuous defeat throughout the whole of last year - the killing of the notorious Tabuley, the killing of Nyeko, the killing of 503 terrorists in Teso region including 41 so -called commanders etc.
In the Lango-Acholi sector, including the operations in February enumerated above, 320 terrorists have been killed, 18 have been captured as POWs, 82 have reported on their own and 444 abductees have been rescued between January and now.
Focusing on the days following Barlonyo, the following have been achieved:
On the 22nd of February, one of the terrorists, belonging to the Barlonyo attackers, was killed and two were killed in Lukwiya’s terrorist group.
On the 24th February 2004, 21 terrorists were killed at Biwang, south of Lira-Palwo, 12 were captured and 22 abductees, including a boy who had been abducted from Barlonyo were rescued.
On the 26th of February, 16 terrorists were killed and 9 rifles were captured. On that same date, another 16 terrorists were killed in the area east of Puranga.
Even yesterday, March 2, the UPDF carried out attacks on bandits near River Agago but I have not got the results yet.
Therefore, the purpose of this statement is to inform Ugandans about our anti-terrorist campaign characterised by successive victories.
This string of victories, however, was marred by the carelessness of our commander in the case of Barlonyo. Victory is, however, certain.
The IDPs will go home like the ones of Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole did after the decisive defeat of ADF; like the IDPs of Teso are now going home after the defeat of Kony in Teso and Kaberamaido.
Kony has always been trying to attack the IDPs. However, all the 249 IDPCs are always successfully defended.
One of the really big attacks on an IDPC was in Pajule on 9th October, 2003, where Otti mobilised the whole of their group and launched a co-ordinated attack that was, nevertheless, defeated-by LDUs in Pajule.
This should serve to show all of you that Barlonyo was an unfortunate accident.
Otherwise, UPDF has done a good job in defending IDPCs and in hunting the terrorists.
Ends
On the 21st of February 2004, a massacre was carried out in Barlonyo village, Ogur sub-county, Lira district.
The facts of the massacre were as follows: There was a small Internally Displaced People’s Camp (IDPC) that had grown up around an Amuka detachment that had been put in that, otherwise, deserted area in order to monitor movement by terrorists.
Such detachments should not have any population around them because they are not adequate to guard an IDPC.
Besides, if a detachment gets bogged down in guarding an IDPC, it will not concentrate on its work of monitoring terrorist movements, carrying out ambushes, etc.
They will become a protection force rather than being a reconnaissance and fighting force. Moreover, Barlonyo had too few people - 4,000 - to be an IDPC.
Since many people had been internally displaced by October last year, (1.4 million people), you cannot afford to have IDPCs of 4,000 people each. They would be too many to defend.
Normally, IDPCs have from 20,000 to 60,000 persons each. That is how the 1.4 million were distributed in 249 IDPCs - an average of 20,000 each.
Therefore, Barlonyo was due to the laxity of the officials involved - army and civilians. They should not have allowed an IDPC to develop around a detachment that was dedicated for another purpose. Such mistakes happen when there is some calmness. We should always be vigilant.
Anyway, on the 21st of February, around 6.30 p.m., a terrorist group from Odhiambo’s group, numbering about 70 (60 armed and 10 unarmed), attacked this Amuka detachment. Civilians informed the Amukas that terrorists were seen approaching.
It seems the Amukas were confident of repulsing the terrorists because they did not tell people to run away. The real problem, however, was that the Amukas of Barlonyo had no communication with the large forces of UPDF in that area.
If only they had informed the division commander in time, what eventually became a disaster would have been an opportunity.
The fast and superior UPDF forces would have been over the area in thirty minutes or less. The massacre then would have been on the terrorist as has been happening in other incidents in the recent past.
Nevertheless, Ugandans need to be informed of the efforts the Army was making to rid Uganda of these terrorists immediately before Barlonyo and after.
Let me start with the 18th of February 2004, at a place called Corner Abichel, north east of Patongo, where our forces killed 37 terrorists and 35 abductees - so called families of the terrorists- meaning sex slaves and the children they have produced, were liberated.
On 19th February, 40 terrorists were killed at Owony Odwee near Omot.
On the 20th of February, 30 terrorists were killed at Keji Keji. The attack on Barlonyo on the 20th of February was part of the desperate actions of the terrorists to react to their continuous defeat throughout the whole of last year - the killing of the notorious Tabuley, the killing of Nyeko, the killing of 503 terrorists in Teso region including 41 so -called commanders etc.
In the Lango-Acholi sector, including the operations in February enumerated above, 320 terrorists have been killed, 18 have been captured as POWs, 82 have reported on their own and 444 abductees have been rescued between January and now.
Focusing on the days following Barlonyo, the following have been achieved:
On the 22nd of February, one of the terrorists, belonging to the Barlonyo attackers, was killed and two were killed in Lukwiya’s terrorist group.
On the 24th February 2004, 21 terrorists were killed at Biwang, south of Lira-Palwo, 12 were captured and 22 abductees, including a boy who had been abducted from Barlonyo were rescued.
On the 26th of February, 16 terrorists were killed and 9 rifles were captured. On that same date, another 16 terrorists were killed in the area east of Puranga.
Even yesterday, March 2, the UPDF carried out attacks on bandits near River Agago but I have not got the results yet.
Therefore, the purpose of this statement is to inform Ugandans about our anti-terrorist campaign characterised by successive victories.
This string of victories, however, was marred by the carelessness of our commander in the case of Barlonyo. Victory is, however, certain.
The IDPs will go home like the ones of Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole did after the decisive defeat of ADF; like the IDPs of Teso are now going home after the defeat of Kony in Teso and Kaberamaido.
Kony has always been trying to attack the IDPs. However, all the 249 IDPCs are always successfully defended.
One of the really big attacks on an IDPC was in Pajule on 9th October, 2003, where Otti mobilised the whole of their group and launched a co-ordinated attack that was, nevertheless, defeated-by LDUs in Pajule.
This should serve to show all of you that Barlonyo was an unfortunate accident.
Otherwise, UPDF has done a good job in defending IDPCs and in hunting the terrorists.
Ends