Hope In Operation Iron Fist
Dec 10, 2002
IN his address to Parliament on November 21, President Yoweri Museveni drew an analogy between the hunt of the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) in the Rwenzori Mountains and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north, to project a more optimistic situat
By Ibra Asuman Bisiika
IN his address to Parliament on November 21, President Yoweri Museveni drew an analogy between the hunt of the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) in the Rwenzori Mountains and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north, to project a more optimistic situation in which the LRA rebellion in the north will be defeated.
Although some people have said that the war against the ADF rebellion was
successively fought because it was in President Museveni’s backyard in Western Uganda, there are some tactical and strategic aspects of the ADF war
that favoured the Uganda Patriotic Defence Force (UPDF).
On November 13 1996, the ADF invaded Uganda from the Democratic Republic of Congo (then known as Zaire), overrun Mpondwe Border Post and infiltrated parts of Kasese District.
According to intelligence information at that time, the rebels’ objective was to take Mbarara. It can therefore be deduced that the initial overall strategy of the ADF rebels was aimed at holding territory and consequently a conventional war show down with the UPDF; of course with supplies from the DRC.
However, with UPDF’s superior fire power and the rebel support from Kasese not forthcoming, this showdown did not last long. By mid January 1997,
when President Museveni visited the frontline, the UPDF had pushed the bulk of the rebels back to the DRC.
From a tactical perspective, the UPDF’s repulsion of the first wave of the
invasion weakened the ADF morally and materially. The rebels were shocked by
UPDF’s steadfastness and the Kasese’s disapproval of rebellion.
ADF’s support from Congo became tenuous when rebels fighting the Mobutu regime (with Uganda’s support) invaded Eastern Congo where the ADF had its rear bases.
Quite different from the scenario in Kasese, the LRA, even during the time
of its predecessor organisations like UPDA, Alice Lakwena’s Holy Ghost
Movement, has strategically avoided the holding of territory thereby denying the UPDF an opportunity to exercise its superior fire power conventionally.
The UPDF maximally used the advantages of the above scenario in Kasese to
beat the ADF. The LRA has never given the UPDF an opportunity for a face-off. The LRA rebels have consistently maintained a strategy of hit-and-run and a systematic visitation of a regime of terror on the civilian population in their areas of operation.
Whereas ADF’s initial invasion was made with the moral and material assistance from a foreign state or states, the LRA and its predecessor rebel groups heavily drew on local resources — mostly popular political discontent in the Acholi
Let us face it, this discontent still exists up to now. The war in the north was not started by Joseph Kony, but by professional soldiers, respected political leaders and intellectuals from the North. Therefore, this discontent to the NRM regime should not be undermined.
Nevertheless, there is hope for Operation Iron Fist. By August 2, 1998, when the governments of Rwanda and Uganda showed open hostility to the late President Laurent Kabila’s regime in Kinshasa by supporting dissenting Congolese troops, the ADF’s capacity to wage a serious war had been seriously reduced.
In spite of some operational mistakes, Operation Safe Haven (the operation under which UPDF was deployed in Eastern DR Congo) was a success.
With their rear bases in Eastern Congo overrun by the UPDF, the ADF came back to Uganda and extensively operated in Bundibugyo in 1999. This is quite the same operational scenario obtaining in the north where the LRA rebels recently returned to Uganda when their bases in the Sudan were overrun by the UPDF. Ends
IN his address to Parliament on November 21, President Yoweri Museveni drew an analogy between the hunt of the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) in the Rwenzori Mountains and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north, to project a more optimistic situation in which the LRA rebellion in the north will be defeated.
Although some people have said that the war against the ADF rebellion was
successively fought because it was in President Museveni’s backyard in Western Uganda, there are some tactical and strategic aspects of the ADF war
that favoured the Uganda Patriotic Defence Force (UPDF).
On November 13 1996, the ADF invaded Uganda from the Democratic Republic of Congo (then known as Zaire), overrun Mpondwe Border Post and infiltrated parts of Kasese District.
According to intelligence information at that time, the rebels’ objective was to take Mbarara. It can therefore be deduced that the initial overall strategy of the ADF rebels was aimed at holding territory and consequently a conventional war show down with the UPDF; of course with supplies from the DRC.
However, with UPDF’s superior fire power and the rebel support from Kasese not forthcoming, this showdown did not last long. By mid January 1997,
when President Museveni visited the frontline, the UPDF had pushed the bulk of the rebels back to the DRC.
From a tactical perspective, the UPDF’s repulsion of the first wave of the
invasion weakened the ADF morally and materially. The rebels were shocked by
UPDF’s steadfastness and the Kasese’s disapproval of rebellion.
ADF’s support from Congo became tenuous when rebels fighting the Mobutu regime (with Uganda’s support) invaded Eastern Congo where the ADF had its rear bases.
Quite different from the scenario in Kasese, the LRA, even during the time
of its predecessor organisations like UPDA, Alice Lakwena’s Holy Ghost
Movement, has strategically avoided the holding of territory thereby denying the UPDF an opportunity to exercise its superior fire power conventionally.
The UPDF maximally used the advantages of the above scenario in Kasese to
beat the ADF. The LRA has never given the UPDF an opportunity for a face-off. The LRA rebels have consistently maintained a strategy of hit-and-run and a systematic visitation of a regime of terror on the civilian population in their areas of operation.
Whereas ADF’s initial invasion was made with the moral and material assistance from a foreign state or states, the LRA and its predecessor rebel groups heavily drew on local resources — mostly popular political discontent in the Acholi
Let us face it, this discontent still exists up to now. The war in the north was not started by Joseph Kony, but by professional soldiers, respected political leaders and intellectuals from the North. Therefore, this discontent to the NRM regime should not be undermined.
Nevertheless, there is hope for Operation Iron Fist. By August 2, 1998, when the governments of Rwanda and Uganda showed open hostility to the late President Laurent Kabila’s regime in Kinshasa by supporting dissenting Congolese troops, the ADF’s capacity to wage a serious war had been seriously reduced.
In spite of some operational mistakes, Operation Safe Haven (the operation under which UPDF was deployed in Eastern DR Congo) was a success.
With their rear bases in Eastern Congo overrun by the UPDF, the ADF came back to Uganda and extensively operated in Bundibugyo in 1999. This is quite the same operational scenario obtaining in the north where the LRA rebels recently returned to Uganda when their bases in the Sudan were overrun by the UPDF. Ends