Reshuffles Mark The Beginning Of A Professional Ugandan Army
Jun 10, 2003
President Yoweri Museveni’s reshuffle in the leadership of the army and intelligence service last weekend could be the last bend in the road to professionalisation and standardisation of the originally a guerrilla or citizen-based army.
By Emmy Allio
President Yoweri Museveni’s reshuffle in the leadership of the army and intelligence service last weekend could be the last bend in the road to professionalisation and standardisation of the originally a guerrilla or citizen-based army.
Before 1986, the armies and intelligence services had a colonial mentality. Their sole aim was to crush dissenting groups and it served the whims of the colonial masters and later served their neo-colonial interests. Those armies were detached from the population and hence committed heinous atrocities on the very people they were entrusted protect. The armies were helped in terrorising the population by intelligence services like, National Security Agency (NASA) and State Research Bureau (SRB).
From 1981 to the present day, the National Resistance Army (NRA) has been transformed from a guerrilla or a citizen-based army into a counter insurgence army. It is now being transformed into a professional regular army.
Likewise, the intelligence organisations have undergone a complete metamorphosis. The spy organisations, Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and External Security Organisation (ESO), have been fighting an image war. They were striving to distance themselves from the brutal methods of NASA and SRB. In doing so, ISO and ESO have undergone transformation like the NRA and later UPDF and, by large, have tended to stick to their statutory guidelines with no powers of arrest and detention of suspects.
The challenges of professionalising the army are enormous. There has been much talk of divisions among officers in the army. There is even talk of top officers working through cliques. The poor relations at the top army echelon are said to have affected operations in war zones.
Major General James Kazini has been one of the most efficient disciplined officers in the post-1986 period. He has been both chief of staff and army commander, an unprecedented feat. From his rise as head of the military police force to army commander, he has established a reputation of ruthlessness and shrewdness. He was for long, an astute disciplined officer who excelled in the field and will be remembered for the battles and the defeat of the West Nile Bank Front, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Sudanese army on the West Nile border.
Kazini led the army into the Democratic Republic of Congo where decisive battles were won. Congo, too, has ended Kazini’s hitherto smooth rise as a disciplined commander. Under Kazini, divisions developed in the army and he found himself accused of favouring one Congolese rebel faction against the other.
Kazini is still yet to explain the Capt. Dan Byakutaga saga. Byakutaga, said to have acquired huge personal wealth, vanished with over a million dollars of soldiers pay in Congo.
Kazini has been at the centre of scandals including unexplained acquisition of huge personal wealth.
Various investigation groups including the United Nations Panel of Experts and the Justice Porter Commission, have exposed him as having misused the army in Congo for personal gain.
Sources said Kazini did not tolerate officers who did not support his Congolese allies and as a result, good public relations also suffered as he used his office to fight his critics.
The removal of Kazini and his replacement by Maj. Gen. Aronda Nyakairima was long overdue. Kazini is one of those officers who have risen through the army ranks without undergoing any formal training.
Sending him for studies benefits the army. When he finishes professional training, Kazini’s rich experience as an efficient war commander could be utilised in staff colleges. Maybe the army should form a council of army generals where the likes of Kazini will serve to advise or teach military issues.
He could also qualify for a post in a professionalised army whose top boss will be the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF).
A professionalised army will, no doubt, need officers like Nyakairima, who belongs to the new crop of educated and increasingly assertive officers in the army.
As the economy grows and people’s social outlook also changes, the army must also grow. It must be geared to serve new threats, which include natural disasters, economic threats or political threats. These threats may not need tanks and artillery. The new threats need systematic approaches, which call for a leadership that is most decisive and dynamic in both warfare and non-warfare. The solution to the modern threat is to produce educated commanders and cadres.
Nyakairima has to prove that knowledge acquired in classrooms or fields can be used on the ground. He has to improve on working relations between senior and junior officers. He has to cater for the needs of the foot soldiers.
I have heard of a growing trend in the army headquarters where officers want to equate rise in rank and status to driving multi-million shilling Range Rovers.
This new culture is inconsiderate of the foot soldiers in the north who still wear torn boots or slippers and lack dry ration as they battle Kony rebels
Will Aronda allow this state of affairs to continue at the expense of the soldiers in the field?
In the past, army commanders said they were overstretched by fighting on many fronts. With no army in Congo and no war in western Uganda, Nyakairima has no excuse. He has a duty to fight Kony in the north. He began this task as the overall commander of the Operation Iron Fist.
“The army or the military, broadly speaking, is a complex organisation. It is like a human body with organs performing different functions,†President Yoweri Museveni said in September 2000 when opening a workshop for senior UPDF officers in Entebbe.
He said his main focus was to transform the army from freedom fighters or “citizens’ army†to a national professional force.
Museveni had expressed his disappointment over commanders failure to adopt standard measures to fight counter-insurgency, especially with establishment of a night-fighting unit.
Such a unit could aim at combating a situation where the UPDF is active the whole day while the rebels lie in wait. Then at night the rebels roam and relocate, ready to hit soft targets at daybreak.
The reshuffles in the intelligence organisations were also long overdue. The army and spy organisations compliment each other. The spies collect and disseminate the information for the police and the army to act upon.
Knowledge is wealth. Efficient security agencies are therefore able to forsee, plan and advise the government adequately.
New threats emerge daily. The spy organisations must be prepared for new challenges. Along with Chieftancy of Military Intelligence, ISO and ESO must be commended for ending the terrorist bomb attacks in the city.
Think of car robbers who dismantle vehicles and reduce them into spare parts. Where do 80% of spare parts in Kisekka market come from? Think of economic saboteurs.
Thugs whom Operation Wembley was combating in the Kampala city and other towns, were targeting the economy and investors. They attacked and killed the rich. They robbed many a forex bureaux in day light. They operated with impunity, as if the security organisations did not exist. Their actions killed investors confidence and caused panic in the business community. The thugs operated like an urban guerrilla group.
Wembley led by Col. Elly Kayanja was an assembly of various security organisations. Wembley adopted unorthodox methods to tackle the situation. It did not only hunt for the thugs, but their collaborators within the security organisations. As such, Wembley ran into trouble with human right groups and opposition politicians who accused them of illegal methods of work and abuses.
Kayanja is a no nonsense operative who found his public...rating rising as the activities of the thugs twiddled.
Sources said Kayanja’s success in Wembley also created uneasy relationship with other security chiefs, including Brig. Henry Tumukunde.
Kayanja’s appointment as the new Director General of International Security Organisation (ISO) to replace Tumukunde must be lauded. Kayanja is a result-oriented man.
But Kayanja must act with caution. Not all situations need to be handled the Wembley way. ISO’s statutory role is to monitor the economy as well as political and social trends. ISO is supposed to operate as secretively as the police special force. In this regard, Kayanja must learn tact and diplomacy. Brutal force may not be the solution in the many challenges he will face.
Tumukunde has ably served the country in various capacities: As spy chief, army division commander and mobiliser. He is sociable and systematic worker.
Col. Peter Kerim has had a long rest since he was dropped as Second division commander in 1998. He is said to have disagreed with other UPDF officers over how to handle Hema-Lendu conflict in Congo’s Ituri region. He was accused of being pro-Lendu.
Kerim is one of the first northerners to rise to top command positions in the NRA. His cool and shy character is a sharp contrast to his civilian boss, David Pulkol who is more outgoing. Kerim’s new appointment as deputy Director General of External Security Organisation (ESO) in charge of Congo affairs has a lot of challenges.
Congo has been one sore spot for not only Uganda but many a neighbour of the potentially rich but impoverished country. Kerim will have to moderate his pro-Lendu sentiments in order to accommodate the minority Hema, the arch rivals of the majority Lendu. The Kinshasa Government has shown open preference to the Lendu in Ituri and has deployed over 4,000 troops there to back their motives to control Ituri. Kinshasa soldiers and Lendu clash daily with the Hema. This situation sends thousands of refugees into Uganda. This is an emerging threat to Uganda’s security.
On the other hand, the Hema are an organised group who are controlled by monarchies. They are emerging as a militarily unified group. The Hema are cousins to Uganda’s ethnic Bahuma groups of Toro and Bunyoro. Under chief Kawa Madro’s PUSIC group, the Hema have raised a large army to resist the Kinshasa and Lendu forces. There are daily battles fought between these groups in areas along the common Uganda-DRC border.
Another Hema group is Union for Patriotic Congolese (UPC) led by Thomas Lubanga. The Rwanda government backs UPC, which reportedly has continued, to airdrop arms in Ituri.
Pulkol and Kerim also have to watch political developments in Ituri in view of the French-led international force. Uganda left behind the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) as a mechanism to end the circle of wars in Ituri. From time to time, Uganda will be consulted on Ituri issues and ESO must provide that answer.
The overall peace process in Congo is still a concern to Uganda. As a former occupying force and a signatory to Lusaka, Luanda and Dar es Salaam agreements, Uganda is still a key partner in the search for peace in Congo.
In all, the new changes reflect emerging threats. Ends
President Yoweri Museveni’s reshuffle in the leadership of the army and intelligence service last weekend could be the last bend in the road to professionalisation and standardisation of the originally a guerrilla or citizen-based army.
Before 1986, the armies and intelligence services had a colonial mentality. Their sole aim was to crush dissenting groups and it served the whims of the colonial masters and later served their neo-colonial interests. Those armies were detached from the population and hence committed heinous atrocities on the very people they were entrusted protect. The armies were helped in terrorising the population by intelligence services like, National Security Agency (NASA) and State Research Bureau (SRB).
From 1981 to the present day, the National Resistance Army (NRA) has been transformed from a guerrilla or a citizen-based army into a counter insurgence army. It is now being transformed into a professional regular army.
Likewise, the intelligence organisations have undergone a complete metamorphosis. The spy organisations, Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and External Security Organisation (ESO), have been fighting an image war. They were striving to distance themselves from the brutal methods of NASA and SRB. In doing so, ISO and ESO have undergone transformation like the NRA and later UPDF and, by large, have tended to stick to their statutory guidelines with no powers of arrest and detention of suspects.
The challenges of professionalising the army are enormous. There has been much talk of divisions among officers in the army. There is even talk of top officers working through cliques. The poor relations at the top army echelon are said to have affected operations in war zones.
Major General James Kazini has been one of the most efficient disciplined officers in the post-1986 period. He has been both chief of staff and army commander, an unprecedented feat. From his rise as head of the military police force to army commander, he has established a reputation of ruthlessness and shrewdness. He was for long, an astute disciplined officer who excelled in the field and will be remembered for the battles and the defeat of the West Nile Bank Front, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Sudanese army on the West Nile border.
Kazini led the army into the Democratic Republic of Congo where decisive battles were won. Congo, too, has ended Kazini’s hitherto smooth rise as a disciplined commander. Under Kazini, divisions developed in the army and he found himself accused of favouring one Congolese rebel faction against the other.
Kazini is still yet to explain the Capt. Dan Byakutaga saga. Byakutaga, said to have acquired huge personal wealth, vanished with over a million dollars of soldiers pay in Congo.
Kazini has been at the centre of scandals including unexplained acquisition of huge personal wealth.
Various investigation groups including the United Nations Panel of Experts and the Justice Porter Commission, have exposed him as having misused the army in Congo for personal gain.
Sources said Kazini did not tolerate officers who did not support his Congolese allies and as a result, good public relations also suffered as he used his office to fight his critics.
The removal of Kazini and his replacement by Maj. Gen. Aronda Nyakairima was long overdue. Kazini is one of those officers who have risen through the army ranks without undergoing any formal training.
Sending him for studies benefits the army. When he finishes professional training, Kazini’s rich experience as an efficient war commander could be utilised in staff colleges. Maybe the army should form a council of army generals where the likes of Kazini will serve to advise or teach military issues.
He could also qualify for a post in a professionalised army whose top boss will be the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF).
A professionalised army will, no doubt, need officers like Nyakairima, who belongs to the new crop of educated and increasingly assertive officers in the army.
As the economy grows and people’s social outlook also changes, the army must also grow. It must be geared to serve new threats, which include natural disasters, economic threats or political threats. These threats may not need tanks and artillery. The new threats need systematic approaches, which call for a leadership that is most decisive and dynamic in both warfare and non-warfare. The solution to the modern threat is to produce educated commanders and cadres.
Nyakairima has to prove that knowledge acquired in classrooms or fields can be used on the ground. He has to improve on working relations between senior and junior officers. He has to cater for the needs of the foot soldiers.
I have heard of a growing trend in the army headquarters where officers want to equate rise in rank and status to driving multi-million shilling Range Rovers.
This new culture is inconsiderate of the foot soldiers in the north who still wear torn boots or slippers and lack dry ration as they battle Kony rebels
Will Aronda allow this state of affairs to continue at the expense of the soldiers in the field?
In the past, army commanders said they were overstretched by fighting on many fronts. With no army in Congo and no war in western Uganda, Nyakairima has no excuse. He has a duty to fight Kony in the north. He began this task as the overall commander of the Operation Iron Fist.
“The army or the military, broadly speaking, is a complex organisation. It is like a human body with organs performing different functions,†President Yoweri Museveni said in September 2000 when opening a workshop for senior UPDF officers in Entebbe.
He said his main focus was to transform the army from freedom fighters or “citizens’ army†to a national professional force.
Museveni had expressed his disappointment over commanders failure to adopt standard measures to fight counter-insurgency, especially with establishment of a night-fighting unit.
Such a unit could aim at combating a situation where the UPDF is active the whole day while the rebels lie in wait. Then at night the rebels roam and relocate, ready to hit soft targets at daybreak.
The reshuffles in the intelligence organisations were also long overdue. The army and spy organisations compliment each other. The spies collect and disseminate the information for the police and the army to act upon.
Knowledge is wealth. Efficient security agencies are therefore able to forsee, plan and advise the government adequately.
New threats emerge daily. The spy organisations must be prepared for new challenges. Along with Chieftancy of Military Intelligence, ISO and ESO must be commended for ending the terrorist bomb attacks in the city.
Think of car robbers who dismantle vehicles and reduce them into spare parts. Where do 80% of spare parts in Kisekka market come from? Think of economic saboteurs.
Thugs whom Operation Wembley was combating in the Kampala city and other towns, were targeting the economy and investors. They attacked and killed the rich. They robbed many a forex bureaux in day light. They operated with impunity, as if the security organisations did not exist. Their actions killed investors confidence and caused panic in the business community. The thugs operated like an urban guerrilla group.
Wembley led by Col. Elly Kayanja was an assembly of various security organisations. Wembley adopted unorthodox methods to tackle the situation. It did not only hunt for the thugs, but their collaborators within the security organisations. As such, Wembley ran into trouble with human right groups and opposition politicians who accused them of illegal methods of work and abuses.
Kayanja is a no nonsense operative who found his public...rating rising as the activities of the thugs twiddled.
Sources said Kayanja’s success in Wembley also created uneasy relationship with other security chiefs, including Brig. Henry Tumukunde.
Kayanja’s appointment as the new Director General of International Security Organisation (ISO) to replace Tumukunde must be lauded. Kayanja is a result-oriented man.
But Kayanja must act with caution. Not all situations need to be handled the Wembley way. ISO’s statutory role is to monitor the economy as well as political and social trends. ISO is supposed to operate as secretively as the police special force. In this regard, Kayanja must learn tact and diplomacy. Brutal force may not be the solution in the many challenges he will face.
Tumukunde has ably served the country in various capacities: As spy chief, army division commander and mobiliser. He is sociable and systematic worker.
Col. Peter Kerim has had a long rest since he was dropped as Second division commander in 1998. He is said to have disagreed with other UPDF officers over how to handle Hema-Lendu conflict in Congo’s Ituri region. He was accused of being pro-Lendu.
Kerim is one of the first northerners to rise to top command positions in the NRA. His cool and shy character is a sharp contrast to his civilian boss, David Pulkol who is more outgoing. Kerim’s new appointment as deputy Director General of External Security Organisation (ESO) in charge of Congo affairs has a lot of challenges.
Congo has been one sore spot for not only Uganda but many a neighbour of the potentially rich but impoverished country. Kerim will have to moderate his pro-Lendu sentiments in order to accommodate the minority Hema, the arch rivals of the majority Lendu. The Kinshasa Government has shown open preference to the Lendu in Ituri and has deployed over 4,000 troops there to back their motives to control Ituri. Kinshasa soldiers and Lendu clash daily with the Hema. This situation sends thousands of refugees into Uganda. This is an emerging threat to Uganda’s security.
On the other hand, the Hema are an organised group who are controlled by monarchies. They are emerging as a militarily unified group. The Hema are cousins to Uganda’s ethnic Bahuma groups of Toro and Bunyoro. Under chief Kawa Madro’s PUSIC group, the Hema have raised a large army to resist the Kinshasa and Lendu forces. There are daily battles fought between these groups in areas along the common Uganda-DRC border.
Another Hema group is Union for Patriotic Congolese (UPC) led by Thomas Lubanga. The Rwanda government backs UPC, which reportedly has continued, to airdrop arms in Ituri.
Pulkol and Kerim also have to watch political developments in Ituri in view of the French-led international force. Uganda left behind the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) as a mechanism to end the circle of wars in Ituri. From time to time, Uganda will be consulted on Ituri issues and ESO must provide that answer.
The overall peace process in Congo is still a concern to Uganda. As a former occupying force and a signatory to Lusaka, Luanda and Dar es Salaam agreements, Uganda is still a key partner in the search for peace in Congo.
In all, the new changes reflect emerging threats. Ends