Govt to blame for electricity shortage

Oct 19, 2004

Continual electricity load shedding has overwhelmed the country. Currently, the demand for electricity exceeds supply and the gap will worsen through 2010 to 2025. Government must therefore prioritise construction of both Bujagali and Karuma hydro power plants to alleviate poverty, modernise agricul

By Gregory Begumisa

Continual electricity load shedding has overwhelmed the country. Currently, the demand for electricity exceeds supply and the gap will worsen through 2010 to 2025. Government must therefore prioritise construction of both Bujagali and Karuma hydro power plants to alleviate poverty, modernise agriculture and accelerate industrial growth.

As of now, only about eight percent of homesteads access electricity. Commercial consumption is minimal and associated with urban centres and government offices. Though it will increase with rural electrification of sub-county and parish offices, in consistency with policies for widespread use of information and communication technology. As of present, industrial demand is the largest and for the next 20 years, projected to grow at 80MW yearly if only 70% of industrial projects licensed by the Uganda Investment Authority take off.

A study by M/s Electric de France put the total demand at over 300MW in 1998, projected to rise to 400MW in 2000 and to 600MW in 2006. Uganda Electricity Board (now Uganda Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (UEDCL)) estimated industrial and residential demand to grow by 4MW per month (The New Vision, September 15, 1999, page 37).

Much time and money were invested in reviewing project plans: Bujagali from 1986 to 2003 and studies by Sir Alexander Gibb (1986), by Acres International (1991) and by Kennedy and Donkin (1997). In between, consultants were employed to summarise the studies, and to review endless summaries.

Despite all these studies, installed capacity is a mere 315.6MW. National installed capacity will rise to just 395MW when the two generating sets at Kiira are installed by June 2005.

The proposed Bujagali and Karuma projects will add 250MW and 200MW around 2009 if constructed simultaneously effective 2005. Another 35MW will be from mini plants on the drawing board. Total installed capacity in 2010 will then be around 800 MW. Actual power supply will fluctuate by 200 MW due to mistakes in the design of Kiira plant: Two simultaneous outflows from Lake Victoria, instead of Kiira being down stream and Nalubaale feeding Kiira. Because of the mistake, either the whole or parts of one of the two plants will be shut down whenever there is not enough water in Lake Victoria, both operating fully when the lake level is favourable.

Going by UEDCL projections, current demand is 468MW, a shortage of 153MW at full generating capacity, assuming enough water in Lake Victoria to feed both Nalubaale and Kiira plants. Demand will grow to 756MW in 2010 and if UIA licensed industrial projects take off, demand will be 1028MW in 2010 (i.e. current demand of 468MW + (80MW x seven years). Hence total demand will be 892MW in 2010 (a common average of the two projections). Industrial demand alone will be 1600MW by 2025.

Yet, in 2010 total electricity installed capacity will hover around 800MW, fluctuating by up to 200MW. The shortage will vary from 92MW to 292MW. Hence power planners are planning for a shortage in 2010 and 2025, just like their predecessors planned the current biting shortage. This is unacceptable. It calls for urgent review of the power planning mechanism in this country. Efforts to market Uganda as an investment destination will not yield if it does not meet preliminary investment criteria of availability of electricity. For example, mining and smelting of iron ore, and steel production would need all the 315MW generated. Other countries developed large, cheap power plants before they attracted investment. Mozambique invested in 2000MW at Cabora Bassa to smelt aluminium. The plant uses about one-and-a-half times the total power generated in Uganda.

Zimbabwe invested in cheap electricity before exploiting iron ore to produce steel, and, manufacturing fertilisers. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) built 1800MW (Inga Dam) to accelerate industrialisation.

Therefore, Uganda’s potential of base metals, petroleum, fertiliser, etc, will remain underground partly due to scarcity of electricity. Uganda could mine and export with minimal processing. However, government pronouncements point to some sort of a ‘Value-added Export-led’ industrialisation strategy. It can safely be predicted, that government’s commitment to eradicate poverty, modernise agriculture and industrialise will all be hampered by scarcity of electricity.

The role of electricity supply in transformation of a country is clarified when the installed electricity capacity of African countries is compared for 2000 (data obtained courtesy of UEDCL in 1999 for which I am grateful).

According to the data, Uganda faired rather badly. Figures suggest that the richer African countries were those whose electricity supply was in multiples of Uganda’s. This explains the prevalence of Kenyan manufactured goods on shop shelves in Uganda. It also suggests the Republic of South Africa is an economic giant because of its gigantic electricity supply. While its population is one-and-half times Uganda’s, it uses 190 times as much electricity. Kenya with a population of 32 million uses three times as much electricity. Despite Uganda’s enormous hydro-electricity potential, Egypt generates about 150 times as much electricity as Uganda, most of it from the river Nile. Mozambique’s rises to 2108MW when the 2000MW at the recently commissioned Cabora Bassa hydro power plant is included.

M/s Umeme Ltd plans to invest $100 million to revamp electricity distribution but what power will it distribute when there is almost no power generated in Uganda? Umeme Ltd. is the firm poised to replace UEDCL and it is said to be a subsidiary of M/s Globeleq and M/s Eskom.

Eskom monopolises electricity supply in the Republic of South Africa: All the installed capacity of 38000MW was owned and managed by Eskom as of 2000. It is a giant by both African and world standards.

Just as an example, of the total electricity supply of England and Wales (49500MW), eight percent (3960MW) was generated by the coal-fired Drax Power Station (The New Vision, August 23, 1999, page 45). This compared favourably with Eskom’s seven coal-fired plants at Duhva (3450MW); Kendal (3840MW);Kriel 2850MW); Lethabo (3558MW); Matimba (3690MW); Matla (3450MW); Tutuka (3510MW). In other words, Eskom generated the equivalent of 50 percent of the electricity requirements of England and Wales at only six of its several plants.

Uganda’s power planners could interest Eskom to generate 3000MW — 4000MW for sale in Uganda, the rest of Eastern Africa, Southern Sudan and the eastern DRC. Uganda’s benefits include direct and indirect employment, taxes, mineral exploitation and even railway transport in the long run. Farm productivity and the quality of life in rural areas would improve. The responsibility of Eskom would be to generate cheap electricity, sell it and make a profit. The possibility of Ugandans’ debates about percentage ownership of Eskom’s local power plants should not be entertained having got our priorities right. Ugandans need cheap electricity irrespective of the ownership of the power plants.

Environmentalists need to research the costs and benefits of building large hydro electric power plants to increase electricity in developing countries. Some of the environmental impact assessment criteria of rich, affluent societies are irrelevant to poor, developing country situations. Such criteria must be adjusted for developing country goals. It has never been a strategic interest of any developed country to industrialise any poor, developing country.

Importantly, too, residents along the Nile River should not bother about the long run effects of more electricity on ancestral and cultural sites. They should appreciate that the long run is divided into a myriad of short runs; that people who do not eat in the short run will not survive to see the long run. History teaches that often, things may get bad before they can get good. Most Ugandans are a long way from appreciating white water surfing on Bujagali Falls after a lunch at the Sheraton in Kampala.

The small Bujagali plant said to cost $580 million can, for example, be financed by even workers via National Social Security Fund (NSSF). Large plants can be financed as East Africa Community or IGAD projects since power deficient neighbours would rather participate in ownership and use than only be buyers.

The technology of hydro electricity is not as intricate and obscure as that of petroleum. Yet, power planners black-mail Ugandans with falsified financial implications of electricity projects while neighbours have multiples of electricity supply capacity using costly sources.

The Government must act more decisively to implement power supply projects. It does not need more mandate and public goodwill than it has.

Finally, the Government must ensure that personnel selection in the power sector bases more on technical competence than on political compromise, even if it warrants non-citizen expertise.

The writer is a Consultant Industrial Economist with M/s Begumisa Financial Services Ltd. Tel. 077-396120

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