Disaster: NASA was warned
Feb 10, 2003
On February 1, the U.S. space shuttle Columbia disintegrated while returning to Earth, killing all seven astronauts on board. As investigations into possible causes of the disaster continue, certain elements of NASA’s shuttle technology are coming under fire
On February 1, the U.S. space shuttle Columbia disintegrated while returning to Earth, killing all seven astronauts on board. As investigations into possible causes of the disaster continue, certain elements of NASA’s shuttle technology are coming under fire
U.S. space agency officials Wednesday defended the use of fragile insulating tiles on the outside of the space shuttle despite the belief that damage to the tiles during liftoff may have been responsible for the catastrophic cause of the Columbia disaster.
Officials also speculated that the space shuttle may have been damaged by space debris or a small meteor during its 16-day orbit in space: “Did we take some hit? That’s a possibility,†said Milt Heflin, NASA’s flight director, in a published report. “Something was breached.â€
Heflin and other NASA officials have not ruled out the theory that the shuttle may have been hit and damaged by orbital debris. Although there were no initial indications that an in-flight hit was being considered as prime cause for the disaster.
There are at least 110,000 pieces of space junk larger than one centimetre in orbit around the Earth. Some of the pieces are much larger but most of those, about 8,000, are tracked by NASA.
The main focus of the investigation continued to closely examine an incident when a piece of foam debris from the external fuel tank sheared off and struck the underside of Columbia. The U.S. space agency had been warned more than two decades ago that hardened foam on the outside of the space shuttles’ external fuel tanks could detach during lift-offs, damage the shuttles and endanger their re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere.
These foam projectiles had previously struck shuttles, but officials at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have said this week that those spacecraft returned without incident and they thought the Columbia, the oldest shuttle, was not in any danger.
However, the piece of foam that hit the Columbia on take-off January 16 was the largest piece of debris to ever hit a shuttle, said Michael Kostelnik, a NASA deputy associate administrator.
The insulation material called foam is, however, hard as a rock, and NASA officials have said it would have hit the Columbia like a cannonball.
As early as 1979, two years before the first flight of a shuttle— the Columbia— an internal NASA report warned of the fragility of the thermal protection tile, and a 1994 report by independent experts commissioned by NASA warned that insulation debris could cause damage to the crucial heat-absorbing tiles lining the outside of the shuttles, which protect them from the intense heat of re-entry. But Kostelnik Wednesday defended the use of the tiles, which he said had performed quite well over the years. Although he admitted that certain locations an the shuttle, such as the undercarriage wheel covers, could be compromised if tiles were lost in that location.
“We’ve had a lot of experience with that thermal protection system. We’ve had good success with the tile system,†said Kostelnik. The 1994 report warned that even the loss of one of the small tiles could act as an Achilles heel, causing the force and friction of re-entry to strip away other interconnected tiles and cause damage that could be beyond repair and endanger astronauts. The report by two university scholars said finding a solution to the foam problem would be the single best way to ensure the safety of the shuttle programme, adding that NASA could not afford to lose another orbiter.
In 1986, the shuttle Challenger blew up on take-off. Like on Columbia, all astronauts aboard were killed and the shuttle fleet was grounded.
Other internal memos and reports in 1997 and 2001 also warned of the foam danger.
Multiple investigations into the Columbia disaster continued Wednesday, with teams examining wreckage found across the south-central United States — including its nose cone, engines and cabin — and looking for crucial debris further west, in California and Arizona, over which the shuttle began to break up.
They also were to examine a video of the shuttle breakup taken by an Apache helicopter flying over Texas as well as Air Force photographs, Kostelnik said. Meanwhile, it was reported that after the 1986 Challenger disaster, U.S. space agency officials considered and then rejected safety measures, including an escape pod, that astronauts could use in an emergency.
NASA officials also took up possibility of using military-style ejection seats or booster rockets to help astronauts flee a doomed space shuttle. “The ideas were eventually rejected because it was not believed they would be effective at saving lives and would add too much weight to the spacecraft,†John Ira Petry, NASA spokesman said.
NASA has extensive plans for aborting missions before take-off and even when shuttles reach low orbit, but maintains there is little that can be done to save astronauts when they reach space.
dpa
U.S. space agency officials Wednesday defended the use of fragile insulating tiles on the outside of the space shuttle despite the belief that damage to the tiles during liftoff may have been responsible for the catastrophic cause of the Columbia disaster.
Officials also speculated that the space shuttle may have been damaged by space debris or a small meteor during its 16-day orbit in space: “Did we take some hit? That’s a possibility,†said Milt Heflin, NASA’s flight director, in a published report. “Something was breached.â€
Heflin and other NASA officials have not ruled out the theory that the shuttle may have been hit and damaged by orbital debris. Although there were no initial indications that an in-flight hit was being considered as prime cause for the disaster.
There are at least 110,000 pieces of space junk larger than one centimetre in orbit around the Earth. Some of the pieces are much larger but most of those, about 8,000, are tracked by NASA.
The main focus of the investigation continued to closely examine an incident when a piece of foam debris from the external fuel tank sheared off and struck the underside of Columbia. The U.S. space agency had been warned more than two decades ago that hardened foam on the outside of the space shuttles’ external fuel tanks could detach during lift-offs, damage the shuttles and endanger their re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere.
These foam projectiles had previously struck shuttles, but officials at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have said this week that those spacecraft returned without incident and they thought the Columbia, the oldest shuttle, was not in any danger.
However, the piece of foam that hit the Columbia on take-off January 16 was the largest piece of debris to ever hit a shuttle, said Michael Kostelnik, a NASA deputy associate administrator.
The insulation material called foam is, however, hard as a rock, and NASA officials have said it would have hit the Columbia like a cannonball.
As early as 1979, two years before the first flight of a shuttle— the Columbia— an internal NASA report warned of the fragility of the thermal protection tile, and a 1994 report by independent experts commissioned by NASA warned that insulation debris could cause damage to the crucial heat-absorbing tiles lining the outside of the shuttles, which protect them from the intense heat of re-entry. But Kostelnik Wednesday defended the use of the tiles, which he said had performed quite well over the years. Although he admitted that certain locations an the shuttle, such as the undercarriage wheel covers, could be compromised if tiles were lost in that location.
“We’ve had a lot of experience with that thermal protection system. We’ve had good success with the tile system,†said Kostelnik. The 1994 report warned that even the loss of one of the small tiles could act as an Achilles heel, causing the force and friction of re-entry to strip away other interconnected tiles and cause damage that could be beyond repair and endanger astronauts. The report by two university scholars said finding a solution to the foam problem would be the single best way to ensure the safety of the shuttle programme, adding that NASA could not afford to lose another orbiter.
In 1986, the shuttle Challenger blew up on take-off. Like on Columbia, all astronauts aboard were killed and the shuttle fleet was grounded.
Other internal memos and reports in 1997 and 2001 also warned of the foam danger.
Multiple investigations into the Columbia disaster continued Wednesday, with teams examining wreckage found across the south-central United States — including its nose cone, engines and cabin — and looking for crucial debris further west, in California and Arizona, over which the shuttle began to break up.
They also were to examine a video of the shuttle breakup taken by an Apache helicopter flying over Texas as well as Air Force photographs, Kostelnik said. Meanwhile, it was reported that after the 1986 Challenger disaster, U.S. space agency officials considered and then rejected safety measures, including an escape pod, that astronauts could use in an emergency.
NASA officials also took up possibility of using military-style ejection seats or booster rockets to help astronauts flee a doomed space shuttle. “The ideas were eventually rejected because it was not believed they would be effective at saving lives and would add too much weight to the spacecraft,†John Ira Petry, NASA spokesman said.
NASA has extensive plans for aborting missions before take-off and even when shuttles reach low orbit, but maintains there is little that can be done to save astronauts when they reach space.
dpa