Why personalise the military in our democratisation?
Oct 24, 2002
Ofwono's Option<br><br>LAST month former presidential candidate Dr Kizza Besigye circulated to MPs a document titled “The Military and Prospects for Transition to Democracy in Ugandaâ€.
Ofwono's Option
LAST month former presidential candidate Dr Kizza Besigye circulated to MPs a document titled “The Military and Prospects for Transition to Democracy in Ugandaâ€.
Most likely the write-up, also published in the media, was meant to enlist their support for what Besigye falsely believes is a diversion from the democratic path and institutional building by President Yoweri Museveni.
In his appraisal of the NRA (now UPDF), Besigye removed and exonerated himself from the institution, and characteristically laid all the blame on Museveni as commander-in-chief.
In building institutions like the UPDF, many new tasks and challenges come into play and hence no straight-jacket method can be applied.
While the UPDF has some glaring challenges, it has also done extremely well in defending and preserving Uganda’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, our lives and property are more secure today than before, save for the ever-narrowing area of conflict in the Acholi sub-region.
The debate on restructuring the army is going on as per the NRA statute, spirit, practice and government policies, taking into account regional balance.
Finger pointing by Besigye is uncalled for because it only serves as a quick fix but with potential political disruption.
However, it is crucial that all parties — the Government, the opposition and other critics manage the on-going transition prudently.
Authority is not only transferred from one leader to another but also from one legal regime to another possibly with new sets of rules.
This is what took place with CA elections, the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections all held under democratic and peaceful atmosphere, and on constitutional schedule. Similarly, referendum 2000, and last year’s elections indicated transfer of power from Museveni’s mandate of 1996 to that of 2001-2006, as was from sixth to seventh parliaments.
All Ugandans except Besigye accepted the outcome notwithstanding the shortcomings.
Although the post-colonial army served sectarian interests, in the last 16 years the Movement has dismantled the colonial vestiges in the army and built a new pro-people one. Within limited resources, the UPDF has been able to stop military coups.
The voters too have equally resisted unlawful or rigged acquisition of power through the ballot, and changed leaders through popular will.
Besigye argued that during the 1981-86 bush war, young intellectuals were despised as “soft and cowardly†and the “semi-literates credited as tough and brave fightersâ€. He also says that certain NRA cadres enjoyed benefits far removed from that of the juniors.
This phenomenon is not exclusive to the NRA but applies to all organisations undergoing metamorphosis. Many young intellectuals left good prospects in civilian life to join the NRA and became good commanders contrary to Besigye’s postulation. Elly Tumwine, Jeje Odong, David Tinyefuza, Mugisha Muntu, Ivan Koreta, Matayo Kyaligonza, Jim Muhwezi, Aronda Nyakairima, Kahinda Otafiire, Jet Mwebaze, Pecos Kutesa, Amanya Mushega and Noble Mayombo are such examples. Distinction in rank and file is characteristic of conventional and guerrilla forces as in other professions, and is based on accumulated experience and exposure for the good of the army.
From the start,
the NRA introduced
unit administration
committees consisting
of all officers to deal with proposals to higher levels such as appointments, promotions and administrative matters within. The NRA successes in battle are testimony to the prudent management of the force then. The physical appearance of Museveni and other commanders in January 1986 bears the unmistakable signs of years of hard work and sacrifice.
Besigye says the massive recruitment in the NRA in 1994 coupled with deaths of many former commanders weakened Museveni’s personal control of the army. However, loyalty to the President is based in the Constitution. If officers like Besigye at one time were loyal to Museveni, it is because he was close to them having personally recruited some of them into the guerrilla army.
The claims that absence of regulations led to corruption and abuse of office is untenable because abundant evidence shows that the civil service with the longest traditions and procedure is not free of corruption.
Discrediting officers like Muntu, Odongo, Salim Saleh and Tinyefuza
is uncalled for because Besigye too was promoted from a rudimentary officer to colonel without any professional or command training. His claims that Museveni referred to some officers in derogatory terms constitute
indiscipline and intrigue to cause subversion by drawing suspicion among UPDF personnel. The UPDF operates under an established and known administrative structure. It is duty bound by policy, law and constitution to obey the army commander appointed by the President.
Good officers serve
to the best of their
abilities and not on how their bosses are appointed. In this regard it is Besigye who failed to transform himself
from a civilian to
a professional soldier.
LAST month former presidential candidate Dr Kizza Besigye circulated to MPs a document titled “The Military and Prospects for Transition to Democracy in Ugandaâ€.
Most likely the write-up, also published in the media, was meant to enlist their support for what Besigye falsely believes is a diversion from the democratic path and institutional building by President Yoweri Museveni.
In his appraisal of the NRA (now UPDF), Besigye removed and exonerated himself from the institution, and characteristically laid all the blame on Museveni as commander-in-chief.
In building institutions like the UPDF, many new tasks and challenges come into play and hence no straight-jacket method can be applied.
While the UPDF has some glaring challenges, it has also done extremely well in defending and preserving Uganda’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, our lives and property are more secure today than before, save for the ever-narrowing area of conflict in the Acholi sub-region.
The debate on restructuring the army is going on as per the NRA statute, spirit, practice and government policies, taking into account regional balance.
Finger pointing by Besigye is uncalled for because it only serves as a quick fix but with potential political disruption.
However, it is crucial that all parties — the Government, the opposition and other critics manage the on-going transition prudently.
Authority is not only transferred from one leader to another but also from one legal regime to another possibly with new sets of rules.
This is what took place with CA elections, the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections all held under democratic and peaceful atmosphere, and on constitutional schedule. Similarly, referendum 2000, and last year’s elections indicated transfer of power from Museveni’s mandate of 1996 to that of 2001-2006, as was from sixth to seventh parliaments.
All Ugandans except Besigye accepted the outcome notwithstanding the shortcomings.
Although the post-colonial army served sectarian interests, in the last 16 years the Movement has dismantled the colonial vestiges in the army and built a new pro-people one. Within limited resources, the UPDF has been able to stop military coups.
The voters too have equally resisted unlawful or rigged acquisition of power through the ballot, and changed leaders through popular will.
Besigye argued that during the 1981-86 bush war, young intellectuals were despised as “soft and cowardly†and the “semi-literates credited as tough and brave fightersâ€. He also says that certain NRA cadres enjoyed benefits far removed from that of the juniors.
This phenomenon is not exclusive to the NRA but applies to all organisations undergoing metamorphosis. Many young intellectuals left good prospects in civilian life to join the NRA and became good commanders contrary to Besigye’s postulation. Elly Tumwine, Jeje Odong, David Tinyefuza, Mugisha Muntu, Ivan Koreta, Matayo Kyaligonza, Jim Muhwezi, Aronda Nyakairima, Kahinda Otafiire, Jet Mwebaze, Pecos Kutesa, Amanya Mushega and Noble Mayombo are such examples. Distinction in rank and file is characteristic of conventional and guerrilla forces as in other professions, and is based on accumulated experience and exposure for the good of the army.
From the start,
the NRA introduced
unit administration
committees consisting
of all officers to deal with proposals to higher levels such as appointments, promotions and administrative matters within. The NRA successes in battle are testimony to the prudent management of the force then. The physical appearance of Museveni and other commanders in January 1986 bears the unmistakable signs of years of hard work and sacrifice.
Besigye says the massive recruitment in the NRA in 1994 coupled with deaths of many former commanders weakened Museveni’s personal control of the army. However, loyalty to the President is based in the Constitution. If officers like Besigye at one time were loyal to Museveni, it is because he was close to them having personally recruited some of them into the guerrilla army.
The claims that absence of regulations led to corruption and abuse of office is untenable because abundant evidence shows that the civil service with the longest traditions and procedure is not free of corruption.
Discrediting officers like Muntu, Odongo, Salim Saleh and Tinyefuza
is uncalled for because Besigye too was promoted from a rudimentary officer to colonel without any professional or command training. His claims that Museveni referred to some officers in derogatory terms constitute
indiscipline and intrigue to cause subversion by drawing suspicion among UPDF personnel. The UPDF operates under an established and known administrative structure. It is duty bound by policy, law and constitution to obey the army commander appointed by the President.
Good officers serve
to the best of their
abilities and not on how their bosses are appointed. In this regard it is Besigye who failed to transform himself
from a civilian to
a professional soldier.